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Owen Lattimore and the P o l i t i c a l Geography of Asia 
Master of Arts, O r i e n t a l Studies 
U n i v e r s i t y of Durham, 1987 
ABSTRACT: 
Owen Lattimore's e a r l i e s t i n t e r e s t was i n trade and c o l o n i s a t i o n i n the 
f r o n t i e r regions of China. This i n t e r e s t l e d him t o work on the h i s t o r y 
and contemporary c o n d i t i o n of the nomadic f r o n t i e r peoples, e s p e c i a l l y 
the Mongols, Lattimore r e j e c t i n g the environmental determinism of 
E l l s w o r t h Huntington and Arnold Toynbee i n favour of a d e p i c t i o n of 
pa s t o r a l nomadism which stressed the r o l e i n i t s e v o l u t i o n of choice and 
i n v e n t i o n w i t h i n geographical parameters. Under the influence of the 
ideas of Oswald Spengler, and concerned vdth the d i f f i c u l t predicament 
of the Mongols, Lattiraore became convinced of the i n a b i l i t y of e i t h e r 
Mongol or Chinese c i v i l i s a t i o n t o survive without fundamental s o c i a l 
renovation. I n h i s h i s t o r i c a l work on nomadic-Chinese i n t e r a c t i o n s he 
stre.ssed the lack of i n t e g r a t i o n between these peoples, r e l y i n g l a r g e l y 
upon the ideas of Karl V i t t f o g e l f o r h i s account of the c y c l i c nature of 
the h i s t o r y of t r a d i t i o n a l China. During the Second World War 
Lattimore's appointment as adviser t o Chiang Kai-shek led him t o 
contemplate both the l i k e l y course of reform i n China, and the f u t u r e 
r o l e of the United States i n Asia. D i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h Chiang by 1947, 
Lattimore grew i n c r e a s i n g l y c r i t i c a l of US f a i l u r e t o adjust p o l i c y t o 
recognise the r i s e of na t i o n a l i s m i n Asia and the emergence there and 
elsevi^here of a " T h i r d World" of nations outside the tv/o i d e o l o g i c a l 
blocks. A f t e r the ordeal imposed upon him as a r e s u l t of Senator 
McCarthy's charges t h a t he had been a Soviet spy, Lattimore returned t o 
work on the h i s t o r y of world f r o n t i e r s , and on China and Mongolia. He 
now regarded the communists as having c a r r i e d through the r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
changes i n China t h a t the Kuomintang had evaded; from 1962 he came t o 
i d e n t i f y the n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s of the Mongol people with the 
Mongolian People's Republic, the p o l i c i e s of which could no longer be 
understood as those of a Soviet " s a t e l l i t e " . Throughout h i s career h i s 
attachment t o the Mongols has been the c h i e f influence on h i s work. 
Preface 
Although the scholarly preference now i s to employ the plnyin system of 
t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n i n reference to Chinese place and personal names, as many of 
Lattimore's work's are quoted using the earl i e r Wade-Giles system (sometimes 
with modifications) or local names then i n currency these have been used 
throughout t h i s text. However the plnyin equivalent has been added i n 
parenthesis the f i r s t time a p a r t i c u l a r place or name occurs, and i f the place 
i s now known by a d i f f e r e n t name i t i s that name which i s appended - thus, 
Kansu (Gansu); Ku Ch'eng-tze (Qi t a i ) , In the case of Mongol names, for the same 
reason the e a r l i e r t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n system i-s generally employed (thus: 
Sukebator) except i n cases where the most common usage encountered has been 
an al t e r n a t i v e or l a t e r system (thus: Natsagdorj). Alternative t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n s 
are s i m i l a r l y appended, though i n the case of mediaeval names there has been 
no systematic attempt to employ the most rigorous scholarly orthography (thus, 
Chinggis Khan rather than "Cinggis Qan"). 
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In-ti-ociuo-b±on 
As a h i s t o r i c a l figure Owen Lattimore i s best known for the part he 
played, a l b e i t u n w i l l i n g l y , i n the b r i e f but prominent national career of 
Senator Joseph McCarthy i n American p o l i t i c s . The involvement of Lattimore and 
State Department China s p e c i a l i s t s including John S. Service, John Carter 
Vincent, and 0. Edmund Clubb i n the r i s e of t h i s unsavoury and opportunistic 
p o l i t i c i a n could well be considered as one of the great puzzles of modern 
American p o l i t i c s . McCarthy's charges prompted a search f o r those spies and 
t r a i t o r s who had allegedly manipulated American policy so as to deliver China 
t o the communists. Though careers were ruined (an,d the course of much 
subsequent US pol i c y i n Asia transformed as a r e s u l t ) none such could be 
found, and the focus of inquiry s h i f t e d t o the academic community. I t was now 
asserted that pro-communist values had been insinuated i n t o the policy debate 
i n the 1940s by communists and t h e i r sympathisers posing as scholarly 
commentators. Once again Lattimore became a key figure, t h i s time as an 
i n f l u e n t i a l member of the I n s t i t u t e of Pacific Relations and former editor of 
i t s journal. Pacific A f f a i r s . 
This major episode i n American p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y has received detailed 
scholarly treatment. Even at the time the extensive documentation made 
available as much as media and public attention generated many studies and 
commentaries, Lattimore himself o f f e r i n g an expose of McCarthy's methods i n 
Ordeal by Slander. Materials obtained more recently with the new ac c e s s i b i l i t y 
of US government records (including Lattimore's heretofore confidential FBI 
f i l e ) have f a c i l i t a t e d a reexamination of past interpretations. 
As an attempt to present the f i r s t f u l l i n t e l l e c t u a l biography of Owen 
Lattimore t h i s study includes a consideration of t h i s phase of his l i f e . ( l ) I t 
i s apparent t h a t i t had a major impact, not merely on Lattimore's academic and 
public career, but also on his thinking. The approach taken, however, w i l l be 
to regard t h i s episode as a less than f u l l y enlightening phase i n a long 
process of i n t e l l e c t u a l evolution, much of which i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e with 
reference t o biographical and i n t e l l e c t u a l developments i n the 1930s. Although 
Lattimore was repeatedly cross-examined by members of two Senate committees 
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as to his views and commitments i n these years and lat e r , his interrogators 
were preoccupied by the l i k e l y impact of his answers on contemporary p o l i t i c a l 
debate. Few had any real knowledge of China l e t alone Mongolia, whereas i t w i l l 
be argued here that by about 1934 or 1935 Lattimore had developed an 
emotional and i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with Mongol nationalism which has 
remained a dominant influence on a l l his subsequent a c t i v i t y . Indeed, i t would 
not be too f a r fetched to compare his commitment to the Mongols with that of 
T.E. Lawrence to the Arabs. This commitment has been both a strength and a 
weakness i n his work since i t has afforded him insights into the world view 
of and pressures upon a poorly understood people while i t has also provided 
him with an often inappropriate yardstick by which to judge other peoples and 
situa t i o n s . 
I t i s necessary, therefore, t o begin the story i n the late 1920s and to 
follow c a r e f u l l y Lattimore's various attempts to organise and comprehend his 
experiences as he t r a v e l l e d i n a period of change and upheaval i n the f r o n t i e r 
regions of China. Having t e n t a t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d these organising ideas t h i s 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n can be tested by tr a c i n g t h e i r influence i n his subsequent work, 
from his w r i t i n g s on foreign policy i n the 1940s to his later and more diverse 
work on topics ranging from Mongol c i v i l i s a t i o n to the role of f r o n t i e r s i n 
world h i s t o r y . I t w i l l be shown that at d i f f e r e n t times Lattimore has been an 
i n f l u e n t i a l figure and something of an i n t e l l e c t u a l pioneer. 
As t h i s study aims to be both c r i t i c a l as well as h i s t o r i c a l some 
assessment w i l l be offered on the coherence of his ideas and on the extent to 
which he has made a l a s t i n g contribution to scholarship. In the long term 
Lattimore's greatest achievement i s l i k e l y to be seen as the central hypotheses 
of his great synthesising h i s t o r i c a l geography of the Chinese periphery. Inner 
Asian F r o n t i e r s of China. But the vocabulary of modern p o l i t i c s w i l l be long 
indebted t o Lattimore since he seems to have been the f i r s t to use the term 
" s a t e l l i t e " t o connote a p o l i t i c a l and ideological dependent state, and one of 
the f i r s t t o re f e r i n the post-war world to the emergence of a "Third World" 
of nations. 
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TOTES: Introduction 
(1) For a b r i e f outline of Lattimore's biography, see: John G, Hangin and 
Urgunge Onon, "Professor Owen Lattimore - A Biographical Sketch", The 
Mongolia Society. Occasional Papers 8(1972), 7-9. Lattimore himself offers 
some autobiographical remarks i n : "Preface", Studies i n Frontier History. 
Collected Papers 1928-58 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 11-31. 
Owen Lattimore and Asia P^ S^  
The China of Owen Lattimore's e a r l i e r years was a country i n p o l i t i c a l , 
economic, and social f l u x , The collapse of the imperial system i n 1911 had 
led to the complete erosion of central authority. At the beginning of the 
1920s China was divided between cliques of contending warlords the c o n f l i c t 
between v/hom disrupted trade and engendered widespread social misery. After 
1923 the growing power of the Kuomintang (Guomindang) and t h e i r new communist 
a l l i e s i n the south threatened a wider c o n f l i c t since with Soviet aid Sun Yat-
sen (Sun Zhongshan) had pledged himself to the reun i f i c a t i o n of his country 
by means of a m i l i t a r y Northern Expedition. On the economic f r o n t the old 
Western dominance was fading with the r i s e of Japan whose trading position 
greatly expanded during the F i r s t World War when European economic energies 
were otherwise absorbed. At the same time the growing world market system 
was drav/ing even the most f a r flung areas i n t o i t s embrace. The old e l i t e of 
landlord and gentry families acquired new economic roles, or were displaced by 
compradores and merchants prepared t o adapt to the requirements of the times, 
A nev/ Chinese self-assertiveness a f t e r the May Fourth movement of 1919 
fur t h e r portended an end to the era when foreigners and foreign enterprises i n 
China could necessarily expect the privileges and protection due to them under 
the unequal t r e a t i e s of the nineteenth century. 
I t i s evident t h a t Lattimore was more aware of the profound changes 
underway i n China than many of his contemporaries. As he later recalled, 
doing business i n the i n t e r i o r , far from the treaty ports where Western power 
was s t i l l concentrated, forced him to deal d i r e c t l y v/ith the consequences of 
the breakdown of the old economic and p o l i t i c a l relations, (1) His employment 
also brought him i n t o contact, a l b e i t i n d i r e c t l y , with those f r o n t i e r areas of 
China by then drawn i n t o commercial rel a t i o n s through merchant intermediaries 
with the world economy, This chapter w i l l deal with Lattimore's f i r s t 
explorations of the northeastern and northwestern f r o n t i e r s of China, While i t 
i s clear t h a t he was from the f i r s t taken with the an t i q u i t y of f r o n t i e r trade 
he was also well aware of i t s contemporary significance, and soon came to be 
especially preoccupied with the impact of trading and of colonisation on the 
peoples of these regions. 
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Travel, Trade Sautes and Geopolitics 
Lattimore spent most of his infancy i n Jforth China v/ith his parents, his 
father being a mission educator i n Pao-ting (Baoding). Returning to China 
a f t e r schooling i n Switzerland and England, Lattimore worked f i r s t f or the 
Peking-Tientsin Times (edited by H.G.W. Woodhead) before jo i n i n g the trading 
f i r m of Arnhold 8s Co, Unhappy with the s u p e r f i c i a l l i f e of the Treaty Ports 
he sought to develop a better understanding of China by study of the language, 
proficiency i n v/hich led him to conduct business f o r the f i r m i n the 
provinces. For one from his youth fascinated by hi s t o r y (at school he wrote 
much epic poetry on h i s t o r i c a l themes(2)) a t r i p to Kuei-hua (Hohhot) and Pao-
t'ou (Baotou) i n 1925(3) t o negotiate the release of a trainload of wool caught 
between the forces of contending viarlords v;as to prove, as he later expressed 
i t , a "turning point". (4) Arnhold & Co. were at the time major dealers i n 
commodities ranging from fleeces and camel hair to dried egg powder, t h e i r 
buyers obtaining these goods from merchants trading with f r o n t i e r regions 
including the northv/est and Mongolia. Thus began f o r Lattimore a 
preoccupation with the connection between China and the i n t e r i o r . 
To study the o r i g i n s and conditions of the trade from Sinkiang (Xinjiang) 
to Kuei-hua Lattimore embarked on the northern or desert trading route from 
Kuei-hua to Ku Ch'eng-tze (Qitai) t r a v e l l i n g f o r more than four months by 
camel to complete the journey i n January 1927. This route was chosen p a r t l y 
because of i t s novelty from the point of viev/ of exploration but also because 
the more northerly "great" road was blocked by independent Mongolia, and that 
through Kansu (Gansu) by c i v i l war and unrest. From t h i s expedition several 
publications resulted including his e a r l i e s t book The Desert Road to Turkestan 
(1928). Although Lattimore has since c r i t i c i s e d the work f o r i t s immaturity 
and condescension, by the standards of the time i t i s both l i v e l y and 
perceptive. He touched on areas traversed by Younghusband, Stein and various 
Russian explorers (including Prejevalsky) (5) but he was the f i r s t to cover the 
entire route. Moreover i t was the manner of his t r a v e l l i n g , attaching himself 
to t r a d i n g caravans, and the fact that he v/as fluent i n the language and even 
the d i a l e c t of the caravan men which was to give him insights missed by 
individuals more concerned with geography than the beliefs and mores of 
traders and the people with whom they had contact. 
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From the v/ritings of t h i s time several themes stand out, Although he had 
steeped himself i n the w r i t i n g s of the great t r a v e l l e r s he had read l i t t l e that 
could be described as more theoretical v;ith the exception of the available 
works of Ellsworth Huntington. Consequently t h i s author's Pulse of Asia, a 
v/ork then very much i n vogue (and employed i n Toynbee's 1934 account of the 
achievement and predicament of nomads), i s often alluded t o ( 5 ) , and i s the 
foundation f o r Lattimora's discussions of cl i m a t i c desiccation and pulsation as 
the root cause of the nomadic h i s t o r i c a l cycle: 
"A very s l i g h t c l i m a t i c v a r i a t i o n i s enough to upset the economy of 
people vfho depend on the grazing t o be found f o r t h e i r c a t t l e ; i t i s 
known that there have been such variations i n Central Asia on the 
edge of our h i s t o r i c a l period, and i t i s arguable that most of the 
migratory wars of the barbaric hordes originated i n the necessity 
so caused of f i n d i n g new pastures."(7) 
In the case of the Mongols t h i s nomad cycle v^ as brought to an end by the 
introduction of the " a r t i f i c i a l measure" of lama Buddhism which enervated the 
race and drained the society of i t s wealth, (8) But Lattimore was also 
absorbed by the geography of the Great Wall f r o n t i e r , the relationship between 
the geography and the h i s t o r y of the area, and the mechanics, lore and 
determinants of trade and trading routes. And i t i s clear also that the 
parlous condition of the Mongols as a people Lattimore found both moving and 
also a puzzle. I t i s apparent that t h i s experience i s at the root of his 
l i f e l o n g quest to understand the mainsprings of the nomadic way of l i f e , and 
to elucidate the relationship between nomads and the sedentary c i v i l i z a t i o n s of 
the oases and China w i t h i n the Great Wall, 
In Desert Road t o Turkestan the Mongols are described as a race who have 
come to a "stand s t i l l " i f they are not actually "dying". Lattimore contrasts 
the p o t e n t i a l of the nomads v/ith the narrow and squalid l i f e of the Chinese 
f r o n t i e r peasantry who are displacing them,(9) although he i s also aware that 
the continuing encroachment of Chinese on Mongol lands though often organised 
by f r o n t i e r o f f i c i a l s i s only passible with the connivance of the Mongol 
n o b i l i t y who s e l l such t i t l e s as they possess to t h e i r lands at the cost of 
the future of t h e i r people. Weakened i n t h e i r own habitat the Mongols have 
become pawns i n the struggle between China, Russia and Japan, As Lattiraore 
explains i n a popular a r t i c l e of the time, the Russians have used Buryats to 
Page 5 Owen Lattimore and Asia 
The Development of a Frontier Perspective/1 
win over the Mongols who may yet with Russian encouragement detach Mongol 
inhabited areas of the nev/ly established Nanking (Nanjing) Republic from 
China. (10) Indeed, at t h i s time Lattimore was inclined to see Russian 
machinations i n other areas of Inner Asia, notably Tibet, (11) and growing 
Russian influence i s one of the themes of his next group of w r i t i n g s which are 
devoted t o the condition and prospects of Sinkiang. 
His wife having joined him (after a series of f r u s t r a t i o n s and 
adventures) on the Soviet border at Chuguchak (Tacheng, Qoqek) Lattimore 
t r a v e l l e d i n Sinkiang f o r most of 1927, v i s i t i n g Turfan (Turpan) and Kulja 
(Yining, Gulja) before crossing i n t o Ladakh i n B r i t i s h India through the 
Karakoram pass. He then t r a v e l l e d to the United States, by way of I t a l y and 
B r i t a i n w r i t i n g High Tartary (published i n 1930) and several attendant pieces. 
There v/as already an extensive l i t e r a t u r e on Chinese and Russian Central Asia, 
and the geographical influences upon i t s h i s t o r y had recently been the subject 
of two lectures published by Sir Aurel Stein. (12) Lattimore r e s t r i c t e d 
himself, therefore, to fu r t h e r explorations of some of the themes broached in 
Desert Road to Turkestan, but he did develop an analysis of the domination, 
precarious as i t was, of Sinkiang by the Chinese, and the l i k e l y future role of 
Soviet Russia i n t h i s domination. 
The influence of Huntington was s t i l l apparent i n his treatment of 
migration and nomad conquest,(13) and Lattimore offers some remarks on the 
influence of geography on trade and on relations between the oasis and steppe 
peoples north and south of the Tien Shan (Tian Shan) i n High Tartary. In an 
a r t i c l e published i n 1928 on p o l i t i c a l conditions i n t h i s area Lattimore 
develops a perceptive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the strategy and consequences of 
Chinese rule. Whereas Chinese rule i n Mongolia was inept and served chiefly 
to undermine the prosperity of the inhabitants t h e i r conduct i n Sinkiang, 
which had been assisted by the presence of capable and energetic rulers has 
done much to improve the material condition of the subject peoples i n a region 
where the proportion of Han Chinese, soldiers, traders and administrators 
al i k e , was alv/ays small.(14) The p o l i t i c a l strategy employed has been to keep 
Turki (Uygur), Kazaks, T'ung-kan (Hui) and Mongols apart, and to accept the 
several paper currencies which exist i n the province, the administration only 
taking such revenue as w i l l keep the l o y a l t y of i t s functionaries. The price 
of t h i s domination however has been considerable. Sealing Sinkiang from 
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contact v/ith the rest of China has kept the currencies stable, prevented 
exactions from central government, and avoided expensive and f r u i t l e s s 
entanglements i n warlord c o n f l i c t , but the consequence has been increasingly to 
draw the dominion into closer economic contact with Soviet Central Asia, 
contact f a c i l i t a t e d p a r t i c u l a r l y by railway building. Thus enters the 
"geopolitical" theme of these writ i n g s , given further expression i n an a r t i c l e 
on Chinese Turkestan v/ritten a l i t t l e l a t e r (but published i n 1933) and 
bemoaned by t h e i r author when w r i t i n g h i s retrospective comments i n 1973, 
Although he now doubts that at that time he was even f a m i l i a r with the 
term "geopolitics" (15) Lattimore adopts the view i n the late 1920s that 
c o n f l i c t between a now revi v i n g China and a resurgent Soviet Russia i s bound 
to occur. Referring c l e a r l y to the establishing of the Nanking regime 
Lattimore believes t h a t great changes have already "broken down a l l the old 
socia l standards and p o l i t i c a l forms i n China", and that portends an "outward" 
surge which w i l l bear upon a l l the f r o n t i e r s of China and which must "meet the 
th r u s t of the expanding Russian people"; 
"Frontiers that are now ,.. nothing but vague swaths of country w i l l 
... have to be narrowly defined. Already a thrust and counterthrust 
i s bearing on them (as i n Manchuria and Mongolia), I t i s a play of 
primal forces, f a r more s i g n i f i c a n t than s u p e r f i c i a l considerations 
of politics."(16) 
The geography of the f r o n t i e r regions has thus not become, he adds, obsolete 
since " l i k e causes ,,. produce l i k e results." Although Sinkiang i s f a l l i n g 
w i t h i n the Soviet economic o r b i t the Chinese have made i t clear when they have 
been given an opportunity that they seek "domination ,., over every race that 
comes w i t h i n the scope of Chinese action".(17) Undermined economically and 
l i k e l y to be subverted by the new Chinese resurgence the old order i n Sinkiang 
i s bound t o crumble. 
In the la t e r a r t i c l e on Chinese Turkestan there i s some development of 
Lattimore's position, There are signs that he i s not so persuaded of the value 
of Huntington's environmental approach; (18) moreover Lattimore has begun to 
pay considerable att e n t i o n to the views of the f r o n t i e r inhabitants themselves. 
I t has been t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l fate to "face" China, consequently t h e i r history 
has been h i t h e r t o determined from that quarter, being "an alternation of 
advance and retreat". They cannot be expected to play an active part i n a 
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coming Chinese expansion since t h i s would require them to partake i n an alien 
s t y l e of l i f e , and one which i s increasingly to be seen as i n f e r i o r to that 
enjoyed by peoples s i m i l a r to themselves i n Soviet Central Asia. I f the 
Chinese continue t o adopt S i n i f i c a t i o n as t h e i r chief f r o n t i e r policy when the 
old order has been f i n a l l y sv/ept aside i t i s to Russia that the people of 
Sinkiang are l i k e l y to turn given that many of them see China now as a 
c i v i l i z a t i o n "crumbling inward on i t s own center." (19) 
The next f i v e years were to see changes i n Lattimore's career almost as 
momentous as those wrought by his t r i p to Pao-t'ou i n 1925. Completing the 
cycle of w r i t i n g s v/hich derived from his expeditions of 1926 and 1927 he 
began t o develop strong connections with the academic world. Writing and 
personal experience led him to seek a more intimate knowledge of the Mongols 
and t h e i r language, and i n 1933 began his connection with the I n s t i t u t e of 
Pacific Relations, a connection vrhich would enhance his scholarly standing but 
would be used by others t o undermine his career and reputation. 
Manchuria and the Struggle of Civilizations 
Returning to the United States Lattimore v/as fortunate, despite his lack 
of formal academic q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , to secure Social Science Research Council 
support f o r work on Manchuria, Whilst his greatest interest was i n Chinese 
colonisation, Japanese a c t i v i t y i n the region gave the intended research great 
t o p i c a l i t y . The Japanese already controlled the s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l South 
Manchuria Railway, and from t h e i r base at Lii-shun (Lushun, Port Arthur) were 
progressively extending t h e i r economic control of the region. In 1928 t h e i r 
endeavours to dominate Manchuria received a setback with the decision of the 
local warlord, Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang), to throw i n his l o t with the 
now successful Kuomintang Northern Expedition af t e r his father had been k i l l e d 
i n an incident perpetrated by the local Japanese m i l i t a r y . Chang's decision 
v/as ultimately to p r e c i p i t a t e the "Mukden Incident" of September 1931 which 
v/as engineered as the pretext f o r the occupation of the region by the Japanese 
Kwantung Army. 
In order the better t o prepare f o r the t r a v e l i n Manchuria that he 
proposed Lattimore spent the academic year of 1928-29 working i n the graduate 
d i v i s i o n of the Harvard University department of anthropology. In 1930 
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Lattimore and his v/ife t r a v e l l e d extensively i n Manchuria, completing 
Manchuria, c r a d l e of c p n f l i c t s h o r t l y a f t e r the annexation of the region by the 
Japanese. A revised version of the book with two additional chapters 
considering the events of 1931, and the creation there i n 1933 of the Japanese 
puppet state of Manchukuo, was published i n 1935. 
Manchuria i s Lattimore's f i r s t attempt at sustained scholarly w r i t i n g , 
Although he i s c r i t i c a l , i n his retrospective assessment of the book, (20) he 
does o f f e r some extremely perceptive analyses of aspects of the recent history 
of the region and he develops further his conception of the f r o n t i e r and i t s 
h i s t o r i c a l role. Indeed, i t i s best to consider the work as one on two levels, 
the f i r s t concerned with these more detailed analyses of h i s t o r i c a l and 
contemporary topics, the second with the altogether more "portentous" (though 
sometimes i n s i g h t f u l ) struggle of powers and c i v i l i z a t i o n s . 
In the h i s t o r y of Manchuria Lattimore detects "a well-defined h i s t o r i c a l 
process", (21) an al t e r n a t i o n of barbarian invasions of China followed by 
Chinese attempts t o extend t h e i r authority i n t o barbarian t e r r i t o r i e s , usually 
upon the overthrow of a conquest dynasty that has been enervated by 
S i n i f i c a t i o n . When barbarian dynasties from beyond the Great Wall control 
China, the northern f r o n t i e r , which i s a zone rather than a fixed line, 
constitutes a "reservoir", supplying o f f i c i a l s as well as troops f or the 
service of t h e i r kindred at the centre from whom they derive much i n the way 
of rewards and honours, w h i l s t protecting the rear of the state against those 
tribesmen f a r t h e r o f f who did not par t i c i p a t e i n the creation of the dynasty. 
The performing of the l a t t e r function i s confirmed by the presence of 
defensive walls f a r beyond the line of the Great Wall, the purpose of which 
was t o protect the reservoir i t s e l f against northerly invasion. Although 
Lattimore c l e a r l y has i n mind Manchu practice, (22) the remnants of which were 
s t i l l t o be seen i n his day in the form of the Banner (.Meng) t r i b e s of Inner 
Mongolia, he extends h i s analysis back to the fourth century. Thus the 
relat i o n s h i p between China and the f r o n t i e r that persisted u n t i l the 1880s i n 
the Manchu (Manzhou) Ch'ing (Qing) Empire can also be seen i n the Wei, the 
early T'ang (Tang), the Liao, the Chin (Jin) and the Mongol Yuan dynasties. I t 
follows, argues Lattimore, that the reservoir region should be regarded "as the 
key to the sovereignty of North China - often of a l l China." (23) Here we f i n d 
a succinct statement of that theme that i s henceforth to dominate much of 
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Lattimore's h i s t o r i c a l v/riting, though he also believes i t i s an insight that 
may be applied to the present. 
The h i s t o r y and mechanics of Chinese colonisation i n the area are the 
subject of a careful analysis which continues t o stand the t e s t of time. (24) 
With the destruction of the old reservoir system the t h i n l y inhabited f r o n t i e r 
became f o r the Ch'ing dynasty not a strength but a weakness, since by the 
1880s only a peopling of the area along conventional Chinese lines came to be 
seen as the most ef f e c t i v e check on Russian designs. Railways caused 
colonisation to take on a new form, permitting the rapid movement of colonists 
through intervening areas and putting newly opened areas into contact with a 
market denied to f r o n t i e r c u l t i v a t o r s whose only transport was the cart. 
Lattimore shows that i n some more remote parts of Manchuria the c u l t i v a t i o n of 
opium has provided as much of a stimulus to settlement as the discovery of 
gold i n America and Australia. But much of Manchuria has never been v i r g i n 
t e r r i t o r y and thus settlement has only been possible a f t e r the absorption or 
displacement of the o r i g i n a l inhabitants. 
Beyond the Chinese pale Manchuria may roughly be divided, argues 
Lattimore, into two regions. An easterly zone, much of i t of forest, was 
occupied o r i g i n a l l y by Manchu and Tungus who engaged i n both hunting and 
herding supplemented by agriculture. In the v/est and north-west t h i s zone 
shades over i n t o a habitat akin to t h a t found i n Inner Mongolia peopled i n the 
main by Mongols p r a c t i s i n g pastoral nomadism and organised, since the Ch'ing 
period, f o r the most part i n Banners under hereditary princes and nobles. 
Lattimore contrasts the means by which the two zones have been or are being 
absorbed i n the march of Chinese settlement. (25) In the Manchu regions much 
squatting had already taken place and since there was a general understanding 
here that the land was held by the state i t was a r e l a t i v e l y easy matter to 
turn the land over either to an owner who would negotiate with the squatters 
or who, i n fa r t h e r flung areas, would bring i n colonists himself. A l l such 
transactions were arranged by local o f f i c i a l s who stood to gain in the f i r s t 
instance by arrangement with the new owners and thereafter because of the 
increased taxation to be levied on newly s e t t l e d land. Many " t r i b a l " areas 
were thus absorbed, a singular example of which Lattimore found i n the case of 
the Goldi or "Fishkin Tatars" of the lower Sungarl (Songhua) r i v e r , a people 
who were also the subject of a separate anthropological study published i n 
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1933,(26) Having the status of Bannermen and known as "New Manchus" the 
Goldi who were already a non-nomadic people l i v i n g i n scattered villages by 
f i s h i n g and hunting, were given t i t l e to t h e i r lands by the Manchu government 
a f t e r the opening of the r i v e r to steamer t r a f f i c i n 1904, Already much 
attached t o Chinese wares and ways the Goldi were no match f o r the Chinese 
v/ho r a p i d l y came in t o possession of most of t h e i r lands. Lattimore reports 
that the Goldi have been reduced to the status of a depressed class though 
there i s l i t t l e animosity between the two peoples, and much intermarriage 
between Chinese men and local women. 
The process and consequences of colonisation i n Mongol areas are both 
very d i f f e r e n t . Land has passed from public to private ownership and has then 
been subjected to conventional forms of administration but only by ignoring 
Mongol t r a d i t i o n and practice. Mobility was as great a value i n the Mongol 
way of l i f e as permanent occupation or t i l l a g e of any s i t e was repugnant, 
Manchu elevation of the Mongol n o b i l i t y and sponsorship of the lama Buddhist 
clergy and t h e i r establishments effected inroads into that way of l i f e , but to 
t r e a t the princes and the church as the actual and personal owners of Mongol 
land was a gross v i o l a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n . This has been the mechanism by 
which individuals or land or grain companies, abetted by o f f i c i a l s and railway 
intere s t s , have come i n t o possession of many areas i n Manchuria hitherto the 
exclusive preserve of the Mongols. Compensation has usually been paid to the 
former owner i n the form of rent, but the bulk of the people have often been 
faced with the stark alternatives of "withdrawal" and the complete 
displacement of t h e i r culture, or what amounts to "gradual extermination", The 
co-operation of the princes i n t h i s destruction of t h e i r people i s accounted 
for by Lattimore i n terms of t h e i r increasingly anomalous position. They are 
driven to look only to t h e i r own interests f o r to i d e n t i f y with Outer Mongolia 
i s t o i n v i t e the e x t i n c t i o n of t h e i r class which has already occurred there, 
w h i l s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with China makes them l i t t l e more than "subsidised 
figureheads" and mere "tools of Chinese policy",(27) 
Once again an i n t e r e s t i n the f r o n t i e r had led Lattimore to contemplate 
the predicament of the Mongol nomads. I t i s clear, from an account written 
much l a t e r that t h i s contemplation was the product of disturbing personal 
experience: 
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"Among the places that we v i s i t e d [ i n 1929-30] was a Chinese 
colonisation project i n the western part of Liaoning Province, the 
Xingan (Hsingan) Tun Ken Chu, a modern version of an ancient 
Chinese practice i n the margin of contact betv/een Chinese farmers 
and Mongol herdsmen; a m i l i t a r y garrison settlement (.tun), 
supporting i t s e l f by agriculture (.ken). This colonisation was 
b r u t a l l y carried out: the Mongols were evicted at the point of a 
bayonet and Chinese colonists planted on t h e i r land. I f any Mongols 
resisted, they were dealt with as 'bandits'."(28) 
I t i s when the second level of Manchuria i s examined that Lattimore's 
argument becomes more speculative, though i n the longer view he does offer 
some perceptive views on the character of Chinese modernisation and the 
coming c r i s i s i n East Asia, 
Drawing upon his analysis of the h i s t o r i c a l function of the "reservoir" 
Lattimore i s of the view that t h i s mechanism may s t i l l come to operate i n 
contemporary China, The Manchurian colonist i s not a frontiersman in the 
mould of the American West, he i s the bearer of an immense h i s t o r i c a l legacy 
the chief burden of which i s that c i v i l i s a t i o n i s only found w i t h i n the Great 
Wall beyond which i s only barbarism; 
",., the colonists are less pioneers, carrying with them a young and 
confident t r a d i t i o n , than refugees, looking over t h e i r shoulders at a 
homeland u n w i l l i n g l y abandoned," (29) 
Such a population along v;ith i t s leadership i s inclined to face inwards rather 
than outwards, the power of leaders beyond the Great Wall to interfere i n the 
a f f a i r s of metropolitan China being enlarged by the presence of railways. The 
local warlord Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin) thus exercised power at the centre 
i n accordance with h i s " h i s t o r i c 'reservoir' position", and so f a r the Republic 
has been fortunate t h a t h i s son and successor Chang Hsiieh-liang being f a m i l i a r 
with the challenge of the west has been more inclined to guard the northern 
f r o n t i e r s than meddle i n i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s . (30) Similar leverage or potential 
leverage i s exercised upon China (though not upon the external f r o n t i e r s ) by 
m i l i t a r y figures i n the north and north-west, whereas i n Ssuch'uan (Sichuan) 
the pressure of a Tibetan population gradually encroaching upon Chinese areas 
has no consequences whatsoever f o r the p o l i t i c s of metropolitan China. (31) 
And the growing power of Russia i n the north constitutes something of the 
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order of an "extra-reservoir" v/hich "transmits cumulating pressures southward, 
but diminishing pressures northward",(32) pressures which have been present 
since Manchu times but which now assume a new form. 
I t i s clear that Lattimore believes that an old pattern of Chinese 
c i v i l i s a t i o n i s to be detected i n these events. That i s that the north and the 
north-west are the heartlands of the c i v i l i s a t i o n and the key to Chinese 
sovereignty, and that f o r the c i v i l i s a t i o n as a whole expansion towards the 
south has brought success, v/hereas expansion to the north has usually brought 
danger i f not disaster, This view Lattimore now at t r i b u t e s to the influence of 
Spengler, the f i r s t volume of v/hose Decline of the Vest he took with him 
during his tra v e l s of 1929-.30. (33) Hitherto the greatest i n t e l l e c t u a l 
influence on Lattimore had been Huntington, but there are clear signs i n the 
wr i t i n g s of t h i s period that he found Huntington's stark environmentalism no 
longer convincing. The extent to which Spengler has displaced Huntington may 
be judged i n Lattimore's remarks on the l i k e l y causes of the nomadic 
migrations of the past; climate may have provided an impetus but the evolution 
of the Mongols i n t o a conquering people "must have been i n the main a 
s p i r i t u a l phenomenon". (34) 
For Spengler and f o r Lattimore at t h i s time then, China was an example of 
a "late" culture; having passed through those p r i o r phases found i n the history 
of every c i v i l i s a t i o n , youth and maturity, i t has "long ago f u l f i l l e d and 
matured every p o t e n t i a l i t y of growth inherent i n i t s own powers".(35) The 
o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n of Manchuria closed with the following peroration which 
s i m i l a r l y captures the s p i r i t of t h i s new influence: 
"The underlying struggle i n Manchuria i s , and w i l l be throughout our 
century, caused by the c o n f l i c t i n g migration of cultures and peoples, 
and the e f f o r t of cultures to assert themselves over peoples. In 
such a struggle, generals and statesmen are the accidents of 
history; t r a d i t i o n , the way of l i f e , the e f f o r t of race and region to 
assert themselves i n the face of culture and nation, and the e f f o r t 
of nation and culture to impose themselves on race and region, are 
his t o r y i t s e l f . " (36) 
Yet there was much i n contemporary Manchuria t o support such a view. On the 
one hand the t i d e of Chinese c i v i l i s a t i o n was sweeping before i t other cultures 
and ways of l i f e with which no compromise seemed possible. On the other, t h i s 
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t i d e had been impelled o r i g i n a l l y by the i r r u p t i o n of c i v i l i s a t i o n s with which 
the Chinese could not deal and from which they could only learn with 
d i f f i c u l t y . Moreover the expansion of China i n t o the f r o n t i e r , producing an 
" a r t i f i c i a l " colonisation, seemed l i k e l y to touch o f f a struggle with external 
pov/ers which vfould be highly unequal. In his assessment of the internal 
tensions w i t h i n China as well as her external predicament Lattiraore's choice 
of a mentor had not been e n t i r e l y i n f e l i c i t o u s . 
As a late culture the t a c t i c most readily resorted to by the Chinese was 
pa s s i v i t y , and China had great d i f f i c u l t y i n adopting the techniques of the 
West f o r her own uses. The railway was an alien instrument which made 
colonisation possible but i n the process threw the t r a d i t i o n a l c i v i l i s a t i o n out 
of balance, since southern rather than northern expansion had been the 
h i s t o r i c a l pattern, and since the areas thus colonised threatened to exercise 
the old northern m i l i t a r y domination. And i t was in the imperfect adaptation 
of Western technology and ideas that Lattimore perceived the greatest threat 
to the society as a whole. The very d i f f i c u l t i e s of adaptation may stimulate a 
movement which abandons altogether any hopes of piecemeal change. 
" I f the c o n f l i c t between east and west should end i n such a 
catastrophe, the nation that would at l a s t emerge might be a China 
dominated and exploited by the west, or i t • might be something 
t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t ; but i t c e r t a i n l y v/ould not be either an 'evolved' 
nation l i k e Japan, in which the old currents have been turned into 
new channels, or a nation vigorously preserving i n a l l i t s i n t e g r i t y 
the o l d c i v i l i s a t i o n of China, f o r t i f i e d externally by borrowed 
western methods."(37) 
But previous attempts to adapt the West to China have manifestly f a i l e d , and 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l class, those most f a m i l i a r with Western ideas, are presently 
at the mercy of "the man of action", m i l i t a r i s t s and t h e i r followers. 
Lattimore places some hope i f hope i s to be found i n the "Chinese 
Renascence"(38) but i n the longer view these observations are singularly 
prescient. Chinese Communism was indeed t o prove "the embodiment of the 
danger th a t a l l alt e r n a t i v e s of adaptation may be abandoned and swept 
away" (39); m i l i t a r y men were to master the men of ideas of the May Fourth 
generation who were then personally to receive treatment as summary as that 
given to t h e i r views. 
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Lattimore then combines the insights he owes to the insp i r a t i o n of 
Spengler with what he knows of the h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l geography of 
Manchuria and i t s environs, thereby broaching a theme which i s to be restated 
i n h i s w r i t i n g f o r a decade. A contest between Russia and Japan i n East Asia 
i s almost inevitable. Both occupy stra t e g i c positions of an "imperative" 
nature which compel them to exert growing pressure on Manchuria, (40) an area 
which f o r h i s t o r i c a l as well as contemporary reasons i s subject to strong 
c e n t r i f u g a l forces. Despite advances i n the race f o r colonisation Chinese 
c i v i l i s a t i o n cannot match the power of her neighbours. Japan possesses the 
vigour of a nation which has recently and successfully employed her old 
energies i n a wholesale borrowing of Western standards and techniques. Russia 
with a s i m i l a r though more selective h i s t o r y of Westernisation also represents 
a r i s i n g force, In terms borrowed from Spengler, Russia i s the only modern 
nation s u f f i c i e n t l y "young" t o possess "men of destiny". Moreover the Russians 
have inherited a t r a d i t i o n of administration (emblematic of the syncretic 
nature of a "young" culture) i n the east which "spreads control through a local 
population, rather than exercising i t over them",(41) making i t possible for 
them as an Asian land power to exercise the old "reservoir" control of China 
by way of her northern t e r r i t o r i e s . By contrast the Japanese l i k e t h e i r 
Western mentors are mere "sea barbarians" whose attempt at leadership over the 
peoples of Manchuria would at best reproduce the colonial tutelage to be found 
i n India and Korea, (42) The u n f a m i l i a r i t y of a challenge from the sea to that 
t r a d i t i o n a l element i n the Chinese outlook, however, renders t h i s challenge the 
more threatening of the tv/o. 
In 1935 Lattimore published a second edition of Manchuria offering a 
revised opinion of the l i k e l y r o l e of the region i n world p o l i t i c s . But his 
nev; viewpoint i s to a s i g n i f i c a n t extent the product of research and personal 
experience i n the intervening years during which his involvement i n the Mongol 
problem increased, and he became more preoccupied with the international 
ramifications of East Asian a f f a i r s . 
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Martyrdom of Man (1872) "prepared" him "for the influence of Spengler": 
"Preface", Studies i n Frontier History, 27. 
(35) Manchuria, cradle of 
V l J t t A AAV 
c o n f l i c t . 
(36) Manchuria, cradle of c o n f l i c t . 
(37) Manchuria. cradle of c o n f l i c t , 
(38) Manchuria, cradle of c o n f l i c t . 
(39) Manchuria, cradle of c o n f l i c t , 
(40) Manchuria, cradle of c o n f l i c t , 
(41) Manchuria, cradle of c o n f l i c t , 
(42) Manchuria. cradle of c o n f l i c t . 
***** 
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From what he knew of Inner Mongolia, and from what he had seen in his 
tr a v e l s of 1929-30 Lattimore was aware that the pressures upon the Mongols 
and t h e i r way of l i f e were e l i c i t i n g a variety of responses from the people 
themselves. In order to understand the p o l i t i c a l and social dimensions of 
these responses and perhaps as a r e s u l t of his excursions i n anthropology (1) 
Lattimore, i n addition to studying w r i t t e n Chinese, took on the study of 
Mongol. This decision was to shape a l l of Lattimore's subsequent career. 
The Mongol Predicament 
In Manchuria, endeavouring to come to some assessment of the policies of 
p r o v i n c i a l and loc a l a u t h o r i t i e s towards the Mongols - he found that troop 
commanders expropriating t h e i r lands were acquiring large sums of money i n 
the r e s u l t i n g land transfers - Lattimore met Kuo Tao-fu (Guo Daofu) a Daghor 
(Daghur) from Hailar whose Mongol name was Merse. According to Lattimore's 
much la t e r recollection Merse who had u n t i l recently been a member of the 
Inner Mongolian Kuomintang (Guomindang) had been involved i n the Pan-
Mongolian n a t i o n a l i s t movement of 1920, Japanese sponsorship of which had 
subsequently blighted his p o l i t i c a l career with the Chinese authorities. 
Possibly as a means of c o n t r o l l i n g his a c t i v i t i e s , when Lattimore met him in 
Mukden (Shenyang) Merse had been placed i n charge of a school for the t r a i n i n g 
of Mongols as bureaucrats. Lattimore several times adverts to the impact of 
meeting t h i s well educated and informed spokesman of his people,(2) and to his 
t r a g i c p o l i t i c a l murder following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. To 
understand the confused p o l i t i c a l currents at work amongst the Mongols 
Lattimore explained that he needed to master t h e i r language; t h i s evidently 
struck a responsive chord i n Merse who introduced him to Biigegesig, a teacher 
at the Mongol-Tibetan school i n Peking (Beijing). 
Though both of these Mongols spoke Chinese and were involved i n the 
Chinese administrative machine they were also staunch nationalists. Biigegesig, 
as well as g i v i n g Lattimore his f i r s t lessons i n Mongol, drew him into what he 
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l a t e r was to c a l l the "l a b y r i n t h " of Mongol nationalism by introducing him to 
Sain Bayar, Through Sain Bayar who had been a leader of the Inner Mongolian 
Kuomintang Lattimore met i n 1931 the Dilowa Khutukhtu (Diluv, Dilov Khutagt) 
and then the Prince Demchukdonggrub (Demchugdongrov) whose Chinese t i t l e was 
Te Wang (De Wang, De Van),(3) These two acquaintances were to prove amongst 
the most important of Lattimore's entire career. The former was a leading 
incarnation i n the Mongolian Buddhist church before fleeing the anti - r e l i g i o u s 
p o l i c i e s of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party regime to take up 
residence i n China i n 1931, He became a l i f e - l o n g friend as well as 
"godfather" to h is son, Lattimore p a r t l y as an act of homage to his deceased 
f r i e n d publishing an annotated edition of his memoirs and biography i n 1982, 
The l a t t e r , the leading figure of Inner Mongolian nationalism, became the 
source of many of Lattimore's contacts i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and the 
subject of a number of his subsequent wri t i n g s . Two of Te Wang's associates 
were l a t e r brought t o the United States by Lattimore, the group then to do 
much t o develop Mongol studies there and lat e r i n B r i t a i n , Moreover, i n the 
li v e s of both of these men, the learned and s a i n t l y p r i e s t and the a r i s t o c r a t i c 
man of action was embodied much of the tragedy of t h e i r people, Lattimore's 
reaction t o which lay behind most of his w r i t i n g and research i n the next f i v e 
or so years. In order to follow t h i s phase of his career, however, i t i s 
necessary f i r s t t o outline something of the hi s t o r y of Inner Mongolian 
nationalism. 
I t was the fate of the national aspirations of the Mongols t o be caught 
i n the complex of rela t i o n s between Russia, China and Japan, Following Chinese 
and White Russian invasions the creation of a national regime i n Outer 
Mongolia had only been possible with the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l support given 
t o the Mongolian People's Party by the new Soviet state i n 1921, A Pan-
Mongolian movement to unite a l l Mongols under a single regime which had 
received backing from the Japanese m i l i t a r y had come to nothing,(4) and the 
Inner Mongolian areas had f a l l e n under the control of pr o v i n c i a l warlords who 
sought t o extend t o them Chinese s t y l e administration and colonisation by 
Chinese s e t t l e r s . The f a i l u r e of many of the Mongol n o b i l i t y and clergy to 
defend t h e i r people against Chinese encroachments had undermined the old 
leadership structure and caused many Mongols to seek more radical 
alternatives,(5) But the most prominent of the new na t i o n a l i s t s remained men 
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of a r i s t o c r a t i c b i r t h and Chinese education. Thus i n the 1920s appeared the 
group known as the Young Mongols of which Te Wang was a leading member. 
Si m i l a r l y the most important p o l i t i c a l faction of t h i s decade, the Inner 
Mongolian Kuomintang, wa.s also led c h i e f l y by men of noble backgrounds. 
In the era of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation which began in 1923 Sun 
Yat-sen's movement from i t s base i n Canton sought to orchestrate a national 
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t upsurge t o unify China, with Russian assistance. In these the 
closing years of his l i f e , Sun had come to place greater emphasis on the 
struggle against imperialism; he also promised an equality of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s 
i n a new Kuomintang China. In these circumstances common cause with the 
Mongols appeared possible, accordingly the Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party sent a delegation to Canton from Urga where they met Pal Yun-t'i 
(Buyantai), the most prominent Mongol i n Sun's entourage. After discussions 
which touched on co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Mongolian 
People's Revolutionary Party, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of eventual u n i f i c a t i o n of the 
Mongols, Sun gave his approval f o r the formation of an Inner Mongolian 
Kuomintang. With the assistance of the warlord Feng Yii-hsiang (Feng Yuxiang) 
then i n co n t r o l of Peking and i n receipt of substantial Russian aid, the F i r s t 
Congress of the new Party was held i n Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) i n October 1925. 
The regime i n Outer Mongolia, now the Mongolian People's Republic, sent several 
delegates, and the Congress declared i t s support f o r the freedom and 
development of the Mongol people as a whole, (6) The present feudal order was 
t o be overthrown and the prosperity of the Mongols was to be provided i n a 
new federated Chinese Republic t o be established i n close collaboration with 
the Chinese Kuomintang. 
But no sooner had t h i s alliance been formed than i t s elements began to 
separate. Feng Yu-hsiang was defeated i n his struggle with Chang Tso-lin and 
forced to withdraw from the scene, spending more than a month i n Ulan Bator 
(Ulaan Baatar, Urga) i n March-April 1926(7) before t r a v e l l i n g on t o the Soviet 
Union, The Comintern began to take a d i f f e r e n t view of Mongolian 
development, (8) and the tensions i n the Kuomintang-Communist alliance caused 
i t to f a l l apart i n A p r i l 1927. Similar fissures appeared i n the Inner 
Mongolian movement. F i r s t Pai Yun-t'i and then other leaders including Merse 
had taken refuge i n the Mongolian People's Republic following Feng Yii-hsiang's 
defeat. Pai Yun-t'i however chose to throw i n his l o t with Chiang Kai-shek i n 
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late 1927 a f t e r disagreements with h i s confederates. The Inner Mongolian 
Kuomintang was formally merged with the parent organisation, now based in 
Nanking, where Pai Yun-t'i was given nominal state o f f i c e . But his former 
colleagues i n the Mongolian People's Republic entertained a d i f f e r e n t vision of 
the Mongol future. In August 1928 Merse led the "Young Barga" revolt the aims 
of which were, with help from the Mongolian People's Republic, to detach the 
Barga region from Manchuria and bring i t w i t h i n the f o l d of the new Mongol 
state. The r e v o l t was defeated by Chang Hsiieh-liang, and Merse and his 
accomplices along with Pai Yun-t'i were branded as renegades by the 
Soviets,(9) I t was s h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s debacle that Merse was to meet Owen 
Lattimore, 
Though Pai Yun-t'i possessed high o f f i c e i n Nanking t h i s did not result 
i n any advance f o r the Mongol cause. Soon aft e r i t s foundation the Kuomintang 
government proposed i n August 1928 the reorganisation of the Mongolian special 
d i s t r i c t s of Jehol (Rehe), Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia (Ningxia) into regular 
provinces, a move that brought protesting Mongol petitioners to Peking. With 
the formation i n the c a p i t a l of the Mongolian-Tibetan A f f a i r s Commission Yen 
Hsi-shan (Yan Xishan), whose regime i n Shansi (Shanxi) had done so much to 
promote the rapid colonisation of former Mongol lands, was appointed Chairman. 
The Mongols were cle a r l y being denied the position held out to minorities i n 
the ideology of the now canonised Sun Yat-sen, and t h e i r disaffection grew 
accordingly. The need f o r a concerted Mongol response came t o a head with two 
fu r t h e r developments. Immediately following the Japanese occupation of 
Manchuria, a s i g n i f i c a n t area of which was populated by Mongols, the 
Kuomintang published a d r a f t plan ( i n October 1931) to further reorganise the 
four f r o n t i e r provinces created i n 1928 i n a way that would extend Chinese 
administration i n t o those Mongol t r i b a l areas which were s t i l l largely s e l f -
governed, (10) Then the Japanese army occupied Jehol, and a Mongol "province" 
of Hsingan (Xingan) was created i n the west w i t h i n the boundaries of the 
puppet state of Manchukuo (Manzhouguo). Japanese m i l i t a r y pressure continued, 
the Japanese occupying part of Chahar province before a truce was agreed with 
Nanking, 
I t now became clear that Nanking was not prepared to uphold i t s 
authority i n the f r o n t i e r region nor would i t protect the Mongols against the 
Japanese, Te Wang who held o f f i c e i n the government of Chahar province led a 
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delegation t o Nanking i n 1932 seeking reform and assistance which was largely 
ignored, the government responding only belatedly by appointing him a Defence 
Commissioner i n the area. (11) But the Kuomintang response to the Japanese 
m i l i t a r y encroachments of 1933 was t o abandon plans to improve the m i l i t a r y 
preparedness of the Mongols. In Pailingmiao (Bailingmiao, Bat-khaalagh 
monastery) i n Suiyuan province a number of meetings of Mongol princes and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s began i n May 1933 i n an attempt to formulate a concerted Mongol 
strategy. (12) I t i s apparent that at these meetings a variety of arguments 
were aired by the nobles and i n t e l l e c t u a l s present. Although many sought a 
defence against Japan, from subsequent events i t can be conjectured that there 
was some ambiguity i n the Mongol view. Even before the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s 
had become interested i n the Mongols Japan had been a model for the reforming 
Prince Gungsangnorbu who had been impressed by the results of the Meiji 
reforms when he had v i s i t e d Japan i n 1903,(13) Gungsangnorbu had been 
p a r t i c u l a r l y energetic i n seeking t o bu i l d a modern Mongol system of education 
and Pai Yun-t'i had been one of his pupils. Following the creation of Hsingan 
province the Japanese began to contact the old r u l i n g princes in Inner 
Mongolia i n the hope of securing t h e i r support, and agents began to make 
forays i n t o Chahar and Suiyuan. In these circumstances the Mongols had at the 
very least acquired the p o s s i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l leverage i n t h e i r dealings 
w i t h Nanking. 
The Pailingmiao meetings i n i t i a t e d a long period of negotiation with 
Nanking. I n i t i a l l y the response from the Chinese side was adjudged 
i n s u f f i c i e n t , and on 14 August the r u l i n g princes of Western Inner Mongolia 
declared that i t was t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to establish an autonomous government, 
such a regime actually being founded i n October despite protests and 
blandishments from Nanking, At t h i s stage Te Wang began to receive overtures 
from the Japanese and by threatening t o align his movement with Japan and the 
soon-to-be-enthroned Emperor of Manchukuo, the l a s t Ch'ing ruler Pu-yi (Puyi), 
he f i n a l l y forced a measure of o f f i c i a l recognition. The Mongolian Local 
Autonomous P o l i t i c a l Council of the Nanking government with Te Wang as the 
d i r e c t o r of the P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s Bureau was in existence by May 1934, but i t 
was almost immediately f r u s t r a t e d i n i t s purpose. The funds provided by 
Nanking were i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r i t s c i v i l and m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and i n 
attempting to raise revenue by taxing the trade of the area the council was 
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opposed by the local warlord Fu Tso-i (Fu Zuoyi) who also prevented attempts 
to extend i t s administrative authority to areas of Inner Mongolia under his 
control,(14) 
These f r u s t r a t i o n s generated tensions w i t h i n the autonomy movement which 
were exploited by the Japanese, and by Fu Tso-i and his overlord Yen Hsi-shan, 
Some time i n 1935, with growing m i l i t a r y pressure being placed on Chahar by 
Manchukuo and the Japanese, and with an apparent lack of resolution by Nanking 
to defend north China, Te Wang f i n a l l y threw i n his l o t with the Japanese, 
When he did so i s d i f f i c u l t to determine but by February 1936 the autonomy 
movement s p l i t , w i th a r i v a l pro-Chinese Mongol council being established 
under Fu Tso-i (with Yen Hsi-shan as "adviser") i n Kweisui. Te Wang removed 
his supporters t o Tehua (Dehua, Jabsar)(15) where he established i n June an 
Inner Mongolian Government, 
1936 marks the end of the autonomy movement since Te Wang's fortunes 
thereafter rose and f e l l with those of the Japanese. A j o i n t Mongol-Manchukuo 
invasion of Suiyuan i n November 1936 was beaten back by Fu Tso-i but with the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war i n July 1936 the area was soon over-run. 
The Japanese then sponsored several Mongolian "governments", Te Wang heading 
one based at Kweisui i n 1938, moving to Kalgan i n 1939. According to Lawrence 
Shyu (whose opinion on t h i s question i s noteworthy given his Kuomintang 
sympathies), of a l l the c l i e n t governments established by the Japanese on 
Chinese t e r r i t o r y ; 
"only the Inner Mongolian regime under Teh Wang achieved some 
degree of s t a b i l i t y and prestige because of the greater autonomy i t 
enjoyed and the a t t r a c t i o n of pan-Mongolism to ethnic Mongols i n 
the region." (16) 
The true Japanese a t t i t u d e towards the Mongolian Federated Autonomous 
Government was revealed however i n 1940 with the creation of the puppet 
Nanking regime of Wang Ching-wei (Wang Jingwei) when Inner Mongolia was 
brought under such authority as i t possessed. Ever i n pursuit of the goal of 
Mongol autonomy Te Wang attempted t o change his allegiance i n 1945 but 
received no encouragement from Chiang Kai-shek. Between 1945 and 1948 he 
liv e d i n Peking under house arrest while most of his people f e l l under 
communist control, Even i n the c r i s i s year of 1948 he was s t i l l unable to 
secure Kuomintang support f o r his f i n a l stand i n the Alashan (Alxa) region, 
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and from 1949 he was imprisoned by the communists f i r s t i n Ulan Bator and 
late r i n China. 
The Failure of Inner Mongolian Nationalism 
Returning from h i s tra v e l s i n Manchuria Lattimore spent the years 1930 
to 1933 based i n Peking. Fellowships from the Harvard-Yenching I n s t i t u t e and 
the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and assistance from the 
American Geographical Society allowed him to devote his time to w r i t i n g and 
study and he also began to make forays t r a v e l l i n g by camel i n the Mongol 
s t y l e i n Inner Mongolia with h i s companion Arash. On his return to America i n 
1933 Lattimore began h i s association with the I n s t i t u t e of Pacific Relations. 
Following h i s attendance at the I n s t i t u t e conference of 1933 held i n Banff, 
Canada, he was i n v i t e d t o become editor of the journal Pacific A f f a i r s , 
published by the I n s t i t u t e from New York. I t was agreed that he could reside 
i n Peking where he would devote h a l f his time to his e d i t o r i a l duties; thus 
Lattimore was able to continue his work i n China (broken only by t r a v e l to 
Europe and the Soviet Union) u n t i l the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war i n 
1937, 
Increasing f a m i l i a r i t y w i th the predicament of the Mongols led Lattimore 
to produce a number of w r i t i n g s on t h i s theme. This i n turn led him both 
backwards and forwards i n time. He sought the h i s t o r i c a l basis of the 
relat i o n s h i p between Mongols and Chinese, and since that relationship i n his 
own time was having and was l i k e l y to have s i g n i f i c a n t international 
repercussions he explored f u r t h e r the nature of the tensions that were soon to 
produce war i n East Asia. He began work also on successive d r a f t s of The 
Inner Asian Frontiers of China. In these years Lattimore's increasing f a c i l i t y 
i n the Mongol language, and his friendship with and knowledge of an extremely 
diverse group of Mongols gave him an unrivalled i n s i g h t into these questions. 
From a r i s t o c r a t s and lamas he was able to learn something of the character of 
the old order and i t s response to the twentieth century; from herdsmen and 
traders he was t o acquire a wealth of f o l k l o r e and t r a d i t i o n as well as dir e c t 
personal understanding of t h e i r social and material conditions. 
The lengthiest work of t h i s period i s The Mongols of Manchuria published 
i n 1934. Although the contemporary importance of the region provided the 
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impulse f o r the book, most of i t i s concerned with the h i s t o r i c a l organisation 
of the Mongols as ordained by t h e i r Manchu overlords, and with the erosion of 
t h i s organisation under the pressures of colonisation and f r o n t i e r r i v a l r y i n 
the nineteenth century, Lattimore draws on a number of Mongol and Chinese 
works p a r t i c u l a r l y the nineteenth century Records of the Mongol Pastures:(17) 
he also pays t r i b u t e t o the pioneering research on t h i s subject by Lieutenant 
G,C, Binstead which i t s e l f was based on a Russian t r a n s l a t i o n of the l a t t e r 
work, (18) In the more contemporary chapters of t h i s book as well as i n a 
number of a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n at the time Lattimore returns repeatedly to several 
themes which w i l l now be considered. These themes remain remarkably constant 
with the exception of Lattimore's estimate of the role of the Inner Mongolian 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Like many Mongols he was i n i t i a l l y hopeful that i t 
would rescue them from ob l i v i o n and render them equal partners in a r e v i v i f i e d 
and reformed Chinese republic; by 1936 he came round to the view that the 
movement would henceforth be a prisoner of the Japanese largely as a result of 
Kuomintang ineptitude and i r r e s o l u t i o n , and the greed of f r o n t i e r e l i t e s 
Chinese and Mongol alike, 
Lattimore's development of an interest i n the Mongols coincided with 
events which, i n his view, enhanced t h e i r p o l i t i c a l importance since t h e i r 
future allegiance could well provide the key to the outcome of the struggle of 
the powers i n the Far East, The f i r s t e dition of Manchuria had sketched the 
context f o r t h a t struggle. Having rejected Huntington i n favour of Spengler, 
Lattimore now began to emphasise the ge o p o l i t i c a l factors at work, fi n d i n g 
less and less plausible Spengler's belief i n ; 
"the logic of h i s t o r y as a form, the idea that cultures and 
c i v i l i z a t i o n s are organic bodies, subject to the laws of youth and 
age, growth and decay,"(19) 
The h i s t o r y of East Asia was a h i s t o r y of land powers and af t e r a century i n 
which t h i s pattern had been disrupted by the i r r u p t i o n of new forces from the 
sea i t was reasserting i t s e l f , (20) In t h i s observation Lattimore f e l t himself 
to be on f i r m h i s t o r i c a l ground; the h i s t o r y of China was largely a record of 
barbarian conquerors becoming assimilated over time to the values of Chinese 
c i v i l i s a t i o n i n a way that was impossible f o r the sea-going barbarians. 
Although the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of East Asia had f o r a time been 
determined by an order sea-going i n i t s i n s p i r a t i o n , the "Open Door", t h i s 
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order was being eroded by the recrudescence of Russian land-based powers. 
Indeed i t could even be claimed that the balance of power i n world p o l i t i c s 
was s h i f t i n g towards continental as opposed to maritime nations.(21) 
But i f an old pattern was re-emerging i t did contain, on Lattimore's view, 
some new features. The character of the f r o n t i e r would continue to be an 
important determinant i n Chinese h i s t o r y but changes i n Chinese society and 
the employment of Western arms and technology offered the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
new form of Chinese mastery of the f r o n t i e r , The position of Japan i n t h i s 
coming age of land power was somewhat anomalous. Japan had turned the 
maritime order to her own advantage i n East Asia, but with the diminishing 
returns t h a t the exercise of such power now offered was seeking to build a 
land empire i n the region. On land the only effective check to Japanese 
expansion was the power of the Soviet Union, and were that check to be 
exercised the area between the Great Wall and Siberia would be crucial. 
The new continental strategy of Japan has led, according to Lattimore, to 
an "inevitable apposition" between Japan and Russia. Whilst world attention i s 
focussed upon a l i k e l y confrontation on the Siberian-Manchukuo f r o n t i e r , the 
flan k position, t h a t i s those t e r r i t o r i e s i n Manchuria, China, Mongolia and the 
Soviet Union occupied by the Mongols, i n a protracted war would prove f a r more 
important, 
"The only flank which either nation could turn by a sweeping and 
decisive movement i s the Outer Mongolian flank of Manchukuo. The 
problems of Vladivostok and the Ussuri-Amur f r o n t i e r are local and 
t a c t i c a l ; the problem of Mongolia i s one which allows room f o r 
strategy. ,.. Mongolia, therefore, of which the world knows less 
than i t knows of China, Siberia or Manchukuo, i s the key to the 
destiny of the whole Far East ."(22) 
This has accordingly transformed the position of the Mongols. From being a 
degenerate and helpless people who could only choose extinction at the hands 
of the Chinese, or d r a s t i c social revolution under Russian auspices, t h e i r 
allegiance must now be courted, and they themselves w i l l play an active 
role. (23) 
Between 1933 and 1935 when i t appeared t h a t the Mongols could be 
independent actors i n t h i s c o n f l i c t Lattimore considered i n several w r i t t e n 
pieces the alternatives open to them. Largely on the basis of his 
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conversations with refugees he formed the view that in Outer Mongolia though 
the Influence of Russia was considerable yet the regime was Mongol in 
character, led by a young and energetic faction whose model for modernisation 
and s o l e source of a s s i s t a n c e was Soviet Russia. Their answer to the "failure 
of the old order to r i s e to the national emergency" was to effect a s o c i a l 
revolution i n which the church i n p a r t i c u l a r , the p o l i t i c a l prerogatives of i t s 
d i g n i t a r i e s and the possessions of i t s monasteries, were afforded 
uncompromising treatment. (24) The position in Inner Mongolia was that i t 
stood as a repository of a l l that had been uprooted in the new Mongolian 
republic, "the old t r a d i t i o n , the power of the princes, the s a n c t i t y of 
r e l i g i o n " . The encroachments of colonisation and Chinese impatience with the 
Mongol way of l i f e had stimulated the formation of the "Young Mongol" 
reformers, a group with varying p r e s c r i p t i o n s for national regeneration though 
a l l opposed i n some degree to the enormous p r i v i l e g e s of the lama church. The 
Japanese annexation of Manchuria, followed by the creation of Hsingan province 
and the enthronement of the Manchu emperor Pu-yi had given r i s e to divided 
l o y a l t i e s . For now the p o s s i b i l i t y was held out of national regeneration under 
pr i n c e l y tutelage s i n c e the Japanese had employed the princes in t h e i r 
"autonomous" p r o v i n c i a l regime, and p a r t i c u l a r l y given the wide sentiment that 
exi s t e d i n favour of some re u n i f i c a t i o n of the Mongol people. On the other 
hand some pr i n c e l y leaders would have preferred a more independent role, using 
the threat of a l l i a n c e with the Japanese to enhance t h e i r power vis-^-vis the 
Chinese republic. Lattimore i s uncertain of the leverage possessed by the 
Chinese i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , though he does note that such concessions as have 
been offered by Nanking have been unwillingly granted and i n s u f f i c i e n t . (25) In 
the circumstances, with the i n i t i a t i v e on the side of the Japanese Lattimore 
expects Japan to pursue "an a c t i v e Mongol policy", one which i s l i k e l y to 
stimulate a c l a s h between Inner and Outer Mongolia, p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s which 
are opposed geographically and p o l i t i c a l l y , i n the name of Mongol 
reu n i f i c a t i o n . (26) 
But the Mongols were not to be permitted to grasp the opportunity which 
seemed to be t h e i r s . The Japanese proved inept in t h e i r administration of 
Hsingan and thus alienated much Mongol support. Although t h e i r early Mongol 
"experts" were often sympathetic to the Mongol predicament and with a good 
command of the language, Lattimore a s s e r t s that they have increasingly been 
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supplanted by a type of petty bureaucrat whose only concern has been personal 
preferment. The regime has thus rendered the princes into mere figureheads, 
and has only been able to offer employment to educated Mongols as 
in t e r p r e t e r s . And the reform of the Mongol herding economy, so e s s e n t i a l i f 
t h e i r d i s t i n c t way of l i f e was to continue, has been s i m i l a r l y subordinated to 
the Japanese need for a cheap source of a g r i c u l t u r a l products and a quick 
return on her i n i t i a l investments. The explanation for t h i s f a i l u r e to exploit 
Mongol nationalism i s to be sought, according to Lattimore, in Japan and in 
Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l position. The rewards of empire must be seen to be 
shared, and twentieth century empire building i s a brutal business especi a l l y 
for a country i n Japan's condition, short of c a p i t a l and beset by the 
h o s t i l i t i e s of the more s u c c e s s f u l imperial powers. <27) No national 
regeneration could be expected under the aegis of such a regime, and 
accordingly by 1937 there were open s i g n s of d i s l o y a l t y from Mongols under 
Japanese occupation. 
Japanese ineptitude i n f a i l i n g to offer any independent role for the 
Mongols was matched by Chinese i n a b i l i t y to come to terms with Te Wang's 
Inner Mongolian autonomy movement. Te Wang had o r i g i n a l l y sought separate 
p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u s for the Mongols and t h e i r recognition as a d i s t i n c t people 
within a defensive a l l i a n c e with Nanking. The e s s e n t i a l prerequisite for such 
an a l l i a n c e would have been the amalgamation of the various Mongol areas into 
a s i n g l e entity, and the ending of Chinese colonisation therein. The Chinese, 
as Lattimore saw i t , would thus have ceased to be competitors i n the 
exploitation of the Mongols with the Japanese, and common int e r e s t would have 
made possible a common stand. But even though only a small group of f r o n t i e r 
m i l i t a r y and o f f i c i a l s stood to lose the p r o f i t s they made from colonisation 
and trade by t h e i r treatment of Mongols and Chinese a l i k e , Nanking was without 
any of the statesmanship that the s i t u a t i o n required; and t h i s despite the 
presence of many Mongols from Manchuria amongst the supporters of Te Wang, a 
f a c t which was so demonstrative of the potential of h i s movement. 
"The Mongol policy of the Nanking Government did not go beyond 
using Mongol pressure on the provinces in order to increase the 
Central Government's power of intervention in prov i n c i a l 
p o l i t i c s . " (28) 
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And the s e l f i s h n e s s of the p r o v i n c i a l authorities was l i t t l e short of 
treasonable. Although the Mongols were given i n s t i t u t i o n a l recognition in 
1934, Nanking did not grant them s u f f i c i e n t finances to render t h e i r 
organisation e f f e c t i v e . They were, however, given the r i g h t to levy taxes in 
t h e i r region, but i n attempting to r a i s e revenue from the t r a f f i c across Inner 
Mongolia controlled by the opium monopoly of Shansi they came into c o n f l i c t 
with Yen Hsi-shan. Nanking's adjudication of the dispute placed much of these 
revenues i n the hands of Yen Hsi-shan who then had an obligation to disburse 
a proportion to the Mongols, though they were never to see any part of a 
share, Yen then succeeded i n h i s manoeuvres to s p l i t the autonomy movement by 
cre a t i n g a separate Council for Suiyuan whose members, according to Lattimore, 
were men heavily compromised by t h e i r association with Chinese colonisation. 
Lattimore's judgment on the reasons for Te Wang's change of allegiance i s 
uncompromising: 
"The Nanking Government f i n a l l y indicated i t s abandonment of Te 
¥ang by recognising t h i s Council, and appointing as Chinese 
p o l i t i c a l adviser to i t Yen Hsi-shan himself, the man who from the 
beginning had most openly obstructed Te Wang's movement. As for Te 
Wang, he has not "gone over" to Japan; he has been tied hand and 
foot and thrown to the Japanese." (29) 
The Analysis of Mongol Society 
The tragedy of Inner Mongolian nationalism led Lattimore to explore 
s e v e r a l l i n e s of research and speculation which were soon to become central to 
h i s s c h o l a r l y corpus. His explanations were both h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary, 
the former finding completed expression in Inner Asian F r o n t i e r s of China, and 
concerned the nature of Mongol so c i e t y and i t s h i s t o r i c a l evolution. He wished 
to determine how a nomadic society with many e g a l i t a r i a n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s had 
come to be dominated by an entrenched n o b i l i t y and clergy; he a l s o sought to 
understand why t h i s entrenched e l i t e had so s i g n a l l y f a i l e d to provide that 
leadership which the Mongols required in the c r i s i s of the past two decades, 
an enquiry which led to speculation on what future course of action would 
preserve them as a people. And s i n c e the fate of the Mongols was related at 
every turn with developments in China, Lattimore was led a l s o to contemplate 
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the past and the present of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two c i v i l i s a t i o n s , 
and what f a i l i n g i n Chinese society had prevented that a l l i a n c e which would 
have been so advantageous to both peoples. 
In an extremely important a r t i c l e published in e a r l y 1935 (though not to 
be found in Lattimore's collected writings) Lattimore considers the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Mongol past and future and in so doing interprets the 
Mongol predicament as a p a r t i c u l a r legacy of history. The history of China 
and Mongolia may be considered as c y c l i c a l , "a rhythmic recurrence of 
invasions of China" during which f r o n t i e r peoples dominate the provinces 
within the Great Wall, followed by Chinese resurgence during which the fro n t i e r 
peoples are removed to t h e i r former habitat, divided and controlled (though at 
considerable cost) by a l l i a n c e s , subsidies, and trading concessions. (30) 
Within the Mongol society of the f r o n t i e r a c l a s s of c h i e f s arose whose role 
was to impose such leadership upon t h e i r followers as would be necessary to 
e x t r a c t s u b s i d i e s from the Chinese during the waxing of the latter's power, 
From t h i s c l a s s of c h i e f s would emerge, aft e r a c y c l e of t r i b a l wars, a "great 
c h i e f of c h i e f s " who would lead h i s people, noble and commoner alike, to the 
plunder and exploitation which would be the f r u i t s of the next dynasty of 
conquest i n China. The lama church appeared much l a t e r on the scene, but the 
role of the clergy p a r a l l e l e d in some respects the role of the c h i e f s or 
nobles. They were used to s a n c t i f y and legitimise various claimants to the 
overlordship of the f r o n t i e r peoples, but they enjoyed many of the p r i v i l e g e s 
previously the preserve of the noble c l a s s . At t h i s point the Manchus stepped 
in to s i d e t r a c k the development of a p o l i t i c a l - e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a l l i a n c e amongst 
the Mongols which would most l i k e l y have overwhelmed the declining Ming 
Empire. As a l l i e s of the Manchus the Mongols did, however, share in the 
exploitation of a g r i c u l t u r a l China, and by seeking to attach princely families 
to p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t i e s and to s e t nobles and clergy i n competition with each 
other for power and p o s i t i o n the Manchus r e a l i s e d t h e i r aim of preventing a 
united Mongol resurgence which would challenge t h e i r dominion. 
The conditions of the nineteenth century were to impose new and 
devastating pressures on the s o c i e t y which had thus come into being. To 
understand these pressures and t h e i r consequences e s p e c i a l l y in Outer Mongolia 
Lattimore employs Marxian c l a s s a n a l y s i s , an approach he finds "devastatingly 
r a t i o n a l " despite the f a c t that the contending c l a s s e s are princes and nomadic 
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tribesmen rather than bourgeois and proletarian. The noble and p r i e s t l y 
c l a s s e s Lattimore considers i n terms of t h e i r function. They evolved as 
superintendents and chief b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the exploitation of China, but since 
the l e s s e r members of Mongol society derived some benefit from that 
exploitation they were, on the whole, inclined to accept a subordinate role. 
A l l t h i s changed with the advent of f r o n t i e r railways, the possession by the 
Chinese of modern armaments, withdrawal or f a l l i n value of Chinese subsidies 
to the n o b i l i t y and clergy, and the penetration of Chinese commerce into the 
nomadic areas which occurred with the s h i f t of attitude of the imperial 
government towards the f r o n t i e r . A s o c i a l structure which was "organised in 
such a manner that i t would produce united action for aggression" (31) was much 
l e s s e f f e c t i v e i n defence. Some princes led t h e i r followers in revolts, but 
many nobles and clergy colluded with traders to exploit t h e i r subjects with 
the r e s u l t that c l a s s became more important than nation: 
"Since the existence of s p e c i a l c l a s s e s depended on exploitation and 
the enjoyment of unearned increment, and s i n c e China could no longer 
be exploited, the common Mongol people, who had once been simply 
the lowest rank of a p r i v i l e g e d nation, became themselves an 
exploited c l a s s , supporting a now useless superstructure of upper 
c l a s s e s - useless because they were no longer the spearhead of 
national expansion, but had become merely the apex of a national 
pyramid of exploitation." (32) 
Lattimore f i n d s t h i s s i t u a t i o n so f a r analogous to the opposition of c l a s s e s 
described by Marx that he l i k e n s the l o t of the common Mongols to that of the 
Western p r o l e t a r i a t or the Chinese peasantry, dominated by c a p i t a l i s t s and 
landlords r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
With h i s understanding of the old Mongol society thus c l a r i f i e d Lattimore 
i s in a p o s i t i o n to offer a systematic account of events in Outer Mongolia. 
The Mongol a s s e r t i o n of independence in 1911, bringing a form of national 
unity a f t e r more than two centuries, appeared to offer the Mongols several 
s t r a t e g i e s . Their h i s t o r y might i n c l i n e them to regard unity as a prelude to 
renewed aggression against China, but t h i s way was closed by the new 
circumstances of the time, p a r t i c u l a r l y the presence of western influence in 
E a s t Asia. There could be no return, thus, to the "dynamic p r i n c i p l e s " of the 
past, instead a "new phase" must be embarked upon. Here, and with the nature 
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of the Mongol s o c i a l structure very much in mind, Lattimore poses two 
al t e r n a t i v e s , The Mongols could r e t a i n t h i s s o c i a l structure as i t was, and 
"become part of a T s a r i s t Russian advance on China", or they could "liquidate" 
that s t r ucture "because i t was no longer capable of f u l f i l l i n g i t s functions" 
by the means of s o c i a l revolution. (33) The f a l l of the Russian Empire 
precluding the former, the l a t t e r therefore became the only way forward. 
In the remainder of t h i s a r t i c l e and at greater length in 1936 Lattimore 
was als o able to account for the f a i l u r e of Inner Mongolian nationalism by 
employing the same approach. (34) In Inner Mongolia the features of the new 
era, p a r t i c u l a r l y railway-fed colonisation, prevented a repetition of the 
f r o n t i e r c y c l e h i t h e r t o enacted upon the collapse of a Chinese dynasty. And 
extensive co-operation by the n o b i l i t y and clergy i n t h i s colonisation had 
de c i s i v e l y compromised most of them in the eyes of the Mongol commoners. The 
parlous and decaying condition of the Mongols stimulated the r i s e of 
nationalism which, id e n t i f y i n g the decline of the Mongols as a people with 
Chinese interference, sought a remedy in a movement towards self-government. 
In time "conservative" and " r a d i c a l " groups i n t h i s movement became 
distinguished with respect to the rol e they wished to accord the old e l i t e in 
the new p o l i t i c a l order which they were t r y i n g to create. 
But the antipathy f e l t by Mongols towards Chinese disguised the r e a l 
source of Mongol impoverishment, which was the ru t h l e s s exploitation of the 
f r o n t i e r peoples, In the manner of one presenting a new and important 
discovery - and there i s no doubt that t h i s theory would influence Lattimore's 
view of the Mongols henceforth - Lattimore s t a t e s that the true problem was 
not the opposition of n a t i o n a l i t i e s but one of "the re l a t i o n of s o c i a l 
.structures to economic systems", (35) Autonomy under t h e i r own princes would 
have led to l i t t l e i f any improvement amongst the common people since to equal 
the power of the p r o v i n c i a l Chinese authorities these nobles would have had to 
place such exactions upon t h e i r people (for they were so dispersed and so few) 
as would lower them to the l e v e l of the Chinese peasantry of the frontier; and 
t h i s despite the f a c t that the common Mongol herdsman i f l e f t to himself 
enjoys a higher standard of l i v i n g than h i s Chinese counterpart. Thus arose a 
more r a d i c a l form of nationalism seeking the promotion to power of able 
commoners, but as most of the n a t i o n a l i s t s shared a common a r i s t o c r a t i c 
background treachery and d i v i s i o n s prevented them from choosing any coherent 
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strategy. Some of the d i s i l l u s i o n e d members of the movement l e f t for Outer 
Mongolia where they may have contributed to the awareness that developed there 
of the " l i m i t a t i o n s of nationalism"; others looked abroad in the hope of some 
form of foreign-led l i b e r a t i o n . Outer Mongolia eventually took the road of 
"economic and s o c i a l revolution" as a Soviet " s a t e l l i t e " whereas the e l i t e s of 
Inner Mongolia sought a s s i s t a n c e from Japan. Japanese conduct however, has 
shown the "old nationalism" to be a sham. The Japanese have preferred to keep 
the Mongols under a form of subjection and thus have kept a l i v e the power of 
the old e l i t e s i n preference to the economic and s o c i a l renovation which the 
Mongols so urgently require: 
"Intervention Cby Japan] has meant only the t r a n s f e r of control from 
Chinese overlords to Japanese proconsuls. Without some degree of 
s o c i a l revolution. Inner Mongolian nationalism can only be led by 
the a r i s t o c r a t s . The lower ranks of the a r i s t o c r a c y may be r a d i c a l 
i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s , but they do not hold the decisive power. 
I t i s the r u l i n g princes, together with the high lamas, who hold 
such r e a l power as e x i s t s ; and they, because of the dichotomy 
between t h e i r c l a s s i n t e r e s t s and national i n t e r e s t s , can never free 
themselves from subordination to an overlord power. Nor can Inner 
Mongolia r a i s e i t s e l f from being exploited on a colonial l e v e l 
except by an economic revolution interacting with s o c i a l 
revolution." (36) 
For the Mongols, as a consequence, s o c i a l revolution i s on the agenda; "the old 
nationalism i s dead". Accordingly amongst many Mongols at t h i s time the 
pres t i g e of Outer Mongolia was on the r i s e . 
By 1935, then, Lattimore had begun to pose ce r t a i n quite s p e c i f i c 
questions of Mongol society. He sought to determine whether t h i s s o c i a l 
s t r u cture could deal with the challenges to and pressures upon i t , and he found 
i n t e l l i g i b l e an answer which exposed the i n t e r e s t s of the various c l a s s e s 
found therein. The evidence suggests that Lattimore's thinking took t h i s 
d i r e c t i o n as a r e s u l t of h i s own observation and experience which were 
undoubtedly c r y s t a l l i s e d by the f a i l u r e of the Inner Mongolian n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement e i t h e r to express a unified Mongol point of view or su c c e s s f u l l y to 
e x t r a c t favourable terms from the Nanking government. In h i s la t e r discussion 
of the ideas and theories which had affected h i s work Lattimore notes that 
Owen Lattimore and Asia P^S^ 35 
F r o n t i e r Society and Mongolian Nationalism/2 
"the most nearly Marxist influence" (37) thereon was K a r l Wittfogel who at that 
time had yet to sever completely h i s r e l a t i o n s with the Communist movement. 
But whatever influence Wittfogel was to have subsequently he can only have 
played a small part i n t h i s discovery, since i t was quite f u l l y enunciated, as 
has been shown, i n an a r t i c l e published at the beginning of 1935 whereas the 
two men were not to meet u n t i l August of that year. (38) 
The Prospects for China 
Thus possessed of new i n s i g h t s , Lattimore turned h i s attention to China, 
the other half, as i t were, of the Mongol puzzle. Nanking had f a i l e d to adopt 
an equitable policy towards the Mongols for reasons i n t e r n a l to China and the 
Kuomintang regime. Sun Yat-sen's ide a l of treating the national minorities as 
"equal c i t i z e n s of a federated Republic" had been abandoned with the r i s e to 
prominence of c o l o n i s i n g and m i l i t a r y i n t e r e s t s within the regime following 
"the abandonment by Nanking of a revolutionary policy for China a f t e r 1928". 
Writing at the time of the "Sian Incident" of December 1936, when Chiang Kai-
shek was r e l u c t a n t l y forced by a m i l i t a r y rebellion into a l l i a n c e with the 
Communist Party to r e s i s t further Japanese encroachements, Lattimore argues 
that the root of the Mongol problem lay in China. This problem would not be 
solved u n t i l there was a return to the position of Sun Yat-sen which "would 
r e s u l t in something very much l i k e the 'united front' which the Chinese 
Communists demand and offer". (39) Lattimore's favourable assessment of the 
prospects for the Chinese Communists did not depend e n t i r e l y however on t h e i r 
alleged freedom from s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . Just as Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) and 
the other Long Marchers were making t h e i r way f i n a l l y into Shensi (Shaanxi) 
a f t e r t h e i r long trek under Kuomintang harassment from the southeast, 
Lattimore was advancing the view, consistent with h i s e a r l i e r geopolitical 
observations, that a new and s p e c i f i c a l l y continental chapter was opening in 
the Asian communist movement. An inland base, such as the communists were 
soon to construct at Yenan (Yanan), would permit them to make contact with and 
draw upon the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d strength of the Soviet Union i n much the same 
way as had been possible for the People's Revolutionary Party in Mongolia. 
And i n a most prophetic passage, a l l the more remarkable given the lack of 
information at that time about the communists in Peking, Lattimore observes 
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that "those who both evade the government troops and survive the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of the country they tr a v e r s e w i l l come out with the reputation of 
supermen". (40) 
The impression that the communists were in China to stay was confirmed 
when Lattimore t r a v e l l e d to Yenan i n June 1937. Acting as a guide and 
i n t e r p r e t e r to two Americans, P h i l i p Jaffe and T.A. Bisson,(41) Lattimore took 
part i n interviews with Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders and was able 
to form an estimate of these men and t h e i r programme, p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t 
affected the minority peoples. Although he was much la t e r to r e c a l l that h i s 
interviews at a t r a i n i n g school for minorities were abruptly closed when he 
began to d i s c u s s Communist Party policy towards the Mongols in the Mongol 
language rather than Chinese, (42) at the time he was to write that the 
communists were neither manipulative nor c h a u v i n i s t i c i n t h e i r attitude 
towards Moslems, Mongols and others. In the same a r t i c l e s (written for though 
never published by The Times) he concludes that i r r e s p e c t i v e of what course of 
action Japan adopts the communists w i l l prove to be a force to be reckoned 
with: 
" I f Japan does not f i g h t the Communists w i l l emerge as a legal 
party with influence a l l over China and a s o r t of p r o v i n c i a l status 
in the region they already control. I f Japan fights, and the 
Communist theory of the r e l a t i o n between army and population in a 
'semi-colonial' country i s correct, a large part of both army and 
people w i l l go over to the Communists."(43) 
In the month following the t r i p to Yenan the Japanese began t h e i r 
invasion of China proper and Lattimore found the environment for h i s e d i t o r i a l 
and research work increas i n g l y adverse. He therefore returned in December 
1937 to the United States and under the patronage of University President 
I s a i a h Bowman joined the s t a f f of Johns Hopkins i n Baltimore, f i r s t as a 
lecturer and l a t e r as Director of the Page School of International Relations, 
where he remained u n t i l 1941. In these years Lattimore began to publish some 
of the preliminary studies for Inner Asian Frontier of China, he also wrote a 
number of pieces on the Sino-Japanese War and the part he considered the 
United St a t e s ought to be playing. And he put together a long and r e f l e c t i v e 
account, based on h i s t r a v e l l i n g notebooks, of the various journeys in Inner 
Mongolia which were the raw material of h i s observations on Mongol society, 
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h i s t o r y , and p o l i t i c s , (44) The preliminary studies are best considered 
together with the work to which they gave r i s e , but Lattimore's writings on 
the c o n f l i c t i n China deserve some a n a l y s i s here. They reveal an attempt to 
combine Lattimore's knowledge of the geopolitics of E a s t Asia with what he 
discovered of the dynamics of the s o c i e t i e s i n question, themes he was to 
explore at great length in h i s wartime and postwar writings on the new place 
of Asia i n the world. 
As e a r l y as May 1936 there are c l e a r indications that Lattimore began to 
see the problems of E a s t Asia more in global terms. Neither continental 
c o n f l i c t between Russia and Japan nor a forward policy towards the Mongols by 
the Japanese are inevitable: both depended on developments in the West and in 
the League of Nations. But the pressures within Japan for conquest and 
expansion are inexorable, and can only be checked by external powers.(45) 
Writing i n 1937, only a month a f t e r the Marco Polo Bridge incident which 
f i n a l l y p r e c i p i t a t e d the Sino-Japanese War, Lattimore predicted, corre c t l y as i t 
turned out, that the Japanese would be most l i k e l y to capture most i f not a l l 
of the Chinese c o a s t a l areas but would make l i t t l e headway in the 
hinterland. (46) Those i n the West, Lattimore argued, who preferred such 
"limited" war were merely a s s i s t i n g the aggressor, the circumstances c a l l i n g 
for resolute a s s i s t a n c e to be rendered to China and to the other victims of 
s i m i l a r attacks, notably Spain. In a more considered piece Lattimore exposes 
the geographical b a s i s of the c o n f l i c t . The f a i l u r e of the i n i t i a l Japanese 
a s s a u l t on Shansi had prevented them from advancing on China along the 
t r a d i t i o n a l avenue of conquest, inland from the north. This f a i l u r e had in 
some measure s i g n a l l e d the i n a b i l i t y of the Japanese ever to bring t h e i r 
invasion to a s u c c e s s f u l conclusion. Advancing from the coast and up the 
r i v e r v a l l e y s would leave Japan in possession of the greater part of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l heartland but would not offer a decisive advantage. 
In the hinterland, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the south-west, there existed great potential 
for development, a potential which only needed "a new Individual mentality and 
a new s o c i a l outlook" (47) neither of which was beyond the people or t h e i r 
regime. The i n s u f f i c i e n c y of Japanese power was underlined by Soviet 
resolution to defend her Far Eastern borders, and those of Outer Mongolia, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as revealed i n the outcome of the fighting at Changkufeng 
(Zhanggufeng) i n 1938, when Soviet forces repulsed a Japanese advance in 
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disputed t e r r i t o r y where the Manchukuo, Korean, and Soviet borders met. (48) 
Indeed, the importance of the Soviet Union in any l a s t i n g settlement in East 
Asia could not be understated. In an a r t i c l e devoted to the Central Asian 
supply route by which Soviet a i d reached China Lattimore exposed the l i k e l y 
consequences of B r i t i s h and American v a c i l l a t i o n over keeping open alternative 
routes (notably the Burma Road) to the Chinese hinterland. Chinese 
development i s possible from two new centres - from the north-west, to link up 
with the USSR and Central Asia, and from the south-west towards the maritime 
countries. B r i t i s h and American inaction may decide which of these 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be r e a l i s e d . (49) 
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3 : Inner- As±an Fr-on-bxei-s 
Owen Lattimore returned to the United States at the end of 1937, taking 
up a position, under the patronage of college President the geographer Isaiah 
Bowman, i n i t i a l l y as Lecturer then as Director of the Page School of 
International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. Inner Asian Frontiers of 
China was published i n 1940 but Lattimore r e f e r s to i t s period of gestation as 
ten years, and by 1937 h i s ideas were s u f f i c i e n t l y developed for him to write 
at length on two of the most important themes of the book. The f i r s t concerned 
the dynamics of nomad (es p e c i a l l y Mongol) society, the second the abiding 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n i n the era before i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . 
The complex of h i s t o r i c a l i s s u e s Lattimore had s e t himself to investigate 
had two p r i n c i p a l aspects. He had come round to the view (expressed as early 
as 1932) that the impact of the nomads was a c r u c i a l factor in Chinese 
h i s t o r y . He had a l s o been persuaded of the r e l a t i v e i n a b i l i t y of the Chinese to 
adopt any other way of l i f e than that which permitted the reproduction of a 
sedentary agrarian pattern. He had therefore to explain both phenomena given 
that repeated nomad-Chinese in t e r a c t i o n s had led neither society to a l t e r i t s 
fundamentals. 
Toynbee on the Nomads 
In a lecture delivered i n 1936 Lattimore sought to refute Toynbee's 
interpretation of the major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of nomad c i v i l i z a t i o n . Toynbee (and 
Huntington, upon whose work Toynbee r e l i e d ) had been an important early 
influence on Lattimore. He had, moreover, quoted Lattimore's writings on 
Manchuria with approval in the same volume of A Study of History in which h i s 
views on nomads were expressed. But h i s argument was the greatest challenge to 
Lattimore's present views s i n c e he maintained that nomadic c i v i l i z a t i o n though 
i t was an h i s t o r i c a l "tour de forc^' was a response to external forces and 
thus was, i n essence, a c i v i l i z a t i o n without an independent history. Nomadism, 
on Toynbee's view, "may be conceived as having a r i s e n in response to the 
searching challenge of desiccation". (1) Innovation may be allowed to the 
nomads i n that t h e i r way of l i f e seems to have evolved subsequent to the 
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discovery of s e t t l e d agriculture (which permitted the i n i t i a l domestication of 
animals, the foundation of nomadism). But thereafter they are the prisoners of 
t h e i r predicament, and the periodic eruptions of these peoples onto the centre-
stage of world h i s t o r y are t o be understood as the result of the operation of 
two external forces: 
"The Jlomad i s occasionally pushed o f f the Steppe by a fresh turn of 
the c l i m a t i c screw which i n t e n s i f i e s the pressure to a degree which 
even the trained and hardened steppe-dweller cannot endure; and 
again he i s occasionally pushed out of the Steppe by the suction of 
a social vacuum which has arisen i n the domain of some adjacent 
sedentary society through the operation of h i s t o r i c processes, such 
as the breakdown and di s i n t e g r a t i o n of a sedentary c i v i l i z a t i o n 
..." (2) 
That I s t o say, whenever the nomad appears on the stage of world history he 
i s either forced from his accustomed habitat by adverse changes i n weather 
conditions or drawn towards s e t t l e d societies by the super f l u i t y of goods 
therein, In a lengthy annex t o t h i s volume of his book Toynbee attempted to 
prove th a t nomadic h i s t o r y could be explained i n i t s e n t i r e t y by the operation 
of these "two mechanical causes", though he had the foresight also to append a 
note by G.F. Hudson which pointed out some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the 
Huntington view of desiccation, the more important of the two causes. Hudson 
argued that desiccation need not necessarily lead t o a reduction i n the amount 
of pasture available t o nomadic peoples, and that such empirical evidence as 
there was available d i d not support i n several instances the chronology of 
nomadic h i s t o r y drawn up by Toynbee himself,(3) 
Although he accepted Toynbee's view that nomadism was a r e l a t i v e l y late 
human development, Lattimore took issue with the assertion that the nomads had 
no h i s t o r y , t r e a t i n g t h i s as a serious hypothesis rather than as an echo of 
Hegel, He accepted that, i n the i n i t i a l stages, the environment was l i k e l y to be 
a powerful determinant upon a p r i m i t i v e society, but he also argued that the 
very marginality of the nomad habitat could lead to the exercise of choice and 
i n i t i a t i v e . Mongol society, f o r example, was replete with instances both of 
c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l s and adaptations, And a study of Mongol his t o r y revealed not 
so much a cycle as a s p i r a l form of development: the empire of the Hsiung-nu 
(Xiongnu) (209 BC - 155 AD) could not be compared with that of Chinggis 
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(1206-1227 AD). Moreover, rel a t i o n s with sedentary societies often led the 
nomad to modify h i s way of l i f e through commerce or even by way of adopting 
the practice of oasis agriculture. As these relations were important throughout 
most of Mongol h i s t o r y , " i t i s the poor nomad who i s the pure nomad", (4) 
The Dynamics of Chinese society 
In t a c k l i n g the problem of the dynamics of Chinese society Lattimore 
turns Toynbee on his head.(5) He does not go so f a r as t o suggest that the 
Chinese have no h i s t o r y , but he does observe that reliance over many dynasties 
upon a r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d f r o n t i e r zone, the Great Wall, suggests that some 
constant factors have been at work i n that history. Following Carl Whiting 
Bishop, Karl V i t t f o g e l , and a number of geographical authorities from von 
Richthofen to Thorp (6), Lattimore develops the view that geography was of 
v i t a l importance i n determining the extent t o which Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n could 
expand. Ar i s i n g i n the readily c u l t i v a t e d loess regions of the north, and 
extending with the development of more extensive i r r i g a t i o n systems under 
state tutelage i n t o the r i v e r regions of central and south China, t h i s 
c i v i l i z a t i o n could only incorporate those new t e r r i t o r i e s i n which such a 
pattern of l i f e could be reproduced. Chinese society was "cellular" i n 
character, each a g r i c u l t u r a l region being dominated by a walled c i t y i n which 
was conducted such market exchange of ar t i s a n and a g r i c u l t u r a l produce as was 
necessary. Long range transport was generally r e s t r i c t e d to the carrying of 
t r i b u t e grain to the c a p i t a l by way of a canal system operated by state 
stipendaries. P o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n had not destroyed t h i s c e l l u l a r structure, 
and as there were no insuperable obstacles to i t s reproduction i n the southern 
margins, China expanded i n d e f i n i t e l y i n th a t direction. Particular h i s t o r i c a l 
circumstances d i d give r i s e to the control of the oasis regions of Sinklang, 
Ninghsia, and Kansu, but these areas never assumed major importance. 
In the north, however, the Chinese were confronted by "the factor of 
range", the very term Toynbee employs to account f o r the geographical 
de l i m i t a t i o n s of nomad societies.(7) Although attempts were made by successive 
Chinese dynasties t o expand i n the north beyond those t e r r i t o r i e s suitable f o r 
intensive, sedentary agriculture, notably i n the Ordos (Mu Us) region, these 
attempts were i n the long run unsuccessful. In considering the impact of t h i s 
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f r o n t i e r upon Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n once the Ch'in (Qin) and former Han 
dynasties had endeavoured to give i t a hard and fast d e f i n i t i o n , Lattimore 
f i n d s that these marginal t e r r i t o r i e s exercise a " p u l l " on t h e i r inhabitants 
every b i t as important as the "pressure" brought t o bear by t r i b a l barbarians 
upon China, Here Toynbee's argument i s recast, with the inhabitants of the 
sedentary empire being pulled towards the steppe as much as the steppe nomads 
are being pulled by a temporary power vacuum towards the fleshpots of a 
se t t l e d c i v i l i z a t i o n . In seeking t o act beyond the natural "range" of the 
p o l i t i c a l and soci a l forms that were the enduring foundation of Chinese 
c i v i l i z a t i o n successive Chinese empires created a population of frontiersmen 
upon whom t h e i r new environment exercised a sometimes f a t a l a t t r a c t i o n : 
"The Ch'in u n i f i c a t i o n of the Great Wall Frontier, by acquiescing i n 
the development of a special f r o n t i e r population, not wholly Chinese 
i n i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , compromised the idea of r i g i d i t y that was 
essential to the Great Wall theory of f r o n t i e r delimitation. I t 
exceeded the effe c t i v e range of action of the newly established 
imperial state ... making i t possible f o r disruption t o begin under 
the feet of the successful conquerors."(8) 
Although the imperatives of the fixe d pattern of Chinese society required the 
existence of a d e f i n i t e f r o n t i e r , the geography of the region was t r a n s i t i o n a l , 
p e r m i t t i n g t o the borderers more than one way of l i f e . From the Ch'in dynasty 
to the eighteenth century, then, attempts to deli m i t the f r o n t i e r s of China i n 
the north and north-west presented a problem insoluble i n the long run. 
Thus were the o r i g i n s o'f the policy of the f r o n t i e r "reservoir" described 
i n Lattimore's e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , To hold the f r o n t i e r the co-operation of the 
"pa r t l y s i n icized nomads and semibarbarized Chinese" of the marginal zones was 
necessary. Their r o l e was therefore c r u c i a l not merely f o r the maintenance of a 
par t i c u l a r dynasty but f o r the larger pattern of Chinese history: 
"In passive phases they represented the balance, at any given time, 
between China and the Frontier; but i n active phases they were 
agents of ferment i n f r o n t i e r relations, causing new adjustments of 
the balance and preventing i t from ever becoming s t a t i c and 
permanent. Because of t h i s , i t i s not always necessary to search the 
core of China f o r the causes of the great periods of Chinese 
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expansion. Nor are the ori g i n s of great nomadic conquests to be 
found only i n the widest regions of the true steppe."(9) 
The Argument of 'Inner Asian Frontiers of China' 
lAner Agian Frohtierg Qf China, i s largely the depiction, on a far broader 
h i s t o r i c a l and geographical canvas, of the themes dealt with i n Lattimore's 
essays of 1936-38. The study f a l l s i n t o two parts, an enquiry into the 
h i s t o r i c a l geography of Chinese f r o n t i e r s (with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the 
Great Wall), and an h i s t o r i c a l exemplification of that enquiry over the three 
periods of Chinese h i s t o r y - the e a r l i e s t period, the era of Chinese states, 
and the Imperial age. 
The work i s a comprehensive and wide-ranging synthesis of much 
scholarship that was then current - archaeological, h i s t o r i c a l , and 
sociological - and as might be anticipated i n many respects i t has now been 
overtaken by subsequent research. Lattimore's account of the spread of early 
bronze working i n t o China, f o r example, i t s e l f based on Bishop, Creel and 
others, would now be rejected by historians. (10) S i m i l a r l y , Lattimore's 
treatment of the Imperial (post-Ch'in) age as a single h i s t o r i c a l e n t i t y would 
now be regarded as an ove r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . In i t s time, however, the book was 
extremely i n f l u e n t i a l and deservedly so, Chinese hi s t o r y w r i t i n g i n English at 
that time tended t o ex h i b i t a bias towards philosophical and p o l i t i c a l 
developments t o the exclusion of other factors. And the influence of 
t r a d i t i o n a l h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l materials often focussed h i s t o r i c a l accounts upon 
the metropolis and the bureaucracy. Lattimore's w r i t i n g was timely i n that the 
findings of archaeology and economic h i s t o r y had begun t o force the revision 
of many conceptions derived from these sources. Moreover contemporary events -
the a c t i v i t i e s of Soviet Russia and Japan i n f r o n t i e r regions, and the forced 
withdrawal of the Kuomintang government t o Chungking (Chongqing) a f t e r 1937 -
demanded a new geographical and g e o - p o l i t i c a l view of China's past. 
In order t o consider the development of Lattimore's ideas, as well as to 
assess the extent of h is permanent contribution to scholarship, the following 
discussion w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to a review of the p r i n c i p a l themes of Inner 
Asian Frontiers of China. These themes, stated simply, are how the Chinese and 
the f r o n t i e r nomads came t o be distinguished, and how t h e i r c i v i l i z a t i o n s and 
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ways of l i f e have interacted. More generally they include the role that 
Lattimore accords to geographical factors i n his analysis. This w i l l be 
followed by a consideration of the response his ideas have generated amongst 
sp e c i a l i s t scholars. 
The origins of pastoral nomadism 
I t i s Lattimore's contention that f o r millenia mixed patterns of ways of 
l i v i n g including hunting, agriculture, and shepherding could be found over much 
of east and inner Asia. (11) From t h i s mixed pattern more specialised hunting 
and a g r i c u l t u r a l societies are l i k e l y to have evolved. Hunting peoples 
especially i n the margins between forest and steppe i n northern Asia could 
have turned t o herding as a supplement to or a modification of t h e i r way of 
l i f e , but nomadism as a d i s t i n c t i v e form of society and economy could only 
have developed with the domestication of appropriate animals, This in turn 
could only have been possible i n a pre-existing a g r i c u l t u r a l society able to 
provide food f o r r e l a t i v e l y closely confined animals from cultivated crops. I t 
i s Lattimore's f u r t h e r contention that the factor responsible f o r s e t t i n g the 
seal on pastoral nomadism as a d i s t i n c t c i v i l i z a t i o n i n Inner Asia was man's 
mastery of the horse. Horse r i d i n g imparted the mobility and s k i l l s which 
permitted an abandonment of permanent relations with marginal peoples and 
habitats i n favour of the extensive grazing of mobile herds ent i r e l y on the 
steppe. The s k i l l s learned at herding could also be employed i n warfare, and 
the pastoral nomads i n time produced a "natural cavalry" only to be contained 
m i l i t a r i l y by neighbouring sedentary societies at ruinous cost.(12) 
Lattimore postulates that marginal societies, forced towards the steppe 
by more vigorous a g r i c u l t u r a l communities, turned to animal control as a 
primary rather than a n c i l l a r y a c t i v i t y . These societies may have combined with 
some populations from the Siberian forest or Central Asian oasis zones to form 
a people thoroughly adapted to the steppe environment. (13) With the acquisition 
of the horse t h e i r transformation i n t o a separate people was complete. 
Lattimore goes on t o argue that Chinese h i s t o r i c a l sources are now to be 
viewed i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . The Jung (Rong) and Ti (Di) barbarians of the 
Spring and Autumn period of Chinese h i s t o r y (c.722-481 B.C.) were not thus to 
be equated with the northern barbarians of later times, s t i l l less were the 
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o r i g i n a l Chou (Zhou) conquerors who supplanted the Shang dynasty (c.l027 B.C.). 
The Jung, T i , and other t r i b e s are t o be considered rather as merely less 
developed and organised peoples excluded or absorbed by the expanding Chinese 
s t a t e l e t s of the time, True 'barbarians' can only be said to have come into 
existence when these s t a t e l e t s ceased t h e i r expansion i n t o the t e r r i t o r y more 
or less suited to agriculture which was open to them, and began to war with 
each other, creating as a by-product a "new steppe society [which] was both 
independent of the society of China and alternative to i t , " (14) This i s 
confirmed by the appearance of mounted nomads i n Chinese h i s t o r i c a l sources at 
the end of the f o u r t h century B,C, Thereafter the cycles of nomadic history, 
beginning with the states organised by T'u-man (Tuman) and Mao-tun (Maodun, 
Modun) of the Hsiung-nu (Xiongnu), were inextricably bound up with the history 
of China. 
The origins of Chinese civilization 
The emergence of Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n may be a t t r i b u t e d to the presence 
of extensive deposits of readily c u l t i v a t e d loess s o i l i n the middle reaches of 
the Yellow River (Huang He), these geographical conditions making possible the 
formation of the e a r l i e s t communities of sedentary intensive a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s . 
From a very early time the uncertain climate encouraged the development of 
i r r i g a t i o n , and i n the o r i g i n a l cradle of the c i v i l i z a t i o n i n valley a f t e r 
valley there evolved forms of co-operative and co l l e c t i v e enterprise, the 
granaries of which were safeguarded against less developed neighbours by a 
warrior class. In an account which shows an indebtedness to Bishop, as well as 
to Wittfogel and h i s Chinese colleagues Chi Ch'ao-ting ( J i Chaoding) and Wang 
Yu-ch'iian (Wang Yuquan)(15), Lattimore offers an interpretation of the 
formation of the centralized Chinese empire. 
With the extension of techniques evolved i n the loess region to the 
Chinese plains large scale co-operation p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the management of 
canal systems f o r i r r i g a t i o n and transport required an authority larger in 
scope than petty feudal lords. F i r s t s t a t e l e t s and then kingdoms came into 
existence, and "feudalism was burst asunder by t h i s growth". From the old 
n o b i l i t y there emerged a "scholar-gentry" class whose function was t o 
administer schemes of water con t r o l and conservancy of ever greater complexity 
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which demanded ever larger inputs of corv6e labour f or t h e i r execution. (16) 
Ultimately the centre of g r a v i t y of the c i v i l i z a t i o n moved towards the south, a 
region of pot e n t i a l grain surplus from which was drawn through canal borne 
transportation(17) the revenues f o r the administrative c a p i t a l , and into which 
the c i v i l i z a t i o n could expand without requiring a change i n i t s habitual 
pattern. 
But i n t h i s expansion l a t e r a l integration of the state remained weak. 
Lattimore returns t o the description offered e a r l i e r of the "cellular" character 
of Chinese society, the formation of which comprised "the adding together of 
innumerable units, which i n spite of local differences were essentially 
homogeneous, each consisting of a r u r a l landscape watched over by a walled 
c i t y - never, i n the more f e r t i l e parts of the country, more distant than a 
day's walk from the next c i t y . " (18) Apart from a li m i t e d variety of 
commodities, t y p i c a l l y s a l t , i r o n , tea, and s i l k , which were traded at longer 
range, the v i l l a g e was the unit of a g r i c u l t u r a l production and the walled c i t y 
provided such a r t i s a n c r a f t goods as were necessary t o supply local demand. 
High population densities and early reliance upon large scale mobilisation of 
labour f o r state administered water conservancy and transportation projects 
hindered the development of labour saving devices and machines. And the 
bureaucratic ethos of the administrative class recruited i n the main from the 
landed gentry who held the empire together dominated the towns, holding the 
development of commerce i n check by monopolies and other controls and 
f r u s t r a t i n g other innovations such as mining. (19) 
The pattern of Chinese history 
I f Bishop and the geographers were the p r i n c i p a l i n s p i r a t i o n f o r those 
portions of Inner Asian Frontiers of China which dealt with the geographical 
basis and pre-history of Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n - as Lattimore records. Bishop's 
"patient c r i t i c i s m helped me to f i n d ray way step by step into the Stone Age, 
and at least part way out of i t " (20) - the ultimate source of Lattimore's 
characterisation of the la t e r pattern of the Chinese p o l i t i c a l and economic 
systems i s c l e a r l y the Marxian conception of the Asiatic mode of production. 
How i t was t h i s conception and i t s elaboration which had already been 
Wittfogel's preoccupation f o r a decade, a preoccupation which had led to the 
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severing of his connections with the o f f i c i a l communist movement, (21) And 
Lattimore acknowledges that a f t e r h i s father, David, and Bishop, Wittfogel was 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t source of stimulus and support i n the w r i t i n g of his 
book. Indeed, the i n t e l l e c t u a l biography by Wittfogel's amanuensis claims that 
Wittfogel wrote a "long memorandum" to Lattimore a f t e r reading the o r i g i n a l 
d r a f t , which resulted i n many changes to the published version. (22) A review, 
therefore, of Lattimore's treatment of the dynamics of Chinese and Inner Asian 
h i s t o r y w i l l reveal the extent both of his o r i g i n a l i t y and of his indebtedness 
to others. 
In Marx's conception of the Asiatic mode of production the social and 
p o l i t i c a l structures which dominated the numerous a g r i c u l t u r a l v i l l a g e 
communities were constituted such t h a t no progress or h i s t o r i c a l development 
(from indigenous sources) was possible. The state machine, i n providing crucial 
aspects of the material conditions of production (especially waterworks, made 
possible by the geography of large r i v e r systems) controlled the ownership of 
landed property and continuously appropriated most of the production surplus, 
thereby preventing the formation of other classes who might usurp those 
functions.(23) Commerce and a merchant class could be found, and populous 
c i t i e s came i n t o being, but a l l were subordinated to the autocratic and 
bureaucratic ethos of the rul e r and the state machine. The parade of dynasties 
i n o r i e n t a l h i s t o r y was of no greater significance than the passing of clouds 
i n the sky since the fundamental r e a l i t y remained constant. 
Wittfogel evidently accepted much of t h i s sketch but sought to give i t a 
more h i s t o r i c a l dimension. In pa r t i c u l a r , from his e a r l i e s t s c i e n t i f i c w r i t i n g 
on China he endeavoured to explain the fact that though dynasties rose and 
f e l l , and the c i v i l i z a t i o n endured periodic crises, the mode of production 
remained unchanged. The best exposition of his answer i s to be found i n an 
a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1935, "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic 
History"(24), a source to which Lattimore i s clearly indebted. There Wittfogel 
maintains that w ith the commuting of labour rent to rent i n kind and then 
money rent, and with the completion of the Grand Canal and the s h i f t i n g of the 
economic centre of g r a v i t y to the lower Yangtze (Chang Jiang) basin, a mature 
p o l i t i c a l and so c i a l order emerged. Though t h i s order was destined to have a 
prolonged l i f e , i t could never escape a periodic cycle of c r i s i s . The efficiency 
of the p o l i t i c a l system depended upon as large a tax revenue as possible, the 
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agents f o r the co l l e c t i o n of which were ultimately the o f f i c i a l s . But these 
same o f f i c i a l s , or the "gentry" or landlord class from whom they were 
recruited, were i n t h e i r private capacity intent upon securing for themselves 
the largest landed estates possible and the largest practicable surplus from 
those estates. There was thus a tendency f o r the gentry to s h i f t more and more 
of the tax burden onto the peasantry and away from t h e i r own holdings, This 
had the effe c t of impoverishing elements of the r u r a l population and reducing 
them to tenant status, thereby diminishing further the tax base of the regime. 
At the same time the government's need f o r l i q u i d assets encouraged the use of 
money, the introduction of which f a c i l i t a t e d the emergence of a merchant class. 
As the merchants were not, i n general, superintending any new form of 
production, t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s served essentially to absorb a growing proportion 
of the surplus. Under these conditions either increasing r u r a l impoverishment 
led t o peasant rebellions which unseated the r u l i n g dynasty, or the enfeebled 
state was no match f o r invaders from without. This understanding of the cycle 
of Chinese h i s t o r y was the basis f o r a long a r t i c l e on the Ch'ing dynasty by 
one of Wittfogel's Chinese colleagues which Lattimore also cites with 
approval, (25) 
I t i s Lattimore's contention that once the feudal stage of Chinese history 
had been surpassed, and with i t a clear delineation had emerged between the 
Chinese and nomadic pastoral ways of l i f e , the in t e r n a l dynamics of Chinese 
c i v i l i z a t i o n produced a cycle of the kind described by Wittfogel. At one point 
the decline of dynasties i s s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to "the overdevelopment of 
the 'scholar-gentry'" i n the provinces and the corresponding evisceration of 
imperial revenues, though elsewhere Lattimore observes that overpopulation and 
the dwindling marginal returns of human labour i n agriculture may also have 
provoked p o l i t i c a l and social c r i s i s , (26) But t h i s i s only part of the story 
since, f o r Lattimore, one of the sources of Chinese h i s t o r y i s to be found on 
the f r o n t i e r s where quite a d i s t i n c t cycle could be discerned. I t i s necessary 
therefore to consider Lattimore's view of the forces at work i n nomadic 
society, and the impact of these forces on Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n , before his 
analysis of the pattern of Chinese h i s t o r y can be properly appraised. 
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Cycles of nomadic history and the appearance of marginal states 
Within the societies of the steppe Lattimore i d e n t i f i e s the following 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c phases of evolution. The need for mobility on the part of the 
steppe dwelling nomads imparted considerable powers to the t r i b a l chiefs who 
regulated the allotment of pastures and migration routes. A chief with a 
s u p e r f l u i t y of stock and followers might be tempted to employ his mobile 
followers on new endeavours, either "to r a i d China i f China were then weak, or 
to patronize trade i f China were strong, or even to experiment with 
agriculture," (27) These "departures from the steppe norm" produced i n time a 
"mixed society" of steppe, marginal, and sometimes a g r i c u l t u r a l t e r r i t o r y which, 
despite various expedients t r i e d by the rulers of such states, i n time broke 
asunder i n t o i t s incompatible constituents. The nomadic norm was reasserted i n 
the steppe, and the cycle began afresh, 
In t h i s cycle the role of "marginal" t e r r i t o r i e s and "marginal" men was 
c r u c i a l , T'u-man who rose to prominence amongst the Hsiungnu was a man from 
the Ordos, forced t o migrate through Chinese pressure, (28) His son, Mao-tun, 
"the f i r s t great khan of the Hsiungnu", was the master of a new kind of 
society which exercised the power of a t t r a c t i o n on some at the margins of the 
new Chinese empire and which had to be dealt with through a combined policy 
of trade, t r i b u t e , and warfare, (29) A s i m i l a r pattern may be seen i n the la t e r 
h i s t o r y of the Toba Wei, the Hsien-pi (Xianbi), the Juan-juan (Ruanruan), the 
Liao and Chin (Jin) dynasties, the Mongols under Chingghls and his successors 
and the Manchus,(30) And the o r i g i n a l leaders of most of these federations of 
peoples were "marginal men", individuals from the periphery i n a social as well 
as i n a geographical sense. They were "men of the border, who knew the 
structure of power both i n the steppe and i n China," (31) 
Lattimore gives some consideration also to the expedients that were 
employed to bridge the gap between steppe and sown i n t h i s succession of 
mixed states. Here the concept of the " t r i b a l reservoir" f i r s t discussed i n 
Lattimore's work on Manchuria enters as the device whereby a conquering 
dynasty of nomadic o r i g i n s kept more distant tribesmen at bay w h i l s t 
providing a ready source of levies f o r i t s rule of a g r i c u l t u r a l China, (32) 
Inner Asian conquerors and rulers of marginal states also employed specialised 
administrators of non-Chinese o r i g i n , sometimes i n conjunction with r e l i g i o n i n 
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an attempt to give longevity to t h e i r domains. Thus Chinggis used central 
Asian, Persian, and other servants to avoid becoming the captive of a Chinese 
bureaucracy. (33) Khobilai (Kublai, Qubilai) also patronised the Buddhist church, 
Tibetan monks being amongst his closest advisers, and he was venerated by 
them as an incarnation of Maitreya, though Lattimore does not point out the 
irony of the f a c t that i t was at t h i s time that Sung (Song) neo-Confucianism 
was brought under Mongol patronage to north China ultimately to become the 
philosophical orthodoxy, (34) 
Lama Buddhism did not put down l a s t i n g roots i n the period of the Mongol 
dynasty but i t was revived i n the sixteenth century by Altan Khan of the Tumet 
(Tiimed) whose r e l a t i o n s with the Tibetan bSod-nams rgya-mtsho recalled those 
th a t had existed between Khobilai and his preceptor 'Phags-pa, Lattimore's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these events places emphasis upon the mixed character of 
Altan's state, rather than the ideological convenience t h i s relationship had 
f o r both p a r t i c i p a n t s , Altan was "a c i t y - b u i l d i n g prince" seeking to rule a 
state inhabited by both pastoral and a g r i c u l t u r a l subjects, who pursued an 
active and successful policy of enriching his domains through trade with 
China, In such a state a "unifying agency" was required, and Altan's patronage 
and employment of Lama Buddhism supplied t h i s without ensnaring him in the 
net of Chinese culture. The church provided f o r the state a body of l i t e r a t e 
administrators, moreover 
"a celibate church with monastic property made possible a better 
management of the most important working problem of a l l such border 
states of mixed economy and society. The church's cooperative, 
impersonal t i t l e to property achieved a higher degree of integration 
between mobile pastoral property and fixed landed property than the 
society of the time could manage i n any other way. I t both stood 
between and linked together the families that were attached to the 
t r i b a l structure of power and those whose power was based on landed 
estates, tenantry, and c i t y a c t i v i t i e s . ( 3 5 ) 
Though the ultimate source of Manchu power was quite d i f f e r e n t , Manchu 
patronage i n the following century of the Buddhist hierarchy amongst the 
Mongols provided them with a useful device to reduce the Mongols to vassalage. 
The Ch'ing rulers were thus 
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"able to perpetuate a Mongol church that was independent of the 
princes, thus creating a permanent dyarchy i n Mongol a f f a i r s , with a 
church t h a t looked toward Tibet (whose p o n t i f f s were granted Manchu 
patronage) and princes that looked d i r e c t l y to the Manchu court i n 
Peking." (36) 
In considering the character of mixed states Lattimore revises his 
previous remarks on the role and character of the t r i b a l "reservoir" of 
f r o n t i e r dynasties. His emphasis had formerly been on the function of the 
reservoir as a source of troops and administrators f o r use wit h i n China, and 
as a m i l i t a r y screen against peoples fur t h e r out i n the steppe. How his work 
on nomads and t h e i r contacts with sedentary c i v i l i z a t i o n s , not to mention h i s 
personal experiences of nomads and t h e i r environment, led him to a more 
complex view. A l l mixed states were bound to experience, to some degree, a 
tension between the peoples of t h e i r two habitats. These peoples followed 
d i f f e r e n t patterns of l i f e , but some f r o n t i e r Chinese sought integration with 
the steppe, and some nomads desired greater contact with the trade and 
commodities of China, In t h i s way the varying form of mixed states was to be 
explained, and the reservoir could be seen t o have the additional function of 
muting or mediating these i n t e r n a l tensions, (37) But a consideration of the 
c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n mixed states raises the fundamental issue of the h i s t o r i c a l 
pattern of interactions between nomads and Chinese, the second major theme of 
the work. 
Nomad - Chinese interactions 
At several paints i n the book Lattimore pauses to review the relationship 
between nomads and Chinese, Having offered a characterisation of pastoral 
nomadism, Lattimore considers the evidence, given the r e l a t i v e self-sufficiency 
of the nomadic way of l i f e , of c l i m a t i c changes causing cycles of concentration 
and dispersal amongst the peoples of the steppe. Such cycles would impinge 
upon the neighbouring sedentary societies, r e s u l t i n g i n competition f o r land or 
warfare. But, quite apart from those reasons already considered f o r rejecting 
the desiccation hypothesis, Lattimore finds that the h i s t o r i c a l record shows 
th a t nomadism was never a "closed world". Irrespective of climatic fluctuations 
the nomads had always engaged i n a complex variety of contacts with adjacent 
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societies i n v o l v i n g trade, p o l i t i c a l domination, and warfare. The continuity of 
these contacts, and the need to consider them i n any account of the evolution 
of nomadic societies, was s u f f i c i e n t f o r Lattimore to describe nomad-Chinese 
interactions as a "symbiosis",(38) 
Lattimore then turns his atten t i o n to the formation i n China of national 
states, and the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n the period from about the s i x t h to the t h i r d 
centuries BC of the two d i s t i n c t ways of l i f e , nomadic and sedentary. As 
Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n expanded to occupy those areas suited to intensive 
c u l t i v a t i o n and warfare between the states became endemic, a " f r o n t i e r s t y l e " 
appeared i n Chinese history. This i s exemplified, according to Lattimore, i n 
the contrasting approach of those states at the outer l i m i t s of the 
c i v i l i z a t i o n , Chao (Zhao), Yen (Yan) and Ch'in (Qin). 
"In Chao the Frontier dragged away from China; the Chao borderers 
were ce n t r i f u g a l . In Ch'in the Frontier was part of a co-ordinated 
c e n t r i p e t a l process; i t contributed to the pressure of Ch'in on the 
rest of China." (39) 
In Chao, and also t o an extent i n Yen, the marginal character of the t e r r i t o r y 
and the use of "barbarian" t a c t i c s i n warfare led the borderers of those states 
to adopt a mixed way of l i f e . The r e s u l t i n g tensions i n Chao pulled the state 
apart. By contrast Ch'in expanded to the north-west i n t o t e r r i t o r y i n which 
Chinese s t y l e agriculture, sometimes i n oasis form, was s t i l l possible. The 
Chinese way of l i f e prevailed, and the borderers recruited into the Ch'in 
cavalry became the m i l i t a r y instrument f o r the u n i f i c a t i o n of China. Thereafter 
Lattimore f i n d s t h i s pattern repeated i n the hi s t o r y of the control of the 
f r o n t i e r regions: 
"a d i s t i n c t 'Frontier s t y l e ' i n Chinese hi s t o r y became recognizable: 
either a dynasty was founded beyond the Frontier or on the Frontier, 
and moved inward to establish i t s control over China, or i t was 
founded w i t h i n China and moved outward to establish control over 
the Frontier and sometimes beyond the Frontier."(40) 
At the end of Inner Asian Frontiers of China, having by then reviewed the 
imperial age of Chinese h i s t o r y , Lattimore brings his argument together, taking 
i n t o consideration also previous attempts t o explain the larger pattern of that 
h i s t o r y , The era of the Western Han (206 BC - 8 AD) saw the coming to 
maturity of the "Great Wall" character of China's rel a t i o n s with Inner Asia, a 
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character that persisted u n t i l i t s disruption by the Europeans u n t i l the 
nineteenth century. Now most w r i t e r s on Chinese h i s t o r y from the f i r s t great 
Chinese h i s t o r i a n Ssu-ma Ch'ien (Sima Qian, 145-90 BC) onwards have agreed 
that t h a t h i s t o r y i s periodic or cy c l i c , and Lattimore devotes some attention 
to those contemporary scholars who have influenced him the most. I t was Ch'ao-
t i n g Chi's view t h a t the most important cycle was the regular fluctuation from 
p o l i t i c a l unity t o p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n , a fluctuation t o be explained i n terms of 
the pre-eminence of "key economic areas". Building on Chi and Wittfogel, Wang 
Yii-ch'iian sought to explain the regular f a l l of dynasties by the operation of a 
bureaucratic cycle, the scholar-gentry gradually permitting the class from 
which they sprang, the landlords, t o escape an increasing proportion of t h e i r 
taxation, thus enfeebling and ultimately strangling the state, (41) I t i s 
Lattimore's contention that i n the periods of disorder which followed, a cycle 
of dynastic formation was repeated because the conditions were conducive to 
the r i s e of "marginal men" able t o lead the rebellious peasantry but 
s u f f i c i e n t l y f a m i l i a r w ith the old order to be able t o work with or manipulate 
the great wealthy clans and t o restore the apparatus of the state when the 
time was appropriate. Although i t i s a topic of only passing interest to the 
t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese h i s t o r i a n s upon whom he must re l y f o r evidence, Lattimore 
f i n d s a related phenomenon i n the foundation of the dynasties of the steppe 
s i m i l a r l y by marginal men. 
But how i s t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n of steppe and sedentary orders which resulted 
i n dynasties from beyond the Great Wall r u l i n g China to be explained? 
Wittfogel traces successful nomadic i r r u p t i o n s to the taxation cycle already 
mentioned. He also paints out tha t the nomadic capacity f o r and interest i n 
invasion was bound t o be greater than corresponding Chinese interest i n 
conquering the steppe. (42) Lattimore refines t h i s analysis by pointing out that 
these nomadic dynasties actually emerged from peoples not of the deep steppe 
but marginal t o Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n , possessed of leaderships with the 
m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l acumen to rule t e r r i t o r y of more than one type. I t i s 
they who evolved the policy of the t r i b a l "reservoir" to control t h e i r diverse 
domains. 
Why then i s there no int e g r a t i o n between China and the steppe despite 
t h i s long h i s t o r y of interaction? The explanation i s ultimately to be sought i n 
the environment. A g r i c u l t u r a l China and the true steppe regions are hosts to 
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ways of l i f e so disparate that there could be no unity of them i n h i s t o r i c a l 
times. Industrialism might have provided a bridge, but i n China the s u r f e i t of 
labour, and i n the steppe excessive mobility, prevented i t s appearance. The 
h i s t o r y of East and Inner Asia i s thus the his t o r y of two separate 
c i v i l i z a t i o n s each with t h e i r own cycles; the Chinese cycle helped to define 
and form the nomadic cycle, but thereafter the nomadic cycle brought to bear 
on the Chinese an independent force; 
"Inasmuch as the evolution of the Chinese agriculture and society, 
by the pressure i t put on the people of the steppe margin, helped to 
create the true steppe society, the nomad cycle was at least i n part 
a product of the Chinese cycle. Once established ... the nomad cycle 
acquired a vigor that enabled i t to interact on the c y c l i c a l history 
of China with independent force."(43) 
The geographical factor and the social structure 
Considering the i n t e l l e c t u a l influences on Lattimore to t h i s point, i t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t many accorded greatest weight t o the role of geographical 
factors i n the explanation of history. Thus Huntington attributed the 
migrations of the peoples of the steppe to climatic fluctuations, and Toynbee, 
though i n general committed to quite a d i f f e r e n t view of human c i v i l i z a t i o n , 
held that the nomadic form of l i f e having evolved the nomads were thereafter 
trapped by the exigencies of t h e i r environment. Although there are statements 
in Im^r Agian Frontiers Q£ Chiha that suggest a form of geographical 
determinism, t h i s i s not Lattimore's position. 
In Manchuria, argues Lattimore, the three types of t e r r a i n (agricultural 
land, steppe, f o r e s t ) have led to the evolution there of three types of history. 
For p r i m i t i v e peoples geography strongly conditions the way of l i f e they 
adopt, and the d i s t i n c t i v e s o c i a l and economic pattern of early Chinese 
c i v i l i z a t i o n could only have appeared i n the loess.lands of the middle Yellow 
River basin. Although the Chinese sought m i l i t a r y control of the west as a 
means to turn the flanks of the nomads, they held t h i s region f o r extended 
periods of time because the Taklamakan, without a zone of continuous pasture 
to provide a base f o r nomad a c t i v i t y , favoured a Chinese type of agriculture 
practised i n oases scattered around the central desert basin. (44) But as has 
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been shown the evolution of pastoral nomadism i s no simple response to the 
problem of s u r v i v a l posed by a parti c u l a r environment, requiring the 
application of techniques (especially the domestication of animals) that could 
only have appeared f i r s t i n sedentary societies. And the actual history of 
nomads i s i n e x t r i c a b l y bound up with the c i v i l i z a t i o n s of other environments. 
How then can Lattimore's evaluation of the geographical factor be 
character ised? 
Geography cle a r l y establishes parameters: the environment accounts f o r 
the fundamental and incompatible differences between nomadic and Chinese 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . However, the human species possesses an immense capacity f o r 
invention and adaptation, a belief which inclines Lattimore to view with some 
scepticism those interpretations of early Chinese h i s t o r y which explain the 
appearance of new techniques (bronze working, f o r example) solely i n terms of 
the d i f f u s i o n of ideas from outside the c i v i l i z a t i o n . Moreover, once a pattern 
of l i f e has become well established the society acquires a momentum of i t s 
own. Here, and especially i n his propounding of c y c l i c interpretations of 
nomadic and Chinese h i s t o r y , Lattimore reveals an abiding indebtedness to 
Toynbee and Spengler, Lattimore's account of the Chinese at t i t u d e towards 
marginal environments i s an excellent i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s social momentum, 
and of the p a r t i c u l a r unwillingness of the Chinese to modify long-standing 
habits and practices. Here a reliance upon extensive agriculture without 
i r r i g a t i o n supplemented by live-stock grazing would have supported a 
s i g n i f i c a n t population of Chinese, but 
"This was not possible f o r the new society of China, which, being 
committed t o i r r i g a t i o n , could not f l o u r i s h unless the population 
was concentrated - i n order to furnish the maximum supply f o r the 
necessary key enterprises, the canals ,.."(45) 
This tendency led i n the mixed states to attempts to s t a b i l i s e the dominant 
"social order" i n the geographical area the state occupied. Thus the Orkhon 
Turks patronised agriculture i n r i v e r valleys i n the f a r north of the steppe. 
But the parameters imposed by the environment are evident i n the eventual 
S i n i f i c a t i o n of dynasties of steppe o r i g i n , and i n the use by the Chinese 
e l i t e s i n marginal t e r r r i t o r i e s of barbarian practices, Lattimore's work on the 
contemporary period must be considered before a d e f i n i t i v e view of his 
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approach to the geographical factor and to the a b i l i t y of c i v i l i z a t i o n s to 
accept or generate change can be offered, 
Lattlmore and modern scholarship 
The impact of Inner Asian Frontiers of China may be assessed i n a 
vari e t y of ways, At the general level Lattimore's influence, and particular his 
"cellu l a r " description of t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese society, i s manifest i n the 
standard u n i v e r s i t y textbooks of John Fairbank and his collaborators (46), as 
well as i n subsequent work on s p a t i a l relationships i n the Chinese economy and 
society. In work on the p o l i t i c a l geography of boundaries and f r o n t i e r s i t i s 
also clear t h a t Lattimore's ideas have been of seminal importance. (47) 
Concerning the question of Lattimore's o r i g i n a l i t y , however, his impact on the 
study of nomadism and the relationship between nomadic and sedentary 
societies has been of l a s t i n g value. 
In h i s t o r i c a l work Lattimore's hypothesis that the appearance and 
evolution of nomadic societies and states could p a r t l y be understood as a 
response to developments w i t h i n neighbouring sedentary c i v i l i z a t i o n s has been 
taken up by scholars working on par t i c u l a r problems. Barfield, with the 
in s p i r a t i o n of Lattimore very much i n evidence, has explained the apparent 
paradox of the emergence from a small population and an extensive but 
undifferentiated economy of a r e l a t i v e l y sophisticated Hsiung-nu state i n terms 
of i t s relationship with China, State forms were required to manage the trade 
and plunder made possible by geographical propinquity. (48) Similarly Sechin 
Jagchid has underlined the essential antagonism between the two ways of l i f e 
i n East and Inner Asia, nomadic and a g r i c u l t u r a l . (49) 
One measure of the worth of a piece of scholarship i s whether or not i t s 
influence transcends d i s c i p l i n a r y boundaries. Here i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that 
anthropologists of Afric a have embraced Lattimore's nomadic hypothesis with 
enthusiasm. Weissleder has found that the relationship i n Ethiopia between the 
Amharic central government and the Adal nomads bears a close resemblance to 
that l i n k i n g the two societies of China's Inner Asian frontiers.(50) And i n an 
important survey a r t i c l e Dyson-Hudson has lamented the fact that Lattimore's 
influence was not f e l t e a r l i e r : 
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"In 1940 ,,, Lattimore's Inner Asian Frontiers of China had appeared, 
with the clear suggestion that nomadism could be a controlled 
p o l i t i c a l response and not merely an environmentally induced reflex. 
But the implications of that powerful suggestion were not 
systematically taken up 
Dyson-Hudson observes that "nomadism" as a concept i s vague and inadequate, 
since i t l i n k s two phenomena not necessarily related, livestock rearing and 
s p a t i a l mobility. 
"Yoking the two sets of phenomena together i s what has f a c i l i t a t e d 
the erroneous assumption th a t nomadic movement i s caused simply by 
environmental factors. Separating them out allows us to see that 
such movement may have social and (as Lattimore t r i e d to t e l l us 
t h i r t y years ago) p o l i t i c a l causes as well."(51) 
Fi n a l l y , i n the d e f i n i t i v e and encyclopaedic work of Khazanov, Lattimore's 
contri b u t i o n t o the study of nomads i s highly appraised. Khazanov"s own view 
i s that there may have been more than one path of development leading to the 
evolution of th a t d i s t i n c t form of society, He finds Lattimore too much 
inclined to regard nomadic societies as p o t e n t i a l l y autarchic, and he also 
holds the view th a t Lattimore's rejection of the p o s s i b i l i t y that desiccation 
or c l i m a t i c change may have been a factor i n the formation of particular 
nomadic societies i s a r b i t r a r y . (52) But i n the d i f f i c u l t but necessary task of 
bridging anthropological and h i s t o r i c a l research i n order to provide an 
adequate characterisation of nomadism, " i n every respect Lattimore's b r i l l i a n t 
book stands out on i t s own," (53) 
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Between 1941 and 1950 Owen Lattimore's reputation i n the scholarly 
community and i n public l i f e rose to considerable heights. In June 1941 he was 
chosen by President Roosevelt as his personal adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, a 
posit i o n he held u n t i l the end of 1942 when he returned to the United States 
to become Director of Pacific Operations of the Office of War Information. In 
the l a t t e r capacity he accompanied a party led by Vice-President Henry Wallace 
which, between 20 May and 5 July, v i s i t e d the Soviet Far East, China and 
Mongolia. At the end of the war, having by t h i s time resumed his academic 
career, he acted a.s an economic consultant to the American Reparations Mission 
to Japan led by Edwin W. Pauley. At Johns Hopkins University he organised an 
Inner Asia Seminar devoted to the study of the Chinese border regions. To 
assist these researches he brought to the United States a number of Mongol 
emigres who were l a t e r to make important contributions to the study of th e i r 
language and society. During and a f t e r the war he was an important participant 
i n conferences of the I n s t i t u t e of Pacific Relations, and i n 1949 he attended 
as a State Department nominee the American-Indian conference convened i n lew 
Delhi. In 1950 he went to Afghanistan as a member of a United Nations 
Technical Assistance Mission. But i n March of that year he was forced to 
return t o the United States t o face the controversy which e f f e c t i v e l y ruined 
his career. (1) In these years the scope of his work broadened and as a result 
of the exigencies of wartime and his connections with members of the United 
States government and administration he became almost exclusively concerned 
with contemporary issues. The i n t e l l e c t u a l foundations of his position can be 
traced however to his w r i t i n g s and experiences of the 1930s. 
America and the Sino-Japanese rar 
U n t i l the outbreak of the Pacific War Lattimore was concerned to cajole 
his countrymen i n t o an awareness of what was at stake i n the c o n f l i c t between 
China and Japan. By opening the Burma Road the Chinese have shown that they 
have the w i l l to defend themselves, but the war w i l l surely result i n such 
poverty and disloc a t i o n that the country w i l l be i n danger of succumbing to 
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Bolshevism. I f t h i s were to happen, the Chinese example would set a powerful 
precedent f o r the remainder of Asia.(2) Indeed, Lattimore finds American policy 
makes a poor comparison with that of the Soviet Union, a re f l e c t i o n of the 
fact that up u n t i l the German invasion of July 1941 with only a f r a c t i o n of 
the resources at i t s disposal Russia's m i l i t a r y and economic aid equalled that 
of the United States, (3) Lattimore pleaded f or the United States to exercise 
more f u l l y the undoubted economic leverage she possessed to curb Japan's 
m i l i t a r y adventures. His own appointment was an indicator of the personal 
in t e r e s t taken i n China by Roosevelt: while i n Chungking Lattimore had a 
dir e c t l i n e t o the President by way of Lauchlin Currie i n the White House(4). 
However, despite having abrogated the commercial treaty with Tokyo i n July 
1939 and banned steel exports to Japan i n 1940, the United States remained a 
major purchaser of Japanese goods and a source of some materials with war 
pote n t i a l u n t i l 1941. 
In Chungking Lattimore found Chiang Kai-shek disappointed and 
demoralised due to the f a c t that, despite shouldering the burden of the war 
against Japan, China was s t i l l without a formal alliance and excluded from the 
diplomatic and m i l i t a r y deliberations of the non-Axis powers. He conveyed i n a 
cable to the President i n August two proposals, the adopting of either of 
which Chiang believed would show that China was taken seriously i n the 
counsels of the "anti-aggression peoples". On the i n i t i a t i v e of Roosevelt, China 
should e i t h e r be drawn i n t o a pact with Russia and B r i t a i n which would provide 
f o r j o i n t m i l i t a r y action i n the event of an attack on one of the l a t t e r powers 
by Japan, or China should be involved i n j o i n t defence planning with the 
B r i t i s h , Dutch, and Americans i n the Pacific. (5) Nothing came of t h i s advice, 
and as f i g h t i n g continued between China and Japan through 1941 Chinese 
apprehension of possible i s o l a t i o n was heightened when i t became apparent that 
Washington and Tokyo were negotiating with the objective of arranging a 
modus Vivendi i n the Pacific. Lattimore reported that Chiang was "really 
agitated" at the prospect that Japan might as a result be able to resume 
purchasing o i l and other commodities from the United States. Just as the 
closure of the Burma Road f o r three months i n 1940 as a result of Japanese 
pressure destroyed B r i t i s h c r e d i b i l i t y i n China so these negotiations would 
f a t a l l y undermine American prestige and may t i p the hand of those Chinese who 
wished to abandon the struggle with Japan i n the interests of "oriental 
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s o l i d a r i t y " . (6) Now i t i s clear that t h i s resumption of l i m i t e d trade with 
Japan was the price American policy makers were prepared to pay f o r securing 
a p a r t i a l Japanese withdrawal from Indochina, a move they evidently f e l t would 
not only improve the security of the Philippines but would reduce the 
l i k e l i h o o d of an eventual Japanese attack on the Burma Road supply lin e to 
China. Indeed, i n early d r a f t s of a document o u t l i n i n g t h i s modus vivendi the 
Americans had proposed a withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and Sino-
Japanese t a l k s on the status of Manchuria, but by the time the Chinese 
government received o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n of these diplomatic manoeuvres 
American policy makers had become convinced that they would have to begin 
with much more l i m i t e d objectives. (7) In the event nothing came of these 
proposals, with the consequence th a t Japanese forces remained i n southern 
Indochina, the United States maintained the embargo on o i l exports to Japan 
imposed i n July, and Japan's leaders decided to launch the war i n the Pacific. 
Unusual i n commentators of that early stage of the war, Lattimore devoted 
some a t t e n t i o n to i n t e r n a l events i n China and to the effect on those events 
external pressures might have. There were good geographical reasons, he 
maintained i n mid-1941, f o r holding the view that the Japanese had so f a r 
f a i l e d to gain a str a t e g i c advantage i n China, While they did not hold the 
t r a d i t i o n a l invasion routes through Shansi, the Yellow r i v e r crossing at T'ung-
kuan (Tongguan), and the Han r i v e r basin they could not hope to dominate the 
country, despite the f a c t that they had occupied many of the most populous 
areas, "Strategic and economic geography lead to p o l i t i c a l geography", and the 
au t h o r i t i e s i n power i n unoccupied China ought to be able to turn the labour 
and resources of the inland to advantage. Both the Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party must s t r i v e to generate as much support as possible from the 
population and avoid morale sapping c o n f l i c t since i t "would be extremely 
dangerous f o r China as a whole i f Free China were i n fact sharply divided 
between a major area controlled by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and a minor 
area dominated by the Communists,"(8) External powers w i l l contribute to the 
e f f o r t s of the Chinese population to the extent that they support the "United 
Front" as opposed to one or the other of the two forces i n the country. With 
hindsight i t can be seen that Lattimore, though he was then optimistic of 
Chiang Kai-shek's leadership capacity, had i d e n t i f i e d i n 1941 the two most 
important issues that were to bedevil American policy makers in the years to 
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come. In 1944 the attempt by General Joseph S t i l w e l l to involve communist 
forces i n operations he hoped to mount against the Japanese i n the southeast 
was one of the issues which forced his r e c a l l . By that time Yenan was 
blockaded by large contingents of Kuomintang troops despite the fact that the 
CCP-Kuomintang alliance agreed at Sian i n 1935 was s t i l l formally i n effect. 
And i t was a continuous r e f r a i n of those aware of the true state of a f f a i r s i n 
the country (including S t i l w e l l , and John S. Service and other US Foreign 
Service o f f i c e r s ) that too l i t t l e of the supplies provided at great cost by the 
Americans f o r Chungking found t h e i r way to those armies f i g h t i n g the Japanese, 
the greater bulk which escaped misappropriation being earmarked instead f o r 
the forthcoming duel with the communists. (9) 
In a s i n g u l a r l y prescient piece, w r i t t e n i n A p r i l of that year, Lattimore 
addresses himself to the question of why i t i s that the Chinese have been able 
to sustain t h e i r resistance to Japan through four t e r r i b l e years. He finds that 
they have been motivated by a revolution defined i n terms of two objectives, 
i n t e r n a l reform and genuine national independence. Lattimore i s inclined to 
think that the Chungking government i s capable of leading the country to the 
a t t a i n i n g of those goals, but h i s concluding remarks s t r i k e a cautionary note: 
"... two things have already been proved i n these four years. The 
f i r s t i s that i n a war of aggression the people can be cheated, but 
i n a war of defense a government must make concessions to the needs 
of the people i f i t demands the lo y a l t y and sacrifices of the 
people. The second i s that i n China a r i g h t wing government can 
stand i f i t has a certain amount of foreign support and approval; 
but i f foreign attack overweighs foreign support, i t must get on 
with the revolution or i t w i l l f i n d that the revolution can get on 
without it,"(10) 
American war aims in the Pacific 
With the entry by the United States into the war, Lattimore's position 
became superfluous, though he stayed i n Chiang's service u n t i l the end of 1942. 
Much of his time was spent i n Washington endeavouring to put the case for the 
greatest support f o r Chungking and f o r g i v i n g p r i o r i t y to the war i n the China 
theatre. (11) In h is w r i t i n g s he turned h i s attention almost immediately to the 
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post-war settlement. Writing f o r an American audience he argued that a return 
to the status quo was both undesirable and impossible. The war was a f i g h t f or 
democracy; i t was no accident that i n Asia those nations that had mounted the 
strongest resistance to Japan, China and the Philippines, were f i g h t i n g with 
the promise of democratic self-government i n mind. According to Lattimore the 
Chinese are f i g h t i n g f o r a new democracy, and t h e i r struggle w i l l have an 
impact throughout Asia, Lattimore also took the position that f o r the United 
States events i n the Far East were of greater moment that events i n Europe: 
" t h i s i s a war about Asia". And i f democracy was to triumph i n Asia af t e r the 
war i t could not co-exist with imperialism. Americans should recognize t h e i r 
complicity i n the old i m p e r i a l i s t world order and resolve to bring i t to an 
end. This would be consistent with t h e i r own principles, i t would also ensure 
that the s o l i d a r i t y of the countries of the United Nations would be maintained. 
Here Lattimore appears to believe that the Soviet Union would regard an end to 
the col o n i a l order i n Asia as congruent with i t s own "nationality principle" 
which "makes no d i s t i n c t i o n whatever between the citizenship of Asiatics and 
the ci t i z e n s h i p of Europeans". But although Lattimore revises his earl i e r 
opinions about the p r a c t i c a l i t y of self-government f o r the Chinese, he admits 
that not a l l of the peoples of Asia are as prepared f o r self-government as the 
Philippines.(12) 
Thus begins a phase of Lattimore's w r i t i n g i n which he returns repeatedly 
to the problem of the possible shape of the post-war world p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
Asia, a problem which w i l l be reviewed l a t e r i n t h i s chapter. Personal 
experiences i n these years provided the background and impetus f o r themes 
which recur i n t h i s w r i t i n g . Lattimore developed an interest i n new 
geographical areas; he also acquired new insights i n t o the problems of 
colonial and post-colonial Asia. Residence i n Chungking made him aware of the 
economic and p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l of southwest China. No longer t i e d to the 
coast and to the old economic regions, the development of Yunnan was l i k e l y to 
be an ind i c a t o r of the shape of the new China. The opening of the Burma Road 
which was achieved by the Chinese themselves pushing outwards marked the 
beginning of a new era as surely as the renunciation of the old Treaty Port 
pri v i l e g e s i n 1942 by Great B r i t a i n and the United States. The impact of t h i s 
example on Southeast Asia w i l l be considerable, and China may well become an 
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a l l y of the nations i n the region should the Western countries attempt to 
restore the old colonial order a f t e r the war i s over.(13) 
Lattimore's extended t r i p to the Soviet Far East also led to w r i t i n g s on 
the character and poten t i a l of the region. Travelling the great c i r c l e a i r 
route from the continental United States by way of Alaska made him aware that 
the road to Asia lay north rather than west.(14) This gave him additional 
reasons f o r holding a view he had already expressed, that events i n the 
heartlands of the continent would be of greater consequence f o r the future 
than events that effected the rim. Thus Japan could never be held as a base 
against the Soviet Union. And a f t e r the war the struggle for the lo y a l t i e s of 
the various minority peoples of Inner Asia would be crucial. Here the Soviets 
held an immense advantage over China i n t h e i r mutual f r o n t i e r zone i n that 
t h e i r policy towards these peoples had so f a r been an "outstanding success". 
The Chinese had h i t h e r t o been hampered by the need to compete with foreign 
imperialisms, and by the assumption of c u l t u r a l s u p e r i o r i t y bequeathed to them 
by the Confucian t r a d i t i o n . Unless a revolutionary China can mobilise these 
peoples by o f f e r i n g them "an opportunity to go forward rapidly i n conjunction 
with a Chinese economy, society, and p o l i t i c a l structure which i s changing as 
r a p i d l y as t h e i r own", the power of a t t r a c t i o n exercised by the Soviet example 
w i l l prove too strong. In s t a t i n g t h i s view Lattimore develops a point which 
w i l l become a major preoccupation i n his l a t e r writings. For the peoples of 
Inner Asia, despite the vague appeal of such notions as democracy, t h e i r 
p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l choices could only be informed by what was f a m i l i a r to 
them. At present they were confronted with the fact that the superiority of 
Soviet as opposed to Chinese minority policy meant that the Soviets were " t i e 
standard of progress from the Ussuri and Amur r i v e r s to the Pamirs", (15) 
Lattimore devoted several popular w r i t i n g s to a Soviet minority policy. 
He argued that the close and apparently voluntary i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the 
minorities with the central government could be explained by the fact that the 
r i g h t s of the former had been granted by the Bolsheviks, (15) This opinion was 
no doubt p a r t l y a product of the s u p e r f i c i a l and carefully managed nature of 
the v i s i t of the Wallace mission, but i t i s also i n accordance with statements 
already published i n Inner Asian Frontiers of China, There Lattimore, basing 
himself on the testimony of refugees and on the contents of government 
statements, expresses the view that as a result of Soviet policy. 
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"the Khalkha Mongols now have, under the Mongol People's Republic, 
the most popular and representative government they have ever had 
and a r i s i n g standard of l i v i n g shared equally throughout the 
country." 
Russian intervention i n Sinkiang, by contrast with the previous policy of the 
Chinese, was s i m i l a r l y a l t r u i s t i c . I t sought to 
"eliminate as f a r as possible the subjection by force of one people, 
r e l i g i o n , culture, or economic a c t i v i t y to another, and to set up at 
least the beginnings of an equal and proportional representation of 
the d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the province."(17) 
I t may be conjectured that Lattimore's approach to the Soviet 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s was conditioned by his Mongol experiences. He imagined that t h e i r 
societies were also forced to choose between the stark and mutually exclusive 
alternatives - i n t e r n a l revolution or extinction - faced by the Mongols. The 
Mongols as a d i s t i n c t people had been saved by Soviet intervention, therefore 
the same must be true of the rest of Inner Asia's minorities. Certainly none of 
Lattimore's observations i n 1944 i n Ulan Bator or Tihwa (Uriimqi), r e s t r i c t e d 
though they were, caused him to revise his opinions. But the s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of 
the Wallace mission as a sound foundation f o r the analysis of any aspect 
whatever of Soviet policy i n the Far East i s revealed by the fact that one of 
the l o c a l i t i e s v i s i t e d was Kolyma, the s i t e of the Arctic death camps 
controlled by Dals t r o i (Far Northern Construction Company). Even at that time, 
as Robert Conquest points out,(18) accounts of these camps by former inmates 
were becoming available, but Lattimore, oblivious to Dalstroi's true function, 
enthuses about the atmosphere i n the gold mines, f i n d i n g i t a far cry from the 
disorder of the American f r o n t i e r ; 
" I t was i n t e r e s t i n g to f i n d , instead of the si n , gin, and brawling of 
an old-time gold rush, extensive greenhouses growing tomatoes, 
cucumbers, and even melons, to make sure that the hardy miners got 
enough vitamins." (19) 
Lattimore much la t e r defended h i s conduct, arguing that he could not then have 
known of the character of these Siberian settlements, but he was never led to 
revise h is assessment of Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s policy. (20) 
Owen Lattimore and Asia Page 73 
Geopolitics and Foreign Policy/4 
American policy in postwar Asia 
Back i n the United States Lattiraore, i n addition to his work with the 
Office of War Information, became a popular and i n f l u e n t i a l speaker at 
u n i v e r s i t i e s and colleges. In two lectures at Claremont College he developed at 
greater length his views on the war and the d i r e c t i o n United States policy 
should take at i t s conclusion. So important did he regard the c o n f l i c t i n China 
that he even expresses the view that the major b a t t l e with Japan should be 
fought there, rather than i n the Pacific theatre, America should ensure that 
the post war world order i s democratic, which implies a demolition of the old 
colonial system. As to the prospects f o r China, Lattimore i s confident that 
c i v i l war w i l l be averted under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek vfho he 
regards as "a world statesman of real genius". However he also develops the 
general argument that as revolutionary upheavals are the product of bad 
government rather than subversion, American policy should aim to support 
governments prepared to provide property, security, and hope f o r t h e i r 
populations, America must not "make the mistake of assuming that strong 
government i s more important than good government", (21) Here i t i s clear which 
side Lattimore inclines towards i n the dilemma which has confounded United 
States policy makers from that time to the present: whether to back as a l l i e s 
those states with s i m i l a r foreign policy interests irrespective of the nature 
of t h e i r i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l systems, or whether to embrace only those states 
s i m i l a r l y dedicated to the same democratic ideals. 
Lattimore elaborated on these themes in lectures delivered in 1944, and 
published the following year as Solution i n Asia. There Lattimore argues that 
America i n imposing a punitive peace on Japan should allow some industry to be 
r e b u i l t but should not protect the i n s t i t u t i o n of emperor which could never be 
the focus of a democratic p o l i t i c a l order without an int e r n a l revolution. In 
any case, i t i s Lattimore's belief that events i n Japan w i l l be subordinate to 
events i n China the shaping of which should be the United States' chief 
preoccupation. 
In considering China Lattimore develops a much more detailed analysis 
than he had attempted heretofore, and one which he was able to describe t h i r t y 
years l a t e r as "pretty sound", (22) China, i t i s his view, i s i n the g r i p of an 
upsurge of nationalism stimulated by the external pressure of imperialism and 
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the revolutionary example of Soviet Russia. In the pursuit of national unity 
the wide c o a l i t i o n of forces led by Sun Yat-sen gave way i n 1927 to a 
narrower grouping of "bankers, i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , employers, landlords, and 
m i l i t a r y leaders". Chiang Kai-shek became the focus of t h i s grouping but he 
never became a d i c t a t o r since his true character was to be "a c o a l i t i o n 
statesman of genius". (23) The struggle between the communists and the 
Kuomintang that then occurred resulted i n a "Red Terror" and a "White Terror" 
both born of desperation. As to t h e i r respective merits, 
"The White Terror, i t should be pointed out, was as bad as the Red 
i n the things done, and worse i n the number of people to whom 
things were done. For every landlord or 'bourgeois' k i l l e d , scores of 
peasants were slaughtered, tortured, or burned i n t h e i r villages; 
untold numbers of peasant g i r l s were sold i n t o brothels and boys 
i n t o bondage. In China, as i n Pilsudski's Poland ... the White Terror 
was worse than the Red because i n a peasant country revolution 
attempts to break the g r i p of a minority, while counterrevolution 
attempts t o break the w i l l of a majority." (24) 
The nature of t h i s struggle was transformed, however, by the growth of the 
Japanese menace which made cooperation between communists and Kuomintang 
possible. The Communist Party widened i t s base of support and modified i t s 
position, according to Lattimore, to become a "co a l i t i o n party" with a policy 
no longer antagonistic but now merely alternative to that of the government. 
At the same time the move to the i n t e r i o r weakened the hold of the bankers 
and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s over the Kuomintang. The party became bureaucratised, and 
came to r e l y increasingly f o r i t s support i n t h i s predominantly r u r a l area on 
the landlord class. By contrast the Communist Party i n Yenan was forced to 
address i t s e l f to the needs of the peasantry and pursuing a moderate policy on 
the land question came to embody the broad peasant interest. In the 
circumstances of t h e i r base area at Yenan, being dependent upon the support of 
the local population the communists have created a sizeable enclave where 
basic economic conditions are better than i n the regions controlled by the 
Kuomintang, and where taxation and conscription are more equitably managed. 
P o l i t i c a l conditions i n Yenan also compare favourably with those i n Chungking: 
"The p o l i t i c a l structure under the Communists i s more nearly 
democratic than i t i s under the Kuomintang, I t i s a fact that 
Owen Lattimore and Asia Page 75 
Geopolitics and Foreign Palicy/4 
governing committees and representative committees are elected, and 
that the Communists l i m i t themselves to one t h i r d of the 
representation; whereas i n Kuomintang-controlled t e r r i t o r y i t i s 
increasingly d i f f i c u l t to hold a public position without jo i n i n g the 
Kuomintang and accepting i t s discipline,"(25) 
On the basis of t h i s assessment of the two parties characters and 
records, Lattimore advocates the creation of a c o a l i t i o n government before a 
unified m i l i t a r y structure i s formed as the best way forward. Only Chiang i s 
strong enough to head such a government but the creation of p o l i t i c a l freedoms 
p r i o r to the merging of m i l i t a r y forces w i l l ensure that parties other than 
the Kuomintang can play a role. What are the alternatives i f t h i s course of 
action i s rejected? There i s a danger of China becoming "a Poland i n Asia", 
with the United States drawn i n t o the role of "the not too enthusiastic backer 
of a ' l e g i t i m i s t ' group with too many Chinese 'Polish colonels' and not enough 
popular support". This i n turn would bring the United States i n t o c o l l i s i o n 
with the Soviet Union which would be bound to support "a group which i s 
legally 'dissident,' but has growing support among moderate groups as well as 
the peasants", (26) 
For, returning to an argument we have encountered before, i n postwar Asia 
the Soviet Union w i l l exercise a power of "at t r a c t i o n " by vi r t u e of the example 
of i t s m i n o r i t i e s policy and the progress, evident to Asiatics, of Soviet 
border regions. The United States can only hope to match t h i s power of 
a t t r a c t i o n by adopting the role of patron and cautious promoter of Asian 
independence. But the two nations should not be i n competition, Lattimore i s a 
f i r m believer i n the need to promote a m u l t i - l a t e r a l policy involving the 
Soviet Union aimed at producing peace and s t a b i l i t y i n Asia, The Soviets have 
already shown t h e i r good f a i t h by the material support they have given to 
Chungking i n the knowledge that some of these supplies were destined for the 
forces attempting to blockade Yenan, Such a m u l t i - l a t e r a l policy, i n his view, 
i s i n the inte r e s t s of a l l of the United Nations, 
Koblherg's campaign against Lattimore 
Lattimore's opinions, though not uncommon amongst commentators on 
Chinese a f f a i r s at that time, had not been expressed without a t t r a c t i n g some 
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adverse comment at least on his views concerning China policy. Although the 
f u l l e f f e c t of the c r i t i c i s m was not f e l t u n t i l some years later, Lattimore's 
role i n the I n s t i t u t e of Pacific Relations and his ideas on post-war 
cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union were the subject of 
a c r i t i q u e authored by Alfred Kohlberg and published i n October, 1945, 
Kohlberg was a businessman who had made his fortune importing lace from 
China. He was a man of singular and strongly held opinions, as i s shown by the 
fact that, having concluded i n 1940 that the Japanese were bent upon merciless 
aggression i n China, he volunteered his services to the Royal Canadian Airforce 
as a kamikaze p i l o t , He l a t e r conducted an on-the-spot personal investigation 
i n t o charges that there was extensive g r a f t amongst the recipients of American 
aid to China, Finding no evidence of these allegations but ignored by o f f i c i a l s 
Kohlberg turned his atte n t i o n to those who he regarded as responsible f o r the 
false image held i n the United States of Kuomintang China. By late 1944 he had 
become convinced that the source could be traced to the machinations of the 
communist conspiracy working through the I n s t i t u t e of Pacific Relations and 
i t s publications. For some years Kohlberg had been a member of the In s t i t u t e , 
which had existed since 1925 to promote the study i n the United States and 
in t e r n a t i o n a l l y of Asia and the Pacific region. After a lengthy campaign 
Kohlberg's charges became the subject of a b a l l o t of members of the I n s t i t u t e 
i n 1947 who rejected them out of hand, (27) Kohlberg then s h i f t e d his attention 
t o other matters, (28) but he had made up his mind on the question of who was 
to blame f o r the communist takeover i n China. He f i n a l l y adopted the role of 
Lattimore's nemesis when he met Senator Joseph McCarthy in March 1950. 
Kohlberg subsequently advised McCarthy on the communist i n f i l t r a t i o n of 
Washington, and his charges were to become the basis, such as i t was, of the 
Senate inquiry i n t o the functioning of the I n s t i t u t e i n 1951.(29) 
Kohlberg found much to c r i t i c i s e i n Lattimore's stewardship of the 
Institute's p r i n c i p a l publication, Pacific A f f a i r s , which he alleged exhibited 
the editor's pro-Soviet bias. Concerning Solution i n Asia Kohlberg alleges that 
the baleful l i k e l y outcome of the i m p a r t i a l i t y between the contending forces i n 
China which Lattimore advises would be "to lock China i n t o the Communist World 
System". (30) In h is reply Lattimore argues that the spread of communism i n 
Asia i s neither desirable nor inevitable but as the Soviet Union as a power on 
the continent i s here to stay some form of agreement with the Soviets i s 
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preferable to c o n f l i c t . His over a l l intention, he maintained, i n his scholarly 
as i n h is public career, had been always to work f o r the spread of democracy 
rather than of communism. (31) 
Although Kohlberg's charges were wild and inaccurate, Lattimore had held 
a high and o p t i m i s t i c estimate of the Soviet Union since the major focus of 
his work had s h i f t e d to the Mongols. He had became s u f f i c i e n t l y interested i n 
Russia t o spend three months i n the winter of 1936 learning the language, 
though i t i s clear that t h i s was largely to permit him access to Russian 
materials on Inner Asia. As has been shovm the most that could be said f or 
Lattimore's enthusiasm f o r Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s policy was that i t was 
tenuously based on inadequate information. l o r had Lattimore confined himself 
to comments on those aspects of the Soviet Union closest to his area of 
expertise. Writing i n an e d i t o r i a l i n Pacific A f f a i r s i n 1938, as Kohlberg was 
able to point out, Lattimore had referred to the findings of the Moscow t r i a l s 
as f u l l y credible and l i k e l y to improve the prospects f o r "democracy" i n the 
Soviet Union. (32) Here he was i n good company, but no sound assessment of a 
man's views can properly be based on his obiter dicta, As one who regarded a 
v i c t o r y i n China f o r the communists as the worst of a l l possible worlds, 
however, Kohlberg was correct i n i d e n t i f y i n g Lattimore as an antagonist. 
Lattimore had never been the proponent of a single party i n the Chinese 
c o n f l i c t . Moreover, a careful reading of his statements on China shows a s h i f t 
i n his opinion as he came to revise his estimate of the Kuomintang and i t s 
leadership. 
Postwar Political Solution in China 
In 1944 Lattimore published with h i s wife a short papular h i s t o r y of 
China, e n t i t l e d The Making of Modern China. In so f a r as the views expressed 
therein are o r i g i n a l , they are mostly drawn from Inner Asian Frontiers of 
China. The concluding section speculates on the future p o l i t i c a l settlement 
l i k e l y to occur i n the country, and here Lattimore i s opt i m i s t i c on the role of 
the Kuomintang. Although China i s not a democracy by any procedural 
d e f i n i t i o n , i t " i s a democratic country i n the sense that the Party and the 
Government represent what the vast majority of the people want". (33) The 
Kuomintang monopolises p o l i t i c a l power, but i t i s committed to an ab o l i t i o n of 
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i t s t u t e l a r y role i n conformity with the o r i g i n a l programme of Sun Yat-sen. 
The functioning of the People's P o l i t i c a l Council (reconstituted by the 
Kuomintang au t h o r i t i e s as an advisory body including other parties i n 1942) 
may be taken as a sign that freedom of association i s on the way, just as the 
growing freedom of the press shows that the party i s now more prepared to 
permit open c r i t i c i s m of at least the details of government measures. The 
communists even more than the Kuomintang must be prepared to compromise to 
avert the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c i v i l war which would be i n no party's interest. 
In the second edition which appeared i n 1947 i t i s noteworthy that the 
prognosis i s less op t i m i s t i c . Lattimore repeats the argument found i n Solution 
i n Asia that under wartime conditions the Kuomintang and the Communist Party 
have both undergone an inner transformation. The Kuomintang has come to stand 
also f o r a c e n t r a l i s i n g and authoritarian approach to government, and i t s 
appeal to the people has been damaged i n that " i n i t s e f f o r t s to impose 
control over them i t appeals not to them but to foreign arms and foreign 
support". (34) American policy has become unbalanced, with the channelling of 
aid to one side i n the domestic c o n f l i c t at the end of the war. The mission of 
General Marshall i n December 1945 to China i n an attempt to encourage a 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y agreement between Chiang and the Communist Party was a 
proper attempt to correct t h i s imbalance, but some i n the United States are 
s t i l l of the opinion that f u l l scale intervention would be appropriate. This 
would be a mistake: 
"In the long run ... s t a b i l i t y and progress i n China must be judged 
by the a b i l i t y both of the country as a whole and of the major 
p o l i t i c a l parties to r i s e above the level of asking for subsidies 
f o r hand-to-mouth maintenance. China, and China's p o l i t i c a l parties, 
must produce t h e i r own proofs of t h e i r a b i l i t y , p o l i t i c a l l y , to stand 
on t h e i r own feet, and t h e i r a b i l i t y , economically, to absorb loans 
f o r productive purposes. S t a b i l i t y and progress ,., are w i t h i n the 
reach of a people which elects i t s government, but not w i t h i n the 
reach of a people which i s subject to i t s government - especially i f 
the government can keep up a 'strong' rule over the people only at 
the price of being so weak that i t has to ask continually f o r 
outside support,"(35) 
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Nothing short of the assumption by America of a colonial role i n China would 
give American pov/er the leverage to influence developments i n that country, 
and such a role would be quite inappropriate i f the United States i s to be an 
opponent of imperialism elsewhere. In other words, by 1947 Lattimore was 
prepared to countenance a communist v i c t o r y i n China i f , as looked to him 
increasingly l i k e l y , the Kuomintang conclusively demonstrated i t s p o l i t i c a l and 
economic incompetence t o maintain ef f e c t i v e government and complete China's 
unfinished revolution. 
Although Lattimore refers to the development of a t h i r d p o l i t i c a l force 
i n wartime China, i f an agreement or c o a l i t i o n between the Communist Party and 
the Kuomintang proves impossible, the alternative to Kuomintang rule i s a 
communist v i c t o r y , What expectations d i d Lattimore have i n the years 
immediately a f t e r the war of the character and programme of a communist 
dominated regime? As we have seen Lattimore believed that Chinese communism 
had largely been transformed by the exigencies of the wartime struggle. I t s 
growth had been almost e n t i r e l y dependent upon i t s n a t i o n a l i s t stance, and i t s 
careful attempts t o mobilise as v/ide a spectrum of peasant opinion as 
possible, Doctrinaire opinions had been abandoned and as the party owed l i t t l e 
to Soviet support a communist regime i n Peking would not be greatly beholden 
to Moscow, The party could only expect to form a successful government by 
following the practices evolved I n Yenan: 
"Chinese Communist practice d i f f e r s i n many ways from Russian 
Communist practice. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that the Chinese Communists, 
as a minority movement f i g h t i n g f o r survival, have perforce drawn 
on non-Communist a l l i e s . A large part of t h e i r rank and f i l e i s non-
Communist. The countryside which supports them i s peopled with 
peasants who are f i g h t i n g p r i m a r i l y f o r the private ownership of 
land and the r i g h t t o be represented i n government. These peasants 
have arms i n t h e i r hands. They can be led by the Communists, i f the 
communists go i n the d i r e c t i o n i n which they want to be led. They 
cannot be dictated to either by the Communists, whom they are now 
following, or by the Government, which they are now resisting".(36) 
Now i t i s evident t h a t Lattimore believes t h a t the present social and economic 
structure i n the Chinese countryside i s r i p e f o r radical reform. In an essay of 
1947 he delineates the features of "the Asiatic paradox" which produces 
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"perennial malnutrition" i n those d i s t r i c t s where grain productivity per acre 
i s highest. This i s the resul t , i n conditions of labour superabundance, of 
landlords s e t t i n g tenant against tenant i n a competition to produce the 
highest ren t a l , A c o r o l l a r y of the paradox i s that the growth of industry i s 
obstructed since t h i s would a t t r a c t labour and reduce the landlord's control 
over his tenants, (37) The f a i l u r e of the Kuomintang to address these problems, 
a f a i l u r e made more certain by the growth of the landlord interest i n the 
party during the years i n Chungking, undoubtedly inclined Lattimore to the 
view t h a t a communist regime would be no bad thing f o r the r u r a l areas. 
Indeed, communist mobilisation of the peasantry i n Yenan had demonstrated that 
t h i s party could t a i l o r i t s programme to the perceived needs of the r u r a l 
population. 
Changes i n world p o l i t i c s also led Lattimore to the belief that a 
reforming regime with a s i g n i f i c a n t communist presence largely independent of 
Soviet control was passible i n China, Writing i n 1947 during a t r i p to Central 
Europe Lattimore discerns s i g n i f i c a n t portents i n developments i n 
Czechoslovakia, There a communist movement with a s o l i d electoral base i s 
cooperating with non-communist parties i n a moderate programme of 
reconstruction aided by an economic tr e a t y w ith the Soviet Union, This 
suggests to Lattimore that the Czechoslovak Communist Party i s experimenting 
with a new road to communism "with prosperity a l l along the way and without 
massacre or coercion". This shows that i t i s incorrect to describe the world 
as divided between two all-embracing camps: 
"There already e x i s t i n the world several d i f f e r e n t kinds of 
socialism or communism, and several d i f f e r e n t kinds of c a p i t a l i s t 
enterprise. In Czechoslovakia they exist side by side", (38) 
Lattimore also holds sanguine expectations of Soviet policy i n Eastern Europe, 
f i n d i n g there a fear not of Soviet but of German power which the United States 
i s f u e l l i n g by underwriting the i n d u s t r i a l reconstruction of West Germany. In 
the event these expectations were to be disappointed. Indeed, p r i o r to 
Lattimore's v i s i t to Prague the Czechoslovakian government had been forced, 
under Soviet pressure, to withdraw i t s e a r l i e r acceptance of Marshall Plan aid 
for reconstruction from the United States; w i t h i n s i x months of Lattimore's 
o p t i m i s t i c v/ords a communist coup had replaced the Czechoslovak co a l i t i o n 
government with one subservient t o Moscow, 
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In early 1948 Lattimore returns to the argument that there i s room for a 
t h i r d bloc or "Third World" between the contending major powers. Though the 
lines are being drawn i n Europe the p o s s i b i l i t y nevertheless that such a bloc 
might e x i s t has been shown by events i n Asia. Guerilla warfare i n Indonesia 
and Indochina has demonstrated that there are l i m i t a t i o n s to the extent to 
which the United States and the Soviet Union can influence events i n other 
countries. The independence of Burma has created a nation which w i l l be 
dependent upon outside assistance i n i t s development f o r some time to come, 
but w i l l never return to any form of colonial status. Lattimore s t i l l believes 
that the f a i l u r e of either side i n the c i v i l war i n China to achieve a m i l i t a r y 
v i c t o r y w i l l r e s u l t eventually i n a compromise. (39) But i t can be seen that he 
would anticipate that a defeat f o r the Kuomintang might lead to the formation 
of a regime, led by the communists but with p a r t i c i p a t i o n by other groups, 
committed to sensible reforms and reconstruction and ready t o place China i n 
the emerging t h i r d world of nations. 
The failure of American policy 
In The Situation i n Asia published i n A p r i l 1949 Lattimore brings these 
ideas together i n a sustained review of events i n postwar Asia and the issues 
confronting American policy makers as a result. Asia i s "out of control", 
engulfed by a wave of n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment which no outside power can check. 
Most of the nations of Asia are destined to belong t o the " t h i r d force" or 
" t h i r d quotient of power" which i s making i t s appearance i n world p o l i t i c s and 
which the United States can only hope to influence from without. 
Lattimore repeats his analysis of the or i g i n s of the Chinese revolution, 
though he now emphasises the role the western powers played i n the o r i g i n a l 
formation of the Nanking regime. By pu t t i n g together a c o a l i t i o n of landlords, 
bankers and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek an 
instrument was forged which i n "smashing the p o l i t i c a l organisations of the 
peasants and the i n d u s t r i a l workers" permitted those powers to r e t a i n many of 
t h e i r privileges. But even now Lattimore defends Chiang against charges of 
di c t a t o r s h i p and personal f a i l u r e , seeing i n his decline the l a s t phase of the 
"old diplomacy" i n China. (40) He revises, however, his assessment of the 
Kuomintang. In 1940 he expected the party, i d e n t i f i e d as i t was with i n d u s t r i a l 
Owen Lattimore and Asia 
Page o^i 
Geopolitics and Foreign Policy/4 
and mercantile i n t e r e s t s , "to raise China from mediaeval agrarianism to modern 
i n d u s t r i a l capitalism" following the precedents of state led modernization 
established by Germany, Japan, and then Turkey, By t h i s time he had come to 
believe that the experience of the war years had so transformed the party that 
i t s p o l i c i e s a f t e r 1945 amounted to nothing less than "an attempt to bring 
modern economic a c t i v i t i e s under feudal control". (41) I t was American i n a b i l i t y 
to recognise that the Kuomintang d i d not stand f o r capitalism i n China that 
drove many exasperated business people and managers into the arms of the 
communists. 
As to the Chinese Communist Party, they w i l l continue to embody the 
peasant inte r e s t u n t i l i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and mechanisation can make a decisive 
impact on r u r a l l i f e . The course of the Chinese revolution has thus been 
u t t e r l y unlike the revolution i n Russia. Communist land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n has 
engendered i n the peasants the p o l i t i c a l w i l l and the m i l i t a r y power to 
protect and conserve the f r u i t s of the revolution: 
"By 1949, many m i l l i o n s of peasants had come to feel thoroughly 
comfortable i n a t r i p l e combination of ownership of land, experience 
i n the use of arms t o defend t h e i r ownership, and rough but 
workable town meeting democracy f o r the d e f i n i t i o n of r i g h t s , the 
assignment of duties, and the election of representatives."(42) 
Communist prestige i s therefore high, but the party "cannot indulge i n 
experiments which the peasants do not accept" because the peasants have the 
power to r e s i s t them. The cooperatives are a r e a l i s t i c alternative to 
c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n which would never be introduced "merely for the sake of 
Marxist orthodoxy" since i t would be i r r a t i o n a l without mechanisation. Given 
the nature of the Chinese revolution and the n a t i o n a l i s t roots of communist 
power i t would be reasonable t o conclude that any future Soviet attempt to 
override Chinese int e r e s t s could bring i n t o being "a Chinese Titoism". (43) 
In retrospect, although Lattimore's remarks on the weaknesses of the 
Kuomintang appear accurate enough, his expectations of the CCP were very much 
wide of the mark. Contemporary observers of wartime Yenan also found there 
much to praise i n the organisation and dedication of the inhabitants of the 
region by comparison with the corrupt and hopeless atmosphere of Chungking. 
But i t i s now clear that i t was at that very time that the foundations were 
being l a i d f o r the personal and ideological dominance of Mao Tse-tung, By 1951 
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a s t a r t had been made on the introduction of wider forms of co-operative 
organisation i n agriculture, a movement which was to have i t s culmination i n 
1958 i n the introduction of large scale Rural People's Communes. In these 
Communes, not only were peasants i n i t i a l l y forbidden much against t h e i r w i l l 
to c u l t i v a t e even small p l o t s on the now c o l l e c t i v e l y owned land, but peasant 
enthusiasm was to take the place of mechanisation. I t should be pointed out 
that Lattimore was not alone at t h i s time i n the conviction that for the 
leadership of the CCP n a t i o n a l i s t goals were l i k e l y to be given high and 
perhaps exclusive p r i o r i t y . But the i n i t i a t i v e taken by Richard Nixon i n 1971-
72 to open American rel a t i o n s with China following the Sino-Soviet s p l i t i n 
1960 shows that there may well have been some room even in the late 1940s 
for an astute American policy to attempt to detatch China from s o c i a l i s t camp. 
The irony of t h i s observation i s that Nixon's o r i g i n a l r i s e from obscurity was 
founded upon the relentless urging i n an atmosphere of national c r i s i s of the 
view that, not only was there no such room but that those who argued that 
there was (including Lattimore himself) were w i t t i n g or unwitting tools of the 
communist conspiracy. 
Looking beyond China, Lattimore develops a c r i t i c a l comparison of the 
European role i n Asia with the methods of rule employed by Russia and the 
Soviet Union. For Asians Russia i s a land power and a neighbour whose 
rel a t i o n s with the peoples of Asia have been d i s t i n c t i v e . In the days of the 
Russian Empire the Russians extended t h e i r control into East and Inner Asia by 
a.ssimilating the upper classes of the peoples with whom they came into 
contact. More recently Soviet Asia has been for many bordering peoples an 
example of the advantages th a t i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and education can bring. By 
contrast the Europeans i n Asia have been maritime c o l o n i a l i s t s whose 
t r a d i t i o n a l policy was to assume that leadership of the landlord class 
h i t h e r t o exercised by Asian despots. So close were the interests of 
c o l o n i a l i s t s and "feudal" landlords i d e n t i f i e d that the landlord class 
"remained loyal t o i m p e r i a l i s t rule long a f t e r other groups i n colonial 
societies had turned n a t i o n a l i s t " as a re s u l t of nat i o n a l i s t s taking land 
reform as t h e i r chief cause. (44) Despite the events of the war Europe retains 
important colonial possessions and the European countries are bound therefore 
to seek to r e s i s t the n a t i o n a l i s t t i d e i n Asia. This continuing entanglement 
which Lattimore describes as "a d i r e c t negation of democracy" d i s t o r t s even 
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the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of these countries: "The sur v i v a l of empire i s what 
explains the strength of right-wing socialism and trade-unionism i n B r i t a i n , 
France, Holland, and Belgium", (45) I t i s also the p r i n c i p l e reason why American 
and European goals i n Asia do not necessarily coincide. 
The mistakes of American policy i n the postwar period have been the 
r e s u l t of a confusion of aims and a lack of preparedness to react to the new 
circumstances of the time. Lattimore castigates the Truman doctrine of March 
1947 i n which the President announced his preparedness to help any nation 
prepared to r e s i s t the onslaught of the m i l i t a n t communism camp as having 
"originated more i n out-of-date B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g than up-to-date American 
thinking". And he blames the fiasco of what he sees as the "attempt to imitate 
,,, Japanese policy i n China" on "the f i r e breathers i n the 80th Congress and 
the tom-tom beating i n the j i n g o i s t i c sections of the press". (46) On t h i s view 
Secretary of State Marshall was quite correct to see, when he abandoned i n 
January 1947 his attempt to mediate between the parties i n the c o n f l i c t raging 
i n China, that that events there were beyond the l i m i t a t i o n s of American power 
to control. 
Lattimore r e a f f i r m s the view that between the Soviet sphere and American 
power i n Asia a gulf populated by " t h i r d force" nations i s l i k e l y to emerge. 
United States policy should be independent, seeking to exercise influence 
rather than mastery and aimed at matching the power of a t t r a c t i o n exercised 
by the Soviet Union while channelling the n a t i o n a l i s t t i d e i n Asia i n a way 
that w i l l keep the continent open to American business and trade. The 
"beachheads of empire" around the Pacific rim of Asia should be abandoned 
following the general rule that no government should be maintained i f i t 
cannot stand alone. America has become associated i n Asia with "bad 
government" and t h i s trend must be reversed. Interference in the internal 
p o l i t i c s of Japan should be abandoned, and i n Korea the "weak and unreliable 
police state" character of the regime should be recognised.(47) In the case of 
the l a t t e r country, f a r from learning from t h e i r mistakes American policy 
makers i n using former collaborators and emigres have "manufactured" t h e i r 
"own Kuomintang". In Asia as elsewhere a "cold truce" i s to be preferred to a 
"cold war", and t h i s w i l l best be achieved through a competition attuned to the 
p o l i t i c a l and so c i a l r e a l i t i e s rather than c o n f l i c t : 
Owen Lattimore and Asia Page 85 
Geopolitics and Foreign Policy/4 
"Nationalism i s the only bedrock on which a p o l i t i c a l structure can 
be b u i l t i n China - or anywhere i n Asia - today. I f we are as quick 
as the Russians and the Communists of Asia are t o build on that 
bedrock, then the new p o l i t i c a l structures that are being b u i l t i n 
China and a l l over Asia w i l l incorporate many features of 
capitalism, private enterprise, and p o l i t i c a l democracy i n t h e i r 
'third country' a r c h i t e c t u r a l design. I f the Russians and the 
Communists continue to keep ahead of us i n accepting Asia on i t s 
own terms, there w i l l be more socialism i n the superstructure".(48) 
Lattimore and his critics 
In March 1950 the members of the Inner Asian Seminar at Johns Hopkins 
under Lattimore's leadership published the f i r s t i n what was hoped to be a 
series of volumes devoted to the hi s t o r y , p o l i t i c s , and economics of that 
region. (49) But at that very time Lattimore was dragged into the maelstrom 
generated by Senator McCarthy's allegations, As he was to r e c a l l later t h i s put 
an end to the Seminar and blighted the careers of the participants. (50) 
In the coming years Lattimore v/as to have l i t t l e time f o r academic or 
popular w r i t i n g , but neither events i n Asia nor the reception of his ideas i n 
America caused him to change the fundamentals of the views he expressed i n 
1949. Thus, despite the outbreak of the Korean war, Lattimore i s ins i s t e n t at 
the end of 1950 that there i s very l i t t l e sign yet of the abandonment of the 
old colonial approach to Asia i n American foreign policy, the direction of 
which i s increasingly i n the hands of "fanatics and cranks". A m u l t i - l a t e r a l 
policy involving America's a l l i e s and the free nations of Asia i s overdue. (51) 
In two opinion pieces devoted to Korea, though Lattimore expresses approval of 
Truman's decision to intervene and the p r i n c i p l e of collective security which 
lay behind i t , he i s f e a r f u l of the consequences of allowing "the same 
incompetent, t i r e d old reactionaries" t o resume control of the state. I f America 
acts as t h e i r patron "our future i n Asia i s black indeed". (52) On the question 
of the outcome of a t r e a t y with Japan, Lattimore argues that i n the longer 
term i t w i l l probably be advantageous f o r the Japanese, given t h e i r 
geographical p o s i t i o n , to seek a middle course between the Soviet Union and 
the United States, American public opinion must be prepared for the fact that 
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the Japanese, irrespective of the conditions of any treaty (and here Lattimore 
evidently has i n mind the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951), w i l l not wish to 
act as makeweight against China and the Soviet Union i n the Pacific.(53) And 
i n a piece devoted t o the construction of new transportation and i n d u s t r i a l 
c o r r i d o r s along the land border between the Soviet Union and China Lattimore 
returns to h is old preoccupation with the geopolitics of Inner Asia, The 
Soviets are building a base of support i n t h i s region because they are 
transforming the material conditions of l i f e of the population, and drawing at 
least the younger generation into developing an interest i n t h i s 
transformation, American policy makers, bemused by the ideological contest, are 
not addressing themselves s u f f i c i e n t l y to the struggle of interests going on 
i n Asia, Nor i s enough atte n t i o n paid to the side effects of offering m i l i t a r y 
alliances and aid to Asian countries deemed f r i e n d l y , (54) I t i s evident that i n 
the early 1950s Lattimore believed that American policy had yet t o take 
account of the true s i t u a t i o n i n Asia. 
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Between 1950 and 1955 Lattimore, from being a figure not widely known 
outside the community of Asia scholars, was propelled i n t o the public 
consciousness to the extent that his name was embellished on hostile 
propaganda produced f o r the 1952 American elections. Senator Joseph McCarthy 
v/as p r i n c i p a l l y resposible f o r Lattimore's r i s e to notoriety, though i n the 
long run the a c t i v i t i e s of McCarthy's colleague, Pat McCarran, v/ere to result 
i n f a r greater damage to his reputation, Generations of Americans have puzzled 
over the meaning of these extraordinary events with the consequence that 
Lattimore's ordeal and the background to i t are illuminated i n a glare of 
l i g h t , and his w r i t i n g s and scholarly contributions are often interpreted 
solely w ith them i n mind,(l) As new evidence of those years becomes available 
the record i s reassessed. Thus the release from 1977 of the f i l e s on Lattimore 
held by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other US government 
departments have resulted i n a more complete account of his case than has 
been available h i t h e r t o , (2) Given that t h i s ground has been well traversed by 
his t o r i a n s of America I wish here p r i n c i p a l l y to consider what these episodes 
reveal about the evolution of Lattimore's ideas and his understanding of them 
i n the l i g h t of the fac t that he was repeatedly required to recapitulate his 
arguments and views and explain the precise chronology of t h e i r development. 
But the context must f i r s t be established v/ith a sketch of the episodes of the 
ordeal, 
The Tydings Loyalty Hearings 
On 9 February, 1950, at an obscure venue i n Wheeling, West Virginia, 
Senator Joseph McCarthy announced that he had "here i n my hand" a l i s t of 205 
names of "active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ri n g " 
who, despite t h i s information being passed to the State Department, were s t i l l 
government employees shaping the nation's foreign policy, (3) These sensational 
charges quickly became the subject of a hearing on the loyalty of State 
Department o f f i c e r s before a specially constituted Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, The Chairman was Senator M i l l a r d E, Tydings, 
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and between March and June, 1950, his Subcommittee heard the testimony of 35 
individuals including John S. Service whose name had been given prominence by 
McCarthy at Wheeling. But as a result of further statements by McCarthy, and 
evidence given by other witnesses (most notably, ex-communist Louis Budenz), 
Lattimore became the most important subject f o r the Subcommittee's scrutiny 
despite the f a c t that he had never served i n the Department. 
In h i s evidence at the hearings McCarthy f i r s t described Lattimore as one 
of the " p r i n c i p a l architects" of American Far Eastern policy with a 
"procommunist" record going back many years. In a l a t e r executive session 
McCarthy went further, charging Lattimore with being within the government 
service "the top of the whole [spy] r i n g of which Hiss was a part".(4) By t h i s 
time Alger Hiss, a former assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, had 
been convicted on perjury charges which implied that he had been a communist 
agent while i n US government service. After Lattimore's i n i t i a l appearance at 
which he strongly defended his record and opinions, the Subcommittee heard 
from other v/itnesses, notably Freda Utley and Louis Budenz, who attempted 
respectively to give some substance to the allegations of Lattimore's 
sympathies and connections. (5) Lattimore was given a second chance to appear 
to rebut t h e i r testimony, though i t s basis was patently insubstantial. In any 
event Budenz's charges that Lattimore was known t o the communist underground 
were undermined by information from the FBI that despite a thorough 
in v e s t i g a t i o n (including many sessions with Budenz) there was nothing to 
indicate that Lattimore was a communist or a subversive; they were also 
refuted by the statements of other ex-communists. As Lattimore's connections 
with senior policy makers i n the State Department were sporadic at best, there 
V7as no substance to anything McCarthy had said. The Subcommitee i n i t s f i n a l 
Report found accordingly, concluding that "we have seen a d i s t o r t i o n of the 
facts on such a magnitude as to be t r u l y alarming". (6) 
McCarthy, however, was only the proximate cause of Lattimore's 
arraignment before the Senate Subcommittee. Such facts as he had i n his 
infamous " f i l e " had been provided largely by Alfred Kohlberg who was the 
ultimate source also of e a r l i e r statements attacking Lattimore's allegedly 
communist sympathies i n an i n f l u e n t i a l a r t i c l e by Max Eastman and J.B. Powell. 
There the authors had argued that American policy makers were offered the 
choice of backing i n China a democratic Chiang Kai-shek or a t o t a l i t a r i a n 
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Coramunist Party. This choice was being obfuscated by means of a deliberate 
communist pl o t t o introduce false notions of Chinese and Soviet communism into 
the American consciousness, Lattimore was singled out f o r his assertion that 
the Soviets practised a "form of democracy" i n Asia which was bound to be 
a t t r a c t i v e to neighbouring peoples.(7) 
In addition i t may be conjectured that Lattimore was suffering for his 
acquaintance with John S, Service and the fact that between 1937 and 1941 he 
had been nominally on the e d i t o r i a l board of Amerasia. Service, a career 
o f f i c e r with the United States Foreign Service, had met Lattimore i n China i n 
1933 and again during the war years i n Chungking. He had been at the centre of 
the "Amerasia a f f a i r " i n 1945, when with four others he was arrested by the 
FBI f o r passing co n f i d e n t i a l government documents to Ph i l i p Jaffe, the editor 
of that decidedly l e f t - w i n g journal. I t w i l l be recalled that Jaffe had been 
one of the two Americans f o r whom Lattimore had acted as translat o r i n Yenan 
i n 1937. The outcome f o r Service was that l a t e r i n the year he was cleared of 
any improper conduct i n passing to Jaffe h i s personal copies of some of the 
factual memoranda he had prepared on conditions as he had seen them i n the 
communist controlled areas of China.(8) Though exonerated, i n the increasingly 
tense atmosphere of Washington as the Cold War developed and the beginnings 
of the Hiss case gave new impetus to fears of national betrayal. Service was 
subjected to furth e r l o y a l t y and security reviews i n 1946, 1947, 1949, 1950 and 
1951. Despite h i s clear record he was f i n a l l y discharged from the State 
Department, though he was eventually declared to have been wrongfully 
dismissed i n a decision by the US Supreme Court i n 1957. From evidence now 
available i t can be confirmed that Service was under FBI surveillance i n 
1945.(9) On the Sunday p r i o r to his arrest regarding the Amerasia a f f a i r 
Service had attended a barbecue at Lattimore's house with other guests among 
whom were Andrew Roth and Professor George F. Carter of Johns Hopkins. During 
the Tydings hearings the barbecue was discussed as a result of some of 
McCarthy's remarks. Roth, Service, and Lattiraore had allegedly spent some of 
the afternoon "declassifying" some documents, although the version of the 
events given by most of those present was that they were examining the proofs 
of Roth's forthcoming book on Japan. University Intrigue plays a part i n the 
prominence given to t h i s episode as i t i s now apparent that despite being a 
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guest i n his house Professor Carter had developed a strong animosity to 
Lattimore and had consequently passed t h i s s tory to McCarthy. (10) 
Following the publication of the Report of the findings of the Tydings 
hearings Lattimore, his reputation apparently vindicated, resumed his work at 
Johns Hopkins. But though McCarthy moved on to other targets, his a c t i v i t i e s 
had drawn extensive public interest and had had a s i g n i f i c a n t effect on the 
elections of 1950. Amongst those who had l o s t seats was the Senator from 
Maryland, M i l l a r d E. Tydings, and a more conservative Congress, s t i r r e d by the 
"loss" of China and the impasse of the Korean war, cast about for s a c r i f i c i a l 
victims. As a re s u l t Lattimore once again became the centre of controversy, 
t h i s time of a f a r more serious nature. 
The McCarran Investigation into the Institute of Pacific Relations 
In 1951 the Inte r n a l Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of 
the Senate chaired by Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada formed a special 
Subcommittee to investigate the organisation and the itifluence of the I n s t i t u t e 
of Pacific A f f a i r s , The character, conduct, and outcome of these hearings, which 
were conducted under the chairmanship of Senator James 0. Eastland of 
Mississippi, were i n every sense a contrast to the Tydings hearings. Although 
the I n s t i t u t e as a whole was under scrutiny Lattimore, as editor of the 
Inst i t u t e ' s p r i n c i p a l journal from 1934 to 1941, became the central figure of 
the investigation p a r t l y no doubt because McCarthy's e a r l i e r charges had shown 
the way. 
To understand why the I n s t i t u t e of Pacific A f f a i r s became a target of the 
Subcommittee i t i s necessary t o say something of i t s history. (11) Originally 
founded i n 1925 i t soon came to be dominated by Edward C, Carter who became 
i t s secretary-general i n 1930. From an organisation o r i g i n a l l y conceived to 
f a c i l i t a t e c u l t u r a l exchange i t became under Carter one concerned as much i f 
not more with economic and p o l i t i c a l issues i n the Asian-Pacific area. Although 
i t s American section, composed of academics and opinion leaders as well as 
some figures from commerce, was by f a r the most important, the I n s t i t u t e had 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l dimension. National a f f i l i a t e s or "councils" (in B r i t a i n the 
Royal I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s ) contributed to the workings of the 
I n s t i t u t e including i t s publications and periodic conferences. In the 
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circumstances of the 1930s the various aims of the I n s t i t u t e often came into 
c o n f l i c t . At the inte r n a t i o n a l conferences of the I n s t i t u t e national 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s could easily be offended when such contentious issues as Sino-
Japanese rel a t i o n s or colonialism were discussed. This s i t u a t i o n was sometimes 
exacerbated by Lattimore's penchant f o r controversy. As editor of the 
Insti t u t e ' s major journal he sought to publish along with academic 
contributions opinion pieces on the problems of the time even though the 
l a t t e r sometimes occasioned complaints from one or other of the national 
councils. Although the Soviet council of the I n s t i t u t e contributed l i t t l e t o i t s 
a c t i v i t i e s Lattimore was very keen to draw the Soviets into a greater 
collaboration, t h i s being the p r i n c i p a l reason f o r h i s t r i p with Carter t o 
Moscow i n 1936. He therefore sometimes edited a r t i c l e s c r i t i c a l of the Soviets, 
or sought t o "balance" such materials v;ith other more complimentary 
contributions, This, i t may be suspected, was also a factor i n his favourable 
personal treatment i n the pages of Pacific A f f a i r s of Soviet books under 
review. 
In the wartime period the a c t i v i t i e s of the I n s t i t u t e took on a more 
i n f l u e n t i a l character. The I n s t i t u t e conferences of that time (at Mont 
Tremblant, Canada, i n December 1942 and Hot Springs, Vir g i n i a , I n January 1945) 
became fora f o r s e m i - o f f i c i a l exchanges of opinion between delegations which 
included a number of senior government o f f i c i a l s . (12) In the United States 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the expertise of many individuals associated with the I n s t i t u t e 
was employed f o r the war e f f o r t , including that of Owen Lattimore who entered 
the Office of War Information. 
For the purposes of the Subcommittee the I n s t i t u t e was a convenient 
target. Though membership did not denote belief i n any particular views, 
c r i t i c i s i n g those many academics and others who had any relationship with the 
I n s t i t u t e (though t h i s sometimes amounted to nothing more than receiving IPR 
journals) by way of tha t relationship gave those opinions the Subcommittee 
found reprehensible and p o t e n t i a l l y treasonous an apparent coherence and 
influence. Moreover the Subcommittee had i n i t s possession the f i l e s of the 
I n s t i t u t e . These permitted members to c a l l witnesses to account f or any 
connections they had with the IPR going back two decades. The Subcommittee had 
heard allegations that various individuals who had published i n IPR books or 
journals were covert communists. F i n a l l y the Subcommittee had the testimony of 
Owen Lattimore and Asia P^ S® ^5 
Opinions on t r i a l / 5 
Louis Budenz, amplified f u r t h e r from his statements before the Tydings 
hearings, to the e f f e c t that Frederick V. Field had organised a communist c e l l 
w i t h i n the IPS i n order to mount favourable propaganda f o r the communist 
cause, Here at least there seemed to be some l i n k with communism. Field was a 
noted l e f t i s t - i n his l a t e r autobiography he admitted his u n o f f i c i a l though 
close l i n k s with the American Communist Party (13) - as well as secretary of 
the American Council of the I n s t i t u t e (1934-1940) and a member of i t s Board of 
Trustees, He had also on occasions given the I n s t i t u t e donations from his 
substantial personal fortune. 
Although much of the ground covered i n the Tydings hearings was 
traversed again - Budenz embroidered h i s already f a n c i f u l tales - many more 
witnesses were heard over a period of eleven months. (14) They included a 
number of former Soviet citizens, the burden of whose testimony was that 
Lattimore and others had cooperated i n the use by the Soviet Communist Party 
of the I n s t i t u t e as a propaganda and intelligence gathering organ. Hostile 
academic witnesses including Karl Wittfogel and Kenneth Colegrove also made 
appearances, Wittfogel damned Lattimore's v/ritings and maintained that he had 
known (despite his denials before the Senators) of the communist connections 
and sympathies of various contributors to Pacific A f f a i r s and other IPR 
publications. Some former members of the State Department t e s t i f i e d regarding 
the allegedly pernicious influence of Lattimore on foreign policy and policy 
makers, And the atmosphere of the hearings was t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those of 
1950. Tydings had permitted Lattimore to read a prepared statement at the 
outset, and the proceedings f o r the most part were conducted i n a f a i r and 
orderly fashion with some consideration shown for those who had drawn 
McCarthy's charges. Lattimore had already attended an executive meeting of the 
Subcommittee but at his f i r s t public appearance on 26 February 1952 he was 
able t o read only a paragraph of a lengthy opening statement before he was 
subjected to a relentless series of cross-examinations from counsel to the 
Subcommittee which continued through the three days i t took simply to complete 
t h i s statement. Eastland and his assistants held the inestimable advantage 
that they had scrutinised the f i l e s of the I n s t i t u t e which had ear l i e r been 
seized at the orders of the Subcommittee. From the f i r s t i t was evident that 
t h e i r t a c t i c s would be to ensnare Lattimore i n inconsistencies and 
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contradictions, a t a c t i c which was bound to succeed since he did not share 
t h e i r access to his l e t t e r s and f i l e s some of them almost twenty years old. 
The findings of the Subcommittee, published i n July 1952, could hardly 
have been more damaging f o r Lattimore, The I n s t i t u t e , and p a r t i c u l a r l y Pacific 
A f f a i r s , under the d i r e c t i o n of members v/ho were "either Communist or pro-
Communist", was found to have been used as a means to influence decision 
makers and public opinion i n favour of the communist cause, Lattiraore and John 
Carter Vincent (another of McCarthy's o r i g i n a l targets who had been counselor 
at the US Embassy i n Chungking, and later Director of Far Eastern A f f a i r s i n 
the State Department) were charged with bringing about "a change i n United 
States policy i n 1945 favorable to the Chinese Communists". And i n a sweeping 
judgment unique i n the document Lattimore was described as being "from some 
time beginning i n the 1930's, a conscious a r t i c u l a t e instrument of the Soviet 
conspiracy". (15) The Report further recommended that "the Department of Justice 
submit to a grand j u r y the question of whether perjury has been committed 
before the subcommittee by Owen Lattimore".(16) This had been the strategy 
th a t had f i n a l l y captured Alger Hiss when d i r e c t charges of espionage could 
not be sustained. 
Lattimore's career v/as i n ruins, The hearings were a traversty, weight 
being given to the uncorroborated statements of witnesses i t i s clear now were 
t o t a l l y untrustworthy, and Lattimore being subjected to questioning, according 
to the opinion of his eminent counsel, "not asked i n order to obtain 
information, but f o r the purpose of entrapment", (17) Although colleagues at 
Johns Hopkins had gathered an impressive body of scholars to give testimony 
to his contribution to o r i e n t a l studies(18), i n the public mind such sentiments 
were f a r outweighed by the depiction of Lattimore i n a number of inaccurate 
and tendentious studies as one of those c h i e f l y responsible f o r delivering 
much of East Asia to the communists, (19) In a dishonourable chapter in the 
h i s t o r y of American academic a f f a i r s , though he was accepted back at Johns 
Hopkins ultimately to f i n d a home i n the History department, Lattimore's School 
was disbanded and the scholars he had collected f o r his project on Inner Asia 
were scattered, some not t o resume an academic career i n the United States. 
Nor did the a f f a i r end there because the McCarran Subcommittee's suggestion 
that Lattimore be charged with perjury was followed, though only as a result 
of McCarran's personal intervention w ith the Justice Department. 
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Aftermath; the Perjury Charges 
In a sorry episode i n American justice McCarran ensured that a perjury 
charge concerning Lattimore be put to a Grand Jury even though, as i s now 
abundantly evident from the records available, neither the Justice Department 
nor the FBI were of the opinion that such a charge could be sustained, and 
when President Truman himself did not wish to see Lattimore subjected to 
furthe r inj u s t i c e . (20) In confirmation hearings before the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary McCarran extracted a promise from James P. McGranery, nominated 
by Truman as Attorney-General, that he would support the presenting of a case 
against Lattimore t o a Grand Jury. To ensure further that the Justice 
Department did not f l a g i n i t s e f f o r t s McCarran pressured McGranery into 
appointing Roy Cohn as a special assistant. Cohn, who l a t e r gained notoriety 
working with McCarthy, drafted an indictment against Lattimore on seven counts 
of perjury which was accepted as a basis f o r prosecution by a Grand Jury i n 
December 1952. In retrospect the charges that Lattimore had l i e d at the 
McCarran ' hearings appear either absurd or t r i v i a l . The government sought to 
maintain that Lattimore had been a "follower of the communist line", though 
only l a t e r was a d e f i n i t i o n offered of t h i s t o t a l l y nebulous notion. I t was 
also alleged that though Lattimore had insisted that Pacific A f f a i r s under his 
stewardship had not published any contributions from communists (apart from 
Soviet authors), he had known that two of his authors were members of the 
communist movement. Although i n May 1952 Federal Judge Luther Youngdahl 
destroyed the prosecution's case by dismissing the specific charges, and 
fi n d i n g the more general ones so vague as t o p r o h i b i t a f a i r hearing, 
Lattimore was not f i n a l l y cleared u n t i l June 1955 af t e r a series of prosecution 
appeals one of which went so f a r as t o impugn Youngdahl's neutrality. 
Lattimore was undoubtedly fortunate, given the nature of the times, i n fin d i n g 
i n charge of his case a judge concerned to see that justice was done without 
fear or favour. I t i s an irony i n retrospect that the p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s i n 
the 1930s of Chen Han-seng and Chi Chao-tlng, both of whom had contributed 
a r t i c l e s on China t o I n s t i t u t e publications, so much discussed on the basis of 
so l i t t l e evidence during the McCarran hearings, were as the Senators had 
hypothesised. Both had been Comintern agents and members of the CCP since the 
1920s.(21) 
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Lattimore at the Tydings hearings 
Before the Tydings Subcommittee Lattimore offered a cogent defence of his 
role and opinions. As to the statement that he had been unusally i n f l u e n t i a l i n 
foreign policy making he was able to show that there were many occasions 
where h i s appeals had been ignored, as f o r example i n 1940 when he urged the 
adopting of a much tougher l i n e towards Japan by the United States. 
The Senators were much preoccupied v/ith policy towards China and 
Lattimore ansv/ered questions both on his past record and on his 
recommendations f o r the future. He i d e n t i f i e d himself as a supporter of Chiang 
Kai-shek, hopeful that he would "stop the advance of communism by i n s t i t u t i n g 
a few, necessary reforms" u n t i l 1946. Thereafter he regarded the Marshall 
mission as the only way of r e t r i e v i n g something of Chiang's position, f i n a l l y 
coming round to the view that "the Kuomintang was beyond salvage" i n 1947. On 
the record of his statements regarding the Chinese communists, Lattimore 
defended the views he had expressed i n 1945. The communists i n Yenan had 
shown themselves capable of working with other p o l i t i c a l groups, and t h e i r 
regime cl e a r l y enjoyed a good measure of popular support, On the alternatives 
open t o America i n 1950, with a CCP regime f i r m l y ensconced i n Peking, 
Lattiraore f o r t h r i g h t l y expounded a view la t e r and with some irony to be 
associated with Richard Nixon, Accepting that a close i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of China 
wi t h the Soviet Union would be the least preferred l i k e l y eventuality, 
Lattimore favoured the use of American influence to foster i n China any 
development l i k e l y t o lead to the creation there of "Titoism", Formosa, which 
had become the f i n a l refuge of the Koumintang and was then threatened by 
imminent communist invasion, would accordingly have to be abandoned. Not only 
was a reconquest of the mainland by the Kuomintang an imp o s s i b i l i t y , but 
v/hatever support was given to Chiang Kai-shek would only serve to drive 
Peking i n t o the arms of Moscow, (22) 
Concerning United States policy towards Asia, Lattimore offered 
recommendations based on the premises expounded i n S i t u a t i o n i n Asia- Making 
public a memorandum w r i t t e n i n October 1949 at the request of Phili p Jessup of 
the State Department, Lattimore rejected any further attempts to pursue "the 
type of policy represented by support f o r Chiang Kai-shek", Neither i n Japan 
nor elsewhere should attempts be made t o create or sustain through economic or 
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p o l i t i c a l interference a l l i e d or c l i e n t regimes which do not rest on popular 
support. I f there i s to be c o n f l i c t with Russia i t w i l l not be won, on 
Lattimore's view, by defeating northern Korea, Vietnam or China, thus America 
should avoid "premature or excessive str a t e g i c deployment i n the Far East". A 
posi t i v e policy towards the emerging n a t i o n a l i s t regimes of Asia represents 
the greatest hope f o r the strengthening of democracy i n that region and world-
wide. (23) I t follows that the regime i n Korea could not be supported: 
"we are there i n a position which i s , I think, untenable for a 
democracy ... t i n ! backing an i n e f f i c i e n t police state against the 
ruthless and e f f i c i e n t police state of the Russians i n North Korea. I 
am a f r a i d that i f that s i t u a t i o n goes on, i t w i l l only mean a 
cumulative loss of prestige f or us, and a very dangerous 
advertisement f o r us i n the rest of Asia."(24) 
As an indicator of how l i t t l e regard was held i n the State Department for 
Lattifflore's point of view, he notes that since his memorandum was sent to 
Jessup not only i s the United States " s t i l l supporting a l i t t l e Chiang Kai-shek 
i n South Korea" but "we have ... taken on another one i n Indochina". (25) I t was 
Lattimore's fear t h a t the United States was becoming involved i n positions i n 
Asia without a careful review of the options. Commitment to Formosa and Korea 
was not merely commitment f o r the wrong reasons, but i t would also absorb 
energies and resources which would be much better directed elsewhere: 
"At the present time anything put in t o Formosa i s being f r i t t e r e d 
away. Anything put i n t o India, Pakistan, Indonesia, has a chance of 
developing i n t o a big going concern, and I think i t i s a grave 
defect of our policy ... that so much attention i s concentrated on 
these holding-point positions which cannot ... be anything but 
temporary si t u a t i o n s , and the main f i e l d of action i s being 
neglected." (26) 
Fi n a l l y , given Lattimore's preoccupation with the Mongols, he was granted 
the opportunity of defending his views on the Mongolian People's Republic. In 
the 1949 memorandum he had stated that he was i n favour of diplomatic 
recognition of t h i s "increasingly important potential listening-post country" 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y situated between Russia and China, and t h i s was s t i l l his 
opinion. Taxed on the exact status of the country Lattimore at one point 
described i t as a " s a t e l l i t e " i n which "high policy" was only decided with 
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Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n . At a l a t e r point he discussed in t e r n a l developments in 
the country, although he did not have the evidence to say whether these events 
were as a result of Russian promptings or were i n i m i t a t i o n of events i n the 
Soviet Union. And he revealed that he had tendered advice to Chiang Kai-shek 
on the Mongol question during his time as Chiang's adviser when the Kuomintang 
s t i l l maintained that China retained a legal t i t l e to a l l of Mongolia, He had 
then stated that i n the event of China regaining a role i n Outer Mongolia 
Chiang should o f f e r a positive role to the Mongols in order to be able to 
counter the influence of the communists whose strength i n the neighbouring 
areas exceeded that of the national government, (27) 
Lattimore at the McCarran hearings 
Before the McCarran Subcommittee Lattimore was called to account in a 
punishing series of verbal duels f o r opinions he had held over two decades. 
Much of the same ground was covered but the aggression of the Subcommittee 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y of i t s counsellors, and t h e i r access to a great body of 
Lattimore's correspondence dating back to 1934, revealed new details. 
In a l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n November 1936 which was made an exhibit 
Lattimore offers a perceptive exposition of Japanese t a c t i c s which were aimed 
at so weakening the Nanking regime that i t would be forsaken by western 
friends and would eventually capitulate. Even before his t r i p to Yenan i n 1937, 
Lattimore could see that the communist presence i n China was a new factor 
l i k e l y to have profound consequences. I f Nanking r e s i s t s Japan, m i l i t a r y defeat 
i s certain, but then the Japanese w i l l be faced by "a genuine national 
resistance", a war "with mud huts and impoverished farms" i n which the 
employment of modern armaments may not make a great difference. In t h i s 
c o n f l i c t the communists would have the considerable advantage of "veteran 
m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l organizers and a nucleus of hardbitten partisan armies 
already inured to that kind of war",(28) 
In an exchange on the status of the Mongolian People's Republic Lattimore 
defends the view that though i t i s now an independent state, from 1921 the 
influence of the Russians has been "very strong" though they have exercised 
t h i s influence " p r i m a r i l y at the request of the Mongols themselves", Bearing i n 
mind the reliance of the hearings on the rememberings by diverse v/itnesses of 
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snatches of conversation which occurred ten or f i f t e e n years before i t i s 
noteworthy that Lattimore i n accepting that Mongolia i s now a Soviet s a t e l l i t e " 
cannot suppose that he used the term before 1945 since t h i s " i s a post-war 
expression". In fact Mongolia i s thus described i n an essay of Lattimore's of 
1936, t h i s perhaps being the f i r s t instance of the modern p o l i t i c a l use of t h i s 
term. (29) Following t h i s up the Subcommittee questioned William C. B u l l i t t , 
former American ambassador i n Moscow, whom Lattimore had met during his v i s i t 
to the Soviet Union i n 1936. B u l l i t t reported a conversation he had had with 
him i n which Lattimore had urged him t o telegraph President Roosevelt to 
extend diplomatic recognition to the Mongolian People's Republic which was now 
f u l l y independent. B u l l i t t made the point t o the Subcommittee that t h i s was 
even i n advance of the o f f i c i a l Soviet position on Mongolia. Though a "protocol 
of mutual assistance" between Russia and Mongolia had been signed ea r l i e r i n 
1936, i n an exchange of diplomatic notes with ITanking the Soviet Union had 
affirmed Chinese sovereignty over that region, B u l l i t t , from his conversations 
with Soviet o f f i c i a l s convinced of Moscow's almost complete control of 
Mongolia, drew the inference that either Lattimore was not as well informed as 
he ought to be on his area of specialty or he was purposely advancing the 
communist cause,(30) 
From Lattimore's recollection i n 1982 of these events i t i s clear that 
his intentions then, though " p o l i t i c a l l y quite unsophisticated", were to seek to 
involve the United States i n the struggle for Mongol l o y a l t i e s l e s t they go by 
default t o Japan, Indeed, Lattimore s t i l l maintains, as he d i d at the hearings 
though t h i s was not mentioned by B u l l i t t , that following his exposition to 
B u l l i t t of the s i t u a t i o n i n Inner Mongolia, the Ambassador was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
impressed as to arrange an interview f o r him with Storaonyakov of the Soviet 
Foreign Office i n order t o have Lattimore refute the Soviet interpretation of 
the Inner Mongolian n a t i o n a l i s t s as pro-Japanese t r a i t o r s . Lattimore 
subsequently explained "to a somewhat impassive audience" that Nanking had 
l i t t l e c ontrol over the regional warlords who were d r i v i n g the Mongols from 
t h e i r lands and thus by t h e i r actions fomenting n a t i o n a l i s t feeling which, i f 
i t went unrecognised, might force the Mongols into the arms of the 
Japanese. (31) 
Allegations of Lattimore's influence over American foreign policy e l i c i t e d 
a memorandum he had w r i t t e n f o r Truman sho r t l y before the President's 
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departure f o r the Potsdam conference. I t may be supposed from other testimony 
at the time that here Lattimore was unwittingly the vi c t i m of r i v a l r i e s 
between China and Japan sp e c i a l i s t s w i t h i n the State Department. Grew, then 
Acting Secretary of State (and a former Ambassador to Japan), had quashed a 
proposal by Vincent that Lattimore be appointed as an occasional consultant to 
the Department - i t transpired l a t e r from Vincent's testimony f o r his special 
knowledge of Inner Asia, The Japan hands Ballantine and Dooman had then been 
replaced i n 1945, and Vincent (a China hand, and Lattimore's friend) had been 
put i n charge of the Far Eastern Division. Dooman t e s t i f i e d that i n his view 
Vincent and then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson were under Lattimore's 
baleful influence p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the views they held regarding American policy 
towards Japan, Dooman quoted the disparaging remarks i n Solution i n Asia on 
Washington's supposed Japan experts (including Grew), and the views therein 
expressed on the need t o dissolve the zaibatsu and turn the emperor over to 
the Chinese f o r internment i f the Japanese people did not themselves 
disestablish the monarchy. He found Acheson and others espousing si m i l a r views 
which became American policy s h o r t l y a f t e r his retirement. And he charged that 
the Pauley report following the v i s i t of the reparations mission to Japan 
which called f o r the "pastoralisation" of that country was drafted by 
Lattimore, Here the Subcommittee could confirm that i n executive session 
Lattimore had stated that he had "co-ordinated" the d r a f t i n g of t h i s 
report. (32) I t i s c e r t a i n l y the case that Lattimore was f o r t h r i g h t i n 1945 i n 
s t a t i n g the case f o r the destruction of the business interests that had 
supported Japan's expansionist policy. In a broadcast discussion i n July 1945 
he had also advocated the internment of the imperial family whose return would 
have to be r a t i f i e d by plebiscite. America should be concerned to point out 
that i t did not wish to punish the Japanese people as a whole, but without 
these measures a recrudescence of m i l i t a r i s m would be possible. Nor did 
Lattiraore spare the Japan hands of the Department of State. For without these 
measures the "decent people" of Japan " w i l l not be able to get i n touch with 
the people i n the State Department who stand f o r a Japanese equivalent of a 
Darlan policy, a Badoglio policy" (33), that i s compromising with former 
supporters of the old regime i n exchange f o r t h e i r present support. 
But the memorandum to Truman, though i t mentions Japan, i s concerned 
largely with China. Here Lattimore argues that America must use her influence 
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l e s t China become divided i n t o two irreconcilable camps which would i n turn 
lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union, An agreement between the 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party backed by an agreement between the big 
powers i s necessary i f t h i s d i v i s i o n i s t o be avoided. The former would e n t a i l 
the creation of a c o a l i t i o n government i n which the communists would have 
"minority standing" but "proportionate t o t h e i r real strength, not just token 
representation". In the absence of a clear American policy made credible to 
Chiang by Soviet concurrence he w i l l assume that America, which he i s advised 
i s "heading f o f a long-term conservative trend", w i l l come down on the 
Kuomintang side " i f he h i t s the r i g h t timing i n a c i v i l war". In view of 
Lattimore's e a r l i e r statement that he had backed a reformed Kuomintang u n t i l 
1946, i t i s noteworthy t h a t here he i s o p t i m i s t i c i n assessing Chiang's 
capacity to accept advice: "Chiang i s tenacious but has shown i n the past that 
he knows when to give i n and t r y a new policy".(34) 
Lattimore defended, against h o s t i l e interrogation, the positions he had 
come to hold by 1949 including h i s conviction that no useful purpose would be 
served by fur t h e r American involvement i n Korea and Formosa, These positions 
were exemplified i n the t r a n s c r i p t of a round table discussion on China policy 
held i n the State Department i n early October of 1949 which was reviewed by 
the Subcommittee, Quite contrary to the assertion at the McCarran hearings by 
one of the other p a r t i c i p a n t s , University of Pennsylvania President Harold 
Stassen, Lattimore d i d not dominate the proceedings nor was he part of a 
"leading group", but he does express a variety of f o r t h r i g h t views on American 
policy. The Chinese communist regime should be recognised as part of a package 
concerning admissions to the United Nations (inevitably including the 
Mongolian People's Republic). There i s a poten t i a l f o r n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment 
even i n the communist leaders of Asia - Lattimore mentions Ho Chi Minh -
which could be exploited by an a d r o i t American policy. Lattimore also 
recognises that the approach taken by the United States regarding aid to and 
trade w i t h Asia i n the years ahead w i l l be of the greatest moment. A l l aid 
monies w i l l have a p o l i t i c a l impact which must be recognized. America must 
give preference t o those countries, and here he has India p a r t i c u l a r l y i n mind, 
i n which the "modernization of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l forms" has "created the 
p o l i t i c a l condition under which economic improvement can be carried forward". 
I t would be a mistake to close to American commerce any country i n Asia 
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including China. This would e f f e c t i v e l y destroy any leverage the United States 
might have i n the countries of the region against the Soviet Union, (35) 
Lattimore's academic critics 
Much of the proceedings before the McCarran Subcommittee were taken up 
with the question of whether the publications and a c t i v i t i e s of the I n s t i t u t e 
of Pacific A f f a i r s exhibited any systematic bias. Contending analyses of the 
a r t i c l e s appearing i n Pacific A f f a i r s and i n other I n s t i t u t e publications - a 
practice which probably had i t s o r i g i n s with Alfred Kohlberg - were presented 
to demonstrate or refute charges of bias or s e l e c t i v i t y . In an age which values 
freedom of opinion and expression t h i s now seems an extraordinary exercise, 
but i t was at least made passible by the structure of the I n s t i t u t e which 
sought t o reconcile objectives which came in t o c o n f l i c t i n the 1930s, As has 
been shov/n the Institute's publications were expected to make contributions to 
science but the federal nature of the I n s t i t u t e , which was based on a number 
of national councils, d i d lead i n time to attempts by the Soviet and Japanese 
constituent bodies t o influence publication policy. In addition the editor of 
the p r i n c i p a l journal. Pacific A f f a i r s , had the task of ensuring that i t was a 
to p i c a l publication which did not avoid controversy, Lattimore was a man of 
strong and sometimes careless opinion, and t h i s as much as his need to keep 
the national councils content with the publication was reflected i n his conduct 
as editor. He made strenuous e f f o r t s to extract contributions from his Soviet 
a f f i l i a t e s (who wrote very l i t t l e f o r the journal), and was conciliatory i n 
responding to t h e i r complaints against p a r t i c u l a r a r t i c l e s . He had l i t t l e time 
for the Japanese, however, nor was he a f r a i d to encourage c r i t i c i s m of European 
colonialism. Of course such an approach i s a long way from the communist 
conspiracy, but the McCarran hearings were able by taking a small sample of 
the Ins t i t u t e ' s work t o e x h i b i t some notable favourite causes. Lattimore's lack 
of a uni v e r s i t y degree and the j o u r n a l i s t i c nature of some of his writings 
were also used i n an attempt to d i s c r e d i t his professional standing. 
To the c r e d i t of the American academic community, many scholars were 
prepared t o a t t e s t to h i s scholarship. In March 1950 John K. Fairbank sent a 
c i r c u l a r l e t t e r to some f o r t y China s p e c i a l i s t s urging them to write to 
Senator Tydings with t h e i r views on McCarthy's charges, A l l but one did so. 
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When Fairbank himself was drawn into the McCarran hearings George Boas, 
professor of the h i s t o r y of philosophy at Johns Hopkins, assembled the 
testimonials of thirty-seven scholars, most of them o r i e n t a l i s t s , i n support of 
Lattimore's i n t e g r i t y and contributions to learning. (36) But at the McCarran 
hearings the predominant academic voice was given to s i x university teachers 
who, f o r one reason or another, were prepared to c r i t i c i s e Lattimore's 
scholarship or p o l i t i c s . 
Rowe, McGovern and Colegrove on Lattimore 
Professor David Rov/e, a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t from Yale (who from his 
evidence may perhaps have been a disappointed s u i t o r f o r the hand of Eleanor 
Holgate, la t e r to be Lattiraore's wife), was an outspoken c r i t i c . Lattimore was 
"probably the p r i n c i p a l agent of Stalinism" i n the United States. The mildest 
of cross-examination revealed, however, that Rowe had no reason to suppose 
that Lattimore was "a formal Communist a f f i l i a t e " , which l e f t him with the 
mere supposition that Lattimore was no more than "a fellow traveler". 
Notwithstanding, Rowe was given the opportunity to introduce an analysis of 
the publications of the I n s t i t u t e prepared by Richard L. Walker, then of Yale 
(and most recently US Ambassador i n Seoul), which purported to show a 
systematic bias. (37) William McGovern, professor of p o l i t i c a l science at 
Northwestern University, who had f i r s t met Lattimore i n the late 1920s, spent 
some time charting the various changes he had observed i n his p o l i t i c a l views 
since 1937 when they had seen a great deal of each other i n Peking. From 
ex h i b i t i n g a "warm admiration" f o r the communists i n 1937-38 ("they 
represented the rea l people"), Lattimore had sh i f t e d towards enthusiasm f or 
Chiang Kai-shek i n the winter of 1941, When t h e i r paths crossed again towards 
the end of the war Lattimore was a proponent of a punitive peace f o r Japan; 
he also advocated g i v i n g the Chinese communists a favourable mention i n Office 
of War Information propaganda. Indeed, he had gone so fa r as saying in 1945, 
regarding American policy, that "we have to build on the forward-looking 
elements i n China", that i s "the people i n Yenan", Now whether or not t h i s was 
an accurate r e c o l l e c t i o n i t reflected sentiments which were bound to be 
d i f f e r e n t l y interpreted at a time when the United States was locked i n a 
sanguinary and apparently prolonged c o n l i c t with the Chinese communists i n 
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Korea. McGovern also commented on Lattimore's post-war views of Japan and 
Korea, and expressed the opinion that Lattimore's influence could be seen i n 
the "Kunming telegram" sent by Wallace to Roosevelt i n late June 1944. Now the 
telegram did advocate p u t t i n g American support behind a "new coa l i t i o n " only 
to be led by Chiang i f he was s u f f i c i e n t l y astute to see the need for reform; 
Wallace's v i s i t also cleared the way f o r an American m i l i t a r y observer mission 
to be sent t o Yenan, (38), But according t o the testimony of Vincent and Alsop 
who were there, and former Vice-President Wallace himself Lattimore had no 
hand at a l l i n any of t h i s , (39) Nevertheless, McGovern i s adamant that 
Lattimore had always followed the " S t a l i n i s t " l i n e , (40) 
Another professor from Northv/estern, the p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t Kenneth 
Colegrove, was prepared to of f e r an even more damning indictment of 
Lattimore's ideas and influence. From his evidence i t i s clear that the two men 
had diagreed v i o l e n t l y i n late 1943 when Colegrove had been offered a position 
i n the Office of War Information (OWI) with Lattimore, At that time he had 
taken strong exception to Lattimore's condemnation of colonialism i n India and 
Indonesia, and to his bel i e f that at the end of the war the Japanese imperial 
family should be interned i n China, His analysis of Lattimore's view at that 
time t h a t the Chinese communists were mere "agrarian reformers" not under the 
con t r o l of Moscow i s worth a more lengthy consideration as i t conveys i n a 
s t r i k i n g fashion the manner i n which the Subcommittee interpreted academic 
comment: 
"Senator FERGUSON, ,,, that was the Communist line? 
Mr, COLEGROVE, Yes, I do not charge him — 
Sen, FERGUSON, With being a Communist? 
Mr, COLEGROVE, No. I did not charge him with following the 
Communist li n e . I simply t o l d him I was sure he knew better, that 
Mao Tse-tung was not a democrat and a mere agrarian reformer ... 
Also I discussed w i t h Lattimore the policy of the United States 
toward the Emperor .,, 
Sen, EASTLAND, Why did you decline a job i n San Francisco [with 
OWI]? 
Mr, COLEGROVE, Largely personal, I did not t r u s t Owen Lattimore, I 
did not care to be associated with him. 
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Sen, EASTLAND, You thought they were following the Communist line 
out there? 
Mr, COLEGROVE. I can't say I was that a l e r t , Senator, Some of us 
professors are not as a l e r t as we should be, I could not say that 
Owen Lattimore was follov/ing the Communist li n e , I didn't l i k e his 
atti t u d e on Asiatic problems. 
Sen, EASTLAND, You say i t was a Communist line? 
Mr, COLEGROVE. Yes. I say i t was the Communist line . 
Sen. FERGUSON. You have no doubt about i t now? 
Mr, COLEGROVE, That was the Communist line, As you look back over 
the s i t u a t i o n and compare i t with the e d i t o r i a l s i n the Daily 
Worker, you can see d e f i n i t e l y that was the Communist line," (41) 
Colegrove also detected i n Lattimore's 1949 memorandum on foreign policy 
views which, i f put i n t o practice, would have furthered the communist cause i n 
Asia, He also commented on other issues but his most outspoken remarks were 
reserved f o r the State Department round table of October 1949. According to 
Colegrove, there Lattimore had led a "pro-Kremlin" group which dominated the 
discussion one of the consequences of which was the severing of aid to 
Formosa i n late October. But as an academic witness with a duty to pass 
judgment on complex matters of fact Colegrove rather undermined his own 
c r e d i b i l i t y , i f only t o pos t e r i t y , by assenting to the proposition that "there 
was a conspiracy by people i n the State Department to throw China to the 
Communists". (42) 
Nicholas Poppe on Lattimore 
A wholly serious witness, and probably the only academic called to the 
hearings with a sound knowledge of Lattimore's specialty, was Professor 
Nicholas Poppe, Poppe, perhaps the v/orld's leading Mongolist, had not been i n 
the United States f o r very long and, being a former Soviet c i t i z e n , was anxious 
to cooperate with the members of the Subcommittee. At the same time from his 
testimony, and from his l a t e r autobiography, i t i s clear that he wished to give 
a f a i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the facts, On the scholarly standing of the Institute's 
Soviet a f f i l i a t e s , Poppe recounted his experience of the evidence of Communist 
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Party control of a l l academic matters, including Voitinsky's purge of the 
Oriental I n s t i t u t e i n Leningrad. On the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and Kongolia Poppe pointed out that Mongolia's independence v/as only nominal -
a l l v i s i t s to the country, even by Soviet scholars, had to have p o l i t i c a l 
approval from Koscow and Lattimore must have known something of t h i s i n his 
attempts to arrange permission for such a v i s i t through his Soviet contacts. 
Indeed, t h i s l a t t e r point may be inferred from Lattimore's correspondence with 
Moscow, though t h i s also bears another construction. As Mongolia's southern 
borders were closed a Soviet visa would have been required to traverse 
t e r r i t o r y not normally open to foreigners, and only Soviet good offices, 
Mongolia not being recognised by any other country, would have gained 
Lattimore entry. On Lattimore's works, Poppe praised his wr i t i n g s on Manchuria 
and Inner Asian Frontiers of China, but found some of his other books 
s u p e r f i c i a l and u n c r i t i c a l . But though the Senators were evidently anxious to 
hear Poppe label Lattimore a communist, he carefully resisted t h e i r attempts to 
do so even though he regarded as nonsense a l l t a l k of Russia exercising a 
power of " a t t r a c t i o n " over Mongolia i n view of the commitment of Soviet troops 
to supress an extensive rebellion there against the communist regime. (43) 
Karl Vittfogel and George Taylor 
The most damaging academic c r i t i c of Lattimore to appear before the 
Subcommittee was Karl August V i t t f o g e l , by t h i s time a professor at the Far 
Eastern and Russian I n s t i t u t e of the University of Washington i n Seattle as 
well as Director of the Chinese History Project at Columbia. George Taylor also 
from Seattle supported some of Wittfogel's remarks concerning particular 
incidents, but Vittfogel's contribution was of far greater importance. A great 
deal of credence was placed i n his testimony because of his unique 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , as an academic and an undoubted influence on Lattimore's 
scholarship, as one closely acquainted v/ith Lattimore f o r a considerable 
period, and as a former communist. In retrospect i t i s clear that the members 
of the Subcommittee were not possessed of the acumen or the i n c l i n a t i o n to 
consider c r i t i c a l l y the bearing of these diverse (and perhaps Inconsistent) 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s on some of Wittfogel's more remarkable statements. On the l a t t e r 
point, i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y stated i n the record of the hearings that the 
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Subcaramittee ( l i k e the Spanish I n q u i s i t i o n i n t h i s i f not i n other respects), 
far from fearing the danger of recidivism or d i s t r u s t i n g the character or 
motives of those who could become communists i n the f i r s t place, accorded 
p a r t i c u l a r weight a p r i o r i t o the evidence of ex-communists. 
f i t t f o g e l was given the widest b r i e f to discuss Lattimore and the 
I n s t i t u t e , and the reader of the proceedings repeatedly feels the lack of 
interventions by counsel to the Subcommittee Robert Korris who i n preemptory 
fashion normally required witnesses to keep to the point and answer the 
question at hand. Indeed, at the end of h i s contribution Morris unashamedly 
contrived to allow Wittfogel a grand peroration with the rather broad inquiry, 
"Now, Dr. Wittfogel, what have you done i n the l a s t 10 years to express your 
opposition to the Communist movement ...?"(44) 
Many of Vittfogel's remarks concerned his relationship with Lattimore and 
t h e i r estimation of mutual acquaintances. Wittfogel was adamant that Lattimore 
knew of his communist a f f i l i a t i o n s , and of the communist connections of 
several contributors to Pacific A f f a i r s , though curiously enough on the former 
question no words actually passed between them. An example of t h i s unspoken 
understanding - Lattimore was supposed to have given Wittfogel a knowing 
smile during a conversation - was to provoke a sardonic response; 
"The t r u t h i s that I have not the fai n t e s t recollection of t h i s 
whole conversation, but i f I smiled at a l l , i t was certainly a non-
Communist smile. Now I v/ould be w i l l i n g to believe that Communists 
have an arsenal of secret signals, but I would never suppose that i t 
included anything as good-natured as a smile. In fact, I thought 
that these grim conspirators regarded a smile as a bourgeois 
gesture - p r a c t i c a l l y as an enemy of the state. I f I am wrong, and 
i f a smile i s a secret Red signal, I confess that I used t o smile a 
great deal. In the pre-McCarthy days I used to think that l i f e was 
lo t s of fun."(45) 
Wittfogel also f r e e l y t e s t i f i e d on the l e f t i s t or communist sympathies of a 
number of individuals connected with the In s t i t u t e . But he was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
scrupulous not d i r e c t l y to name Lattimore as an organised communist - he 
preferred to profess ignorance on t h i s question, though he found his p o l i t i c a l 
p o s i t i o n i n retrospect t o be consistently "pro-Soviet". And he denied that 
Lattimore's lack of formal academic q u a l i f i c a t i o n s should have any bearing on 
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his scholarly standing, though he was of the opinion that Lattimore's 
considerable authority i n a l i m i t e d academic f i e l d did not j u s t i f y a claim to 
"global" expertise. 
According to Wittfogel's account, at a point i n 1947 he had come round to 
the view that he detected i n Lattimore's past statements, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the 
post-war fate of Korea and American treatment of the Japanese imperial family, 
a careless and irresponsible lack of integration. Lattimore had been due to 
contribute a preface to the volume prepared by Wittfogel on the Liao dynasty 
as the f i r s t f r u i t s of h i s connection with the Chinese History Project at 
Columbia. Hov/ever, with t h e i r r elationship soured by p o l i t i c a l disputes 
V i t t f o g e l was no longer prepared to incorporate such a preface i n the book. 
The precise dating of t h i s break i n t h e i r relations i s important since 
V i t t f o g e l c r i t i c i s e d Lattimore at the McCarran hearings inter alia f o r views 
which he had expressed i n 1944 and 1945. Lattimore declared himself puzzled 
during the hearings that although Wittfogel had d e f i n i t e l y broken with 
communism i n 1939, he was s t i l l able to write to Lattimore describing him as 
"an expert to end a l l experts" i n March 1945.(46) 
I t may be conjectured that Vittfogel's relations with Lattimore were 
constituted of a tangle of scholarly and p o l i t i c a l as well as personal 
considerations. When Wittfogel arrived i n China he was v i r t u a l l y unknown i n 
the American China f i e l d , His friendship with Lattimore had opened doors, at 
the same time as his ideas had contributed to the structure of Inner Asian 
Frontiers of China, From his la t e r w r i t i n g s and behaviour i t i s evident that 
he found i t d i f f i c u l t to be beholden to any other person apart from figures 
such as Marx and Veber who were safely dead. I t i s noteworthy, therefore, that 
V i t t f o g e l ' s 1949 work on the Liao dynasty, i n i t s incorporation of a new 
approach to the h i s t o r y of "barbarian" conquest dynasties i n China, b u i l t on 
the major theoretical preoccupation of Inner Asian Frontiers of China which 
was the relationship between f r o n t i e r and heartland i n Chinese history. (47) 
At the McCarran hearings V i t t f o g e l went so f a r as to refer to the " h i s t o r i c a l 
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis" of Lattiraore's 1940 book as having "so f a i t h f u l l y 
followed my ideas", but Lattimore's greatest theoretical debt to V i t t f o g e l lay, 
as has been shown, i n his analysis of the social and p o l i t i c a l pattern of the 
Chinese a g r i c u l t u r a l heartland. 
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In the early 1940s Wittfogel's p o l i t i c a l views began to harden. From 
l e t t e r s of 1943 and 1944 i t i s apparent that Lattimore had found Wittfogel's 
increasing "vehemence" more and more d i f f i c u l t to accommodate. As he says in 
the l a t t e r ; 
"About confining myself to conventional phrases during your b r i e f 
v i s i t here, the fact i s that I was completely dazed. I thought we 
were meeting as old friends for the f i r s t time i n a long period and 
was at a loss as to what to say when you opened with a violent 
personal attack on another old f r i e n d f o r whom I have as much 
respect as I do fo r you. You followed that up by a very forceful 
presentation of p o l i t i c a l opinions on which I , myself, have either no 
opinion or only an unformed or half-formed opinion. In such cases I 
f i n d i t very d i f f i c u l t to be expected to endorse somebody else's 
strongly held opinions, even i f I know that h i s opinion i s based on 
experience and knowledge. I s t i l l c l i n g to the privilege of what I 
believe i s known legally as the 'Scotch verdict' - that i s , the r i g h t 
to say that I don't know."(48) 
From h i s peroration a t the McCarran hearings i t can be seen that Wittfogel had 
come to see by t h i s time a l l issues, personal relations as well as scholarly 
questions, i n terms of "the Soviet issue"; 
" I may have been one of the f i r s t persons who raised the question 
among the O r i e n t a l i s t s that we have to adjust ourselves t o a world 
which i s not one world. We held the f i r s t convention of American 
O r i e n t a l i s t s i n the spring of 1946, and the president of our 
professional organization discussed the lessons of the war. In my 
own paper I took the l i n e that the Orien t a l i s t s have to become 
r e a l i s t s and to be aware that we are not going to l i v e i n one world 
... Year by year I have t r i e d to show we cannot work i n the modern 
f i e l d of o r i e n t a l h i s t o r y and study what Is going on i n modern 
times without understanding communism .,."(49) 
For Lattimore, as has been shovm, the Soviet issue was never pre-eminent, 
Lattimore had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n ideological issues (as a number of his rather 
bemused references i n the 1930s and early 1940s to Wittfogel's views 
demonstrate), and his recommendations for post-war foreign policy were never 
based on a need to contain or defeat world communism as a f i r s t p r i o r i t y , 
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Indeed, he believed that there were l i m i t s w i t h i n which the United States and 
the Soviet Union could co-operate, and that i n some circumstances a heedless 
opposition to communism would not be to America's advantage. I t i s not 
surp r i s i n g , therefore, t h a t by 1952 Wittfogel was prepared to swear under oath 
that "Lattimore's special and unusual talents were increasingly furthering the 
aims of t o t a l power" thereby doing "great harm to the free world". (50) 
But how was t h i s harm manifest? Here, as has been shown, Wittfogel f e l t 
t h at too many of Lattimore's ideas on foreign policy ran p a r a l l e l to those of 
the world communist movement. Wittfogel, however, appeared before the 
Subcommittee p r i n c i p a l l y as a s c i e n t i s t and so he offered also an example of a 
deliberate s c i e n t i f i c d i s t o r t i o n which had appeared i n Lattimore's work because 
of his increasing sympathies f o r the Soviet Union. He showed, f i r s t of a l l , 
that Lattimore e a r l i e r was aware of the importance f o r the communists of 
obscuring the bureaucratic nature of t r a d i t i o n a l East Asian society (lest t h e i r 
own plans to create a s i m i l a r bureaucratic system of t o t a l power become 
apparent) by i n s i s t i n g that such society was "feudal". He showed that 
Lattimore's own past w r i t i n g s rejected the application of the "feudal" 
denotation t o imperial China. But i n one of the preparatory studies for Pivot 
of Asia published i n 1948 Lattimore and his collaborators referred to the 
presence of "semifeudal agrarian relations" i n Sinkiang. Ergo, Lattimore's 
science had been v i t i a t e d by the influence of Marxism. (51) The response of 
the normally assiduous Morris was " I t h i n k that i s enough of that". Lattimore's 
l a t e r reaction was to comment that he did not know that the communists had a 
"patent" on the term "feudal", but perhaps t h i s i s an instance of a s i n against 
science on Wittfogel's part f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. Sinkiang i s hardly 
a g r i c u l t u r a l China, and the application of the term feudal to some aspects of 
Sinkiang society does not amount to any comment on the nature of t r a d i t i o n a l 
or modern China, 
Lattimore and the debate on post-war policy 
I t was almost inevitable that i n the atmosphere of the early 1950s, 
Lattimore's w r i t i n g s and opinions would be interpreted i n the l i g h t of the 
debate on the "loss" of China, Seen i n that context his views were neither 
extreme nor p a r t i c u l a r l y o r i g i n a l . The creation of a c o a l i t i o n government i n 
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China incorporating the Communist Party as a measure t o avoid c i v i l c o n f l i c t 
was one of the objectives of Ambassador Hurley's f i v e point agreement of 
ITovember 1944 which he unsuccessfully endeavoured to have the CCP and the 
Kuomintang accept, Hurley, who la t e r blamed the State Department China 
sp e c i a l i s t s including Service and Davies f o r undermining Chiang's regime with 
t h e i r misleading reports on the communists, believed at the time and went on 
saying u n t i l 1951 that the Chinese communists were not "real communists". (52) 
What i s perhaps most noteworthy i s that Lattimore was one of the earliest 
commentators to see the pote n t i a l f o r a communist led g u e r i l l a resistance 
dedicated to the destruction of the Japanese invaders. But, despite his overall 
assessment of the Kuomintang, he remained hopeful of Chiang Kai-shek's powers 
of leadership long a f t e r others f a m i l i a r w ith conditions i n China had come to 
see his cause as hopeless. 
On the shape of the post-war settlement i n Asia Lattimore was more 
outspoken. But i t should be recalled that i n connection with proposals f o r a 
hard peace with Japan, i n 1943 and 1944 a s i m i l a r proposition f o r the 
"pastoralisation" of Germany (the Morgenthau plan) had been accepted for a 
time by the a l l i e s . Even on the issue of Korea the United States Congress had 
delayed the aid package assembled i n 1949 on the grounds that Korea was a 
l o s t cause, and Eisenhower was la t e r to rue the day that he was forced to have 
dealings with the administration of Syngman Rhee. In Indochina American policy 
makers i n a Republican administration were to decide, in 1954, against a di r e c t 
m i l i t a r y role i n Vietnam though of course t h i s decision was later reversed 
with t r a g i c consequences. And the unequivocal American commitment to defend 
the Kuofflintang on Taiwan, a commitment which Secretary of State Acheson had 
not wished to make, only came about with the outbreak of the Korean War, 
Indeed, i t has now been established that i n 1949 Acheson was already w i l l i n g 
to countenace diplomatic recognition of Peking, (53) I t must be concluded that 
Lattimore suffered less for his opinions than f o r the times i n which he had 
held them, 
Lattimore also suffered f o r his associations. The l e f t i s h sympathies of 
some of the individuals who had been his colleagues in the I n s t i t u t e were 
cl e a r l y a l i a b i l i t y i n the United States of the early 1950s. But important 
also, though a factor which i s not so evident from the McCarran hearings, was 
Lattimore's membership of the Hew Deal generation who were now held to account 
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f o r America's f a i l u r e to win the peace, i n Asia and elsewhere, Lattimore owed 
his p o s i t i o n as Roosevelt's emis.sary to Chiang to Laucblin Currie, Roosevelt's 
administrative assistant who i n superintending lend-lease aid to China was an 
important influence on China policy at that time.(54) And Roosevelt himself 
had reacted with enthusiasm when Wallace had informed him that on Currie's 
suggestion he was taking Lattimore, as an expert on Inner Asia, on his 1944 
mission.(55) Roosevelt's i d e a l i s t i c desire to admit China to the ranks of the 
post-war powers i s well documented, as i s the distaste with which he viewed 
the col o n i a l status of much of Asia, These two views were at the bottom of 
Roosevelt's approach to post-war policy i n the region, as shown in the last 
l e t t e r w r i t t e n by Lattimore t o Chiang Kai-shek i n his capacity as Chiang's 
adviser. This informs Chiang of a conversation with the President i n which he 
put forward the view that i n Southeast Asia a new form of trusteeship would 
need to be evolved as a rest o r a t i o n of the old colonial order i n Asia would 
not be desirable, I t also reports the President's conviction that a f t e r the war 
China v ; i l l be one of the "four 'big policemen' of the world" along with B r i t a i n , 
the United States and Russia.(56) In so f a r that these beliefs were to provide 
a f a u l t y foundation f o r subsequent American China policy, Lattimore was bound 
to be seen as one who shared the blame. 
Lattimore's assumptions and the evolution of American foreign policy 
I t should be observed by way of conclusion that certain of Lattimore's 
fundamental beliefs contravened the assumptions which came to be most 
prominent i n the t h i n k i n g of American foreign policy makers as the Cold War 
developed. In the l a t e r 1940s Lattimore formed the strong conviction that Asia 
would be dominated by an upsurge of n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment and by popular 
yearnings f o r (an i n e v i t a b l y i l l - d e f i n e d ) democracy. He also remained convinced 
of the veracity of an idea that he had come to accept i n the 1930s, that the 
coming age was one i n which land based power rather than sea power would be 
dominant. A successful United States policy i n Asia would need to take a l l 
these factors i n t o account. The d r i f t of American policy, however, was i n quite 
the opposite d i r e c t i o n . In the period from George F. Kennan's "long telegram" 
of February 1946 on the fundamentals of Soviet policy to the declaration of 
the Truman Doctrine i n the following year, Washington moved towards a policy 
Owen Lattimore and Asia Page 115 
Opinions on t r i a l / 5 
of confronting a Soviet bloc whose conduct was regarded as aggressive and 
in i m i c a l to American interests. This doctrine of "containment" was expounded i n 
the National Security Council's lsfSC-68, drafted at the beginning of 1950 and 
formally accepted as American policy by Truman later i n that year when the 
outbreak of the Korean War seemed to validate i t s postulates, Though John 
Foster Dulles at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration sought to 
distance himself pu b l i c l y from State Department policy hitherto, i t i s well 
established that "containment" of the Soviet bloc remained the princi p a l 
American objective well i n t o the 1960s,(57) 
As a response t o the Korean War and events i n Europe, the United States 
participated i n or prompted the formation of a series of agreements and pacts 
to replicate i n Asia the security system created i n Europe by the North 
A t l a n t i c Treaty. Thus between 1951 and 1955 the United States entered into 
security t r e a t i e s with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China 
on Taiwan, and prompted the creation of AHZUS, SEATO, and CENTO. As a 
concomitant of t h i s security system, r e s t r i c t i o n s were placed on economic 
contacts with the communist v^/orld, including a boycott on a l l trade with the 
People's Republic of China. American strategy aimed at holding the existing 
l i n e i n Asia through the maintenance of a r i n g of m i l i t a r y bases from which 
a i r and maritime power could be projected. Neutrality by the t h i r d countries i n 
the region was to be p o s i t i v e l y discouraged, and American business was to be 
induced to concentrate i t s e f f o r t s on developing l i n k s with those countries 
who were active p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s strategy. 
The fundamentals of t h i s strategy c l e a r l y ran contrary to Lattimore's 
views of the s i t u a t i o n i n Asia, The United States appeared to be seeking to 
dominate Asia i n the old way. From offshore m i l i t a r y bases America could well 
be thought by Asians t o be imposing an external and unsought hegemony on 
peoples whose national and material aspirations were being subordinated to the 
global contest against America's p r i n c i p a l enemy. Such a strategy denied the 
existence (and would thus delay or prevent the emergence) of nationalist 
d i v e r s i t y w i t h i n the expanded communist bloc and i t would be l i k e l y also to 
drive the t h i r d countries into the embrace of the very enemy from whom they 
should be shielded. And the essentially maritime approach to the region denied 
the new r e a l i t y of continentally based land power as the key to the control of 
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the new Asia, a power America could not match by cl i n g i n g to the Asian 
fringes. 
As more becomes known of the detailed thinking at t h i s time of American 
policy makers i t i s becoming clear that Lattimore's views were less at 
variance with those of leading figures i n the government than his c r i t i c s made 
out i n the early 1950s. The most i n f l u e n t i a l individual i n the making of policy 
i n these years was Kennan. Though he v/as the p r i n c i p a l architect of the 
containment doctrine, on policy towards Asia he was both more cautious and 
less preoccupied with the single fa c t o r of communist expansion than later 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s of that doctrine. The best approach to Asia, he believed, was not 
to f i g h t communism where and when the communists chose but to hold strong 
points (Okinawa, the Philippines, Japan) from which an appropriate response 
could be mounted. He proposed exp l o i t i n g the differences that were bound to 
develop within the communist camp and to t h i s end did not favour any 
entanglement i n China where "Titoism" could well appear. He held a low opinion 
of Chiang Kai-shek and even suggested at one point i n 1949 that the 
Kuomintang be expelled from Taiwan and the island held possibly as an 
American strong point. (58) There i s good evidence that Dulles, though in his 
public pronouncements a proponent of the view that communism was monolithic, 
was aware as early as 1953 that Sino-Soviet disagreements could be exploited. 
Indeed, United States pressure on China in 1954 (following the Mutual Defence 
Treaty with Taipei) and again i n 1958 was exerted p a r t l y to induce a 
reassessment i n Moscow of the costs of underwriting Chinese foreign 
policy. (59) The real difference between the Truman-Acheson approach to world 
p o l i t i c s and t h a t of Dulles was that whereas f o r the former containment was a 
means to the end of influencing Soviet conduct and inducing the Soviets to 
negotiate on t h e i r differences with the United States, for the l a t t e r 
containment became almost an end i n i t s e l f . This was largely a result of the 
changes wrought by McCarthy and his a l l i e s i n domestic p o l i t i c s as a result of 
which anything less than implacable opposition to world communism could be 
construed as treasonous, (60) In the new era of the 1950s Lattimore's dogged 
adherence to those positions he had espoused i n the previous decade was a 
personal strategy very much against the current of o f f i c i a l opinion. 
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Although Lattimore was never again to exert influence i n p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s 
i n the United States, the experiences of 1950-1954, though they exacted an 
immense physical and psychological t o l l , d i d not bring h i s v/ork t o an end. He 
continued to be a p r o l i f i c w r i t e r , often returning to and elaborating on ideas 
f i r s t considered i n the 1930s. He remained at Johns Hopkins u n t i l 1963, 
f i n d i n g a home i n the department of History when the Page School was 
liquidated, and moving to Leeds University i n 1963 to become foundation 
professor of Chinese Studies, Following his retirement i n 1970 and the death 
of h i s wife and co-worker, Eleanor, he live d f i r s t i n Paris (working with his 
Japanese collaborator i n research, Fujiko Isono) and then i n Cambridge (where 
he became attached to King's College), before i l l health forced his return to 
l i v e i n the United States with his son i n 1985. 
Three major themes have dominated h i s more recent wri t i n g s . The history 
and contemporary condition of the Mongols which has been his major 
preoccupation w i l l be considered i n the following chapter. The present chapter 
w i l l review his more speculative work on the wider h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l 
impact of the f r o n t i e r on c i v i l i s a t i o n s and empires, and his essays on 
contemporary China ( i n which the consideration of f r o n t i e r problems i s 
prominent) many of which were occasioned or stimulated by his assumption of 
the Leeds chair. But f i r s t the background to both of these themes w i l l be 
sketched i n through a consideration of those aspects of his work of the 1940s. 
Frontiers and foreign policy in Asia 
In those books and a r t i c l e s published towards the end of the v/ar 
Lattimore repeatedly emphasised that the old colonial era i n Asia was drawing 
to a close, and that policy makers i n the United States would need to abandon 
the old maritime view of Asia which was an inheritance from that era i f they 
were successfully t o take the measure of the new Asia,(l) The postwar era was 
destined t o be one dominated by land rather than sea powers, and consequently 
developments i n the Asian hinterland would be of much greater moment than 
events on the Pacific rim.(2) The "success" of the Soviet policy towards the 
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national m i n o r i t i e s i n the that portion of the Asian hinterland which lay 
wi t h i n the USSR was thus of much greater than local significance. <3) In 1945, 
as has been shown, Lattimore expressed the view that Soviet Russia exercised a 
potent "power of a t t r a c t i o n " f o r the peoples of Inner Asia by virtue of the 
material progress and "democracy" to be found i n the Central Asian Soviet 
republics. The fundamental orientation of Soviet policy, Lattiraore asserts, has 
been the p r i n c i p a l cause of t h i s power of a t t r a c t i o n , though the continuous 
geographical re l a t i o n s h i p between Russia and Asia gave even the empire of 
Tsarist times much greater integration than was seen i n the other European 
empires. The strength of the Soviet power of a t t r a c t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
manifest i n re l a t i o n s with Mongolia. These establish a "standard" deserving of 
"careful and respectful study" i f Soviet influence i s to be matched or emulated 
(here Lattimore has China p a r t i c u l a r l y i n mind) by others.<4) 
Having returned to Johns Hopkins late i n 1944, Lattimore embarked on a 
number of studies of Inner Asian f r o n t i e r regions which were to have t h e i r 
f r u i t s i n collaborative publications p a r t i c u l a r l y on Sinkiang, the most 
important of which was Pivot of Asia. (5) Of the greatest importance f or his 
own i n t e l l e c t u a l development was a comparative study Lattimore made using a 
d i v e r s i t y of Russian sources of the expansion of the Chinese and Russian 
empires. Published i n 1947 t h i s was to provide a new basis f o r a l l his 
subsequent discussion of the his t o r y of and contemporary developments i n Inner 
Asia. (6) The lack of a clear geographical d i v i s i o n on the Russian f r o n t i e r 
between land suited f o r agriculture and steppe led from the begining of 
Russian h i s t o r y to an interpenetration of economic, p o l i t i c a l , and social forms, 
The mode of l i f e and the economic role of the p r i n c i p a l agents of Russian 
expansion i n the early modern period, the Cossacks, were emblematic of t h i s 
interpenetration, When the spread of railways and the growth of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Russia enabled the Tsarist empire to expand 
administratively i t could readily incorporate a variety of peoples within i t s 
t e r r i t o r i e s , often extending i t s power i n Asia by absorbing the old ru l i n g 
classes i n t o the imperial social and p o l i t i c a l order, A greater contrast with 
the Chinese f r o n t i e r could not be imagined. I f China could not absorb and 
assimilate f r o n t i e r peoples and habitats to the Chinese way of l i f e these were 
rejected, and any p o l i t i c a l and social order which attempted to straddle the 
f r o n t i e r was inherently unstable. The construction of railways and the 
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extension of i n d u s t r i a l l y based power by the Chinese into the f r o n t i e r regions 
exacerbated these i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s . 
The Russian method of imperial expansion by "incorporation" thus 
produced, by comparison with the Ch'ing empire, a f a r more more integrated 
p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y . The Russian revolution, so Lattimore's argument goes, 
reinforced t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n by introducing the additional bonds of class 
s o l i d a r i t y , In the c i v i l war i n Asiatic Russia the old r u l i n g e l i t e , to preserve 
t h e i r p r i vileges, threw i n t h e i r l o t with the White forces. The Bolshevik 
v i c t o r y was attained with the help of a good part of the "common people" who 
were then able to improve t h e i r economic and social conditions by drawing upon 
Russian i n d u s t r i a l power; 
"As a res u l t of the Russian Revolution a new standard has been 
established, which may be called the standard of u t i l i z a t i o n . Within 
the Russian theater of a c t i v i t y , under a system of socialization and 
c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , i t i s no longer adequate to speak of 'the f r o n t i e r -
conquering c i v i l i z a t i o n ' . What we appear to have i s a merging of 'the 
f r o n t i e r ' w ith ' c i v i l i z a t i o n ' , and a common u t i l i z a t i o n of the t o t a l 
resources of the t o t a l area. This common u t i l i z a t i o n i s characterized 
by rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of both Russian and non-Russian societies 
w i t h i n the Soviet p o l i t i c a l structure and by the integration of both 
pastoral and a g r i c u l t u r a l economics with the i n d u s t r i a l economy." (7) 
Again, but f o r an additional reason, the Russian association with Mongolia i s 
of singular importance. In a manner which "appears to resemble the 
Rooseveltian Good Neighbour policy" the Mongols "were admitted to the Russian 
standard of common u t i l i z a t i o n of resources". Although few countries could 
match the Soviet role i n Asia t h i s example demonstrated that i f China i s to 
extend her influence i n t o the f r o n t i e r s i t must be upon a new basis, one 
consistent, Lattimore hazards, only "with far-reaching changes i n the social 
f a b r i c and p o l i t i c a l structure" of metropolitan China. (8) 
In Situation i n Asia, i n addition to the recapitulation of the hypothesis 
of the Soviet "power of a t t r a c t i o n " over Asian peoples, these ideas form the 
basis f o r Lattimore's new analysis of the d i f f e r e n t types of empire to be 
found not only i n Asia but i n recent world history. According t o his later 
r e c o l l e c t i o n t h i s p o s i t i o n was f i r s t expouded i n a lecture before a meeting of 
the American H i s t o r i c a l Association i n Washington i n December 1948, a 
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condensed version of which was published the following year. (9) In t h e i r 
respective geographical characters and methods of expansion the Russian empire 
was "incorporative" and the Chinese empire v/as "absorptive"; both were d i s t i n c t 
from the "accumulative" character of the B r i t i s h empire i n Asia which had i t s 
o r i g i n s i n the m i l i t a r y and economic command of the sea, and was conducted by 
an administrative and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e who remained quite aloof from the 
conquered colonial subjects,(10) Lattimore's h o s t i l i t y towards imperialism, the 
major theme of the book, can thus be seen to derive from more than a naive 
Rooseveltian d i s l i k e of colonialism. On the one hand the age of maritime 
ascendancy v/as over, and thus the French and Dutch, as much as the B r i t i s h 
should not receive American support for an enterprise that could not be 
sustained. On the other t h e i r empires were not of the kind that would permit 
the extension of "the standard of u t i l i z a t i o n " already achieved i n Soviet Asia 
to t h e i r colonial subjects. American trade and assistance alone might achieve 
t h i s objective, but only i f the United States took action i n Asia f o r the r i g h t 
p o l i t i c a l reasons; m i l i t a r y support f o r supposedly f r i e n d l y despots would only 
recreate the conditions of the former empires and would be no match for the 
a t t r a c t i o n s of the Soviet example. In the Inner Asian f r o n t i e r regions i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , American c i v i l i s a t i o n was on i t s mettle to demonstrate the 
s u p e r i o r i t y of i t s values. 
The new power alignment in Asia 
In an important a r t i c l e published i n 1953 Lattimore developed t h i s 
analysis fu r t h e r to account f o r the h i s t o r i c a l geography of the f r o n t i e r s of 
Inner Asia. The d e l i m i t a t i o n of these f r o n t i e r s had the appearance of paradox 
fo r boundaries were drawn i n a precise manner despite the fact that the areas 
i n question were ethnographically and geographically mixed zones of sparse 
population. Between 1895 and 1907 the B r i t i s h and Russian Empires, having 
grown i n the manner already described, came to a series of f r o n t i e r agreements 
which reflected the diminished economic and administrative returns t h e i r 
expansion had by then encountered. The boundaries of Afghanistan were drawn so 
as to ensure that these empires had no common f r o n t i e r , seperate spheres of 
influence were agreed i n Persia, and Britain's preeminence i n Tibet found i t s 
Owen Lattimore and Asia Page 127 
Chinese and World Frontiers/6 
equivalent i n the Russian role i n Outer Mongolia despite China's t r a d i t i o n a l 
suzerainty i n those t e r r i t o r i e s . (11) 
This s t a b i l i s a t i o n , Lattimore points out, had been the basis of 
Mackinder's bold attempt to define the geographical foundations of the world 
balance of power. For Mackinder w r i t i n g i n 1904 the world was divided into two 
zones, the Eurasian land mass and the lands of the crescent around the rim of 
that mass. In recent times the supremacy of sea based power had extended the 
B r i t i s h Empire to dominate the lands of the crescent; now the construction of 
railways projected from newly i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g Eastern Europe was resulting i n 
a matching of t h i s sea power by land based power. The age of Columbus had 
passed i n t o history. Because the l i k e l y potential of the newly tapped resources 
of Asia (so remote as to be unaffected by the exertions of any sea power) was 
so great, i f t h i s t e r r i t o r y f e l l to the possession of a single power naval 
forces could be constructed from t h i s region large enough to overwhelm any 
power based on the crescent lands and thus rule the world. Mackinder's 
objective was to prevent m i l i t a r y cooperation between Russia and Germany which 
would produce such a single power; to t h i s end he advocated the maintenance of 
the balance of power through an Anglo-Russian alliance. (12) 
How i n Lattimore's works there i s a good deal of evidence that he was 
much influenced by the geo p o l i t i c a l school. The close of the era of the sea 
powers i s a r e f r a i n i n his wr i t i n g s f i r s t heard i n his studies of Manchuria, 
and i n 1943 he offered a trenchant c r i t i q u e of Nicholas Spykman (himself a 
c r i t i c of Mackinder's l a t e r work) on the grounds that Spykman's recommendation 
that the United States seek m i l i t a r y control of the Eurasian rim was a 
mistaken attempt to recreate the vanished supremacy of "Gunboat Policy".(13) In 
his o r i g i n a l analysis of 1904 Mackinder expressed the view that "the pivot 
region of the world's p o l i t i c s " was the "vast area of Euro-Asia which i s 
inaccessible to ships, but i n an t i q u i t y lay open to the horse r i d i n g nomads, 
and i s to-day about to be covered with a network of railways". (14) This 
statement, of course, was the i n s p i r a t i o n f o r the t i t l e of Lattimore's book on 
Sinkiang, But i t also prompted him to reconsider the geopolitics of Inner Asia 
in the l i g h t of the communist v i c t o r y i n China, The f r o n t i e r s of t h i s region, 
Lattimore avers, have been transformed. The old imperial powers no longer 
con t r o l the rim (the wars i n Vietnam, Korea, and Malaya are at best holding 
operations) and f a r from the f r o n t i e r s marking zones of diminishing returns 
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they are now everywhere of v i t a l i nterest to policy makers. Where communist 
and non-communist Asia face each other Soviet development exercises an 
undoubted and growing power of a t t r a c t i o n . In the case of the Sino-Soviet 
f r o n t i e r regions, these have become "zones through which communication between 
China and Russia i s imperatively necessary". In the past the development of 
China took place, f o r the most part, near the coast. low "economically and 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y , China i s making a right-angled turn away from the coast and 
toward Inner Asia" to develop the resources of the hinterland and l i n k up with 
the Asian republics of the Soviet Union. Inner Asia i s no longer peripheral to 
world p o l i t i c s ; i t i s "a f r o n t i e r between revolutionary and evolutionary 
methods". A new balance i n Asian and world p o l i t i c s w i l l only be struck i f 
Western policy makers respond to t h i s new s i t u a t i o n by matching Soviet 
development i n i t i a t i v e s ; 
"Nev/ processes of s t a b i l i z a t i o n , to take the place of those that 
underlay the t h i n k i n g of Mackinder, can only be created by 
deliberately i n i t i a t i n g , on the non-Soviet side of the f r o n t i e r , 
changes th a t match i n t h e i r potential of growth the changes going 
on i n Soviet t e r r i t o r y . Only a counterbalance of change can 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y replace the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of i n e r t i a of half a century 
ago".(15) 
I t was t h i s t h i n k i n g which underlay Lattimore's insistence that the United 
States i n pursuing m i l i t a r y and str a t e g i c objectives was i n danger of 
overlooking the more fundamental need to build friendships in Asia by 
encouraging and f a c i l i t a t i n g economic and social development. (16) 
In one of his few w r i t i n g s d i r e c t l y concerned with policy making, 
Lattimore examines President Truman's 1949 "Point Four" proposal f o r the 
United States government to underwrite the investment of private capital i n 
the underdeveloping countries. I t was Truman's hope that such a scheme might 
perform f o r the Third World what the Marshall Plan aimed to provide for 
Europe, making American c a p i t a l and technical expertise available to assist 
modernisation while winning influence i n these countries for the West. 
Lattimore considers the l i k e l y p o l i t i c a l role of economic relationships with 
non-communist Asia, and with China. Although American prestige i n Asia i s 
high, colonialism has l e f t a heritage of d i s t r u s t of outside interference which 
w i l l require careful p o l i t i c a l management to dispel. American investors, and 
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American taxpayers, w i l l have to accept that Point Four investment must be 
directed towards those areas of the economy of the nation concerned that i t s 
government adjudges most i n need of development. Investors must also expect a 
time lag before they can repatriate p r o f i t s , and they w i l l have to resign 
themselves to eventual ob.solescence as they are bought out or taken over when 
the nation or i t s c a p i t a l i s t s are strong enough to do so. Anything less, 
however, v^ould smack of the old colonialism, and i t must be the aim of the 
United States, t h i n k i n g i n terms of "alliance" rather than "control", to offer 
"the sharing of s a c r i f i c e s as well as the sharing of benefits" that an equal 
alliance implies, Lattimore i s sure that the p o l i t i c a l benefits of enhanced 
world influence v/hich would accrue to the United States would be worth the 
expense; 
"The s a c r i f i c e , I am convinced, i s worth making. Allies freely 
associated with the United States because they benefit by that 
association are worth having. Countries that are discontented with 
t h e i r association with the United States because they believe they 
are being controlled or exploited by the United States are 
undependable. Countries which, out of t h e i r association with the 
United States, develop an increasing class of modern-minded men 
running modern enterprises are the a l l i e s most worth having, because 
the most s o l i d and sound democratic structures grow up where men 
who feel that they are free w i t h i n t h e i r own country and independent 
of foreign rule j o i n together to protect and promote t h e i r freedom 
by electing men of t h e i r own kind to represent them and t h e i r own 
government," (17) 
In the case of China, the p o l i t i c a l function of economic relations 
presents a rather d i f f e r e n t problem to American policy makers. Although the 
communists were the masters of China they had drawn many others into support 
f o r t h e i r programme on the basis of t h e i r appeal to n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment. 
Continued American support f o r the "rump government" on Formosa, those 
remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's regime who had taken refuge on Taiwan, would not 
return the Kuomintang to the mainland but i t would alienate that wide section 
of the population who had thrown i n t h e i r l o t with the communists, and provide 
an ideal excuse f o r the building of Soviet bases on the China coast. Setting 
aside the problem of d i r e c t diplomatic relations, which should only be resumed 
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when i t i s possible t o do so i n a "d i g n i f i e d and honorable" fashion, the United 
States should not obstruct the seating of Peking i n the United Nations and 
should then open the v/ay f o r "two-way relations", economic and p o l i t i c a l , which 
would not drive the Chinese into a greater dependence on the Soviet Union. The 
ultimate aim would be to make China more l i k e the " t h i r d countries" of Asia, an 
outcome preferable from the point of view of the United States to the creation 
i n China of r e l i a b l e Soviet s a t e l l i t e . 
Lattimore also entered a plea f o r the United States national e f f o r t to be 
coordinated with that of the United Nations. By the time t h i s a r t i c l e was 
published, in July 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War i n the preceeding 
month had rendered many of these hopes p o l i t i c a l l y impractical. President 
Truman had by then ordered (on 27 June) the United States Seventh Fleet into 
the Taiv/an S t r a i t to deter any attempt by the Chinese communist regime to 
expel Chiang Kai-shek. The entry of China into the war la t e r that year 
guaranteed an American h o s t i l i t y towards China which was to l a s t for twenty 
years, and the position taken in Washington on the t h i r d countries of Asia in 
the ensuing decade was to place the highest p r i o r i t y on enrolling them i n 
treaty alliances aimed at the containment of communism. 
The historical geography of frontiers 
These arguments are recapitulated and extended in two a r t i c l e s of the 
mid-1950s. Here Lattimore's project i s nothing less than to develop an 
approach to h i s t o r i c a l geography i n which the central role i s accorded to the 
character and dynamics of the frontier.(18) In the circumstances of the time 
i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that t h i s project was only sketched i n the most general 
terms. Although Lattimore was reinstated at Johns Hopkins there was undoubted 
h o s t i l i t y towards him from some quarters in the university; others feared that 
too close an association with so controversial a figure would harm the i r 
careers, given the fate of many of those scholars who had o r i g i n a l l y worked 
with him on his Inner Asian project. 
Discussing at t h i s time the evolution of t r a d i t i o n a l China, Lattimore 
underlines the difference between the "inclusive" southern f r o n t i e r of the 
c i v i l i z a t i o n which permitted a more or less i n d e f i n i t e expansion of the 
c i v i l i z a t i o n , and the "exclusive" northern f r o n t i e r . The l a t t e r was more sharply 
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delimited because the social and economic " i n s t i t u t i o n s " of the Chinese way of 
l i f e "were too strong to permit" adaptation towards forms of l i f e which were 
more appropriate to the steppe, Lattimore offers an interpretation of the 
regional and f r o n t i e r structure of the Chinese imperial state i n terms of three 
contrasts of "geographical range": the t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s f o r the state of 
m i l i t a r y action, of centralised c i v i l administration, and of economic 
integration. Lattimore finds these to have been, i n the Chinese case as in "the 
whole of the Old World" p r i o r to the f i f t e e n t h century, of progressively 
decreasing size. The radius of m i l i t a r y action by the state was, at least 
p o t e n t i a l l y , very great, encompassing an area much larger than could be 
administered or was of v i t a l importance f o r commerce. The a b i l i t y of the state 
to administer an integrated empire was more li m i t e d due to the tendency 
towards regionalism which became manifest once a r u l i n g dynasty had passed 
i t s early vigour. Economic integration had the shortest range for the 
sedentary empires, though nomads using camels grazed on the open steppe could 
trade p r o f i t a b l y at considerable distances. Most commodities were produced 
l o c a l l y , and long-distance trading though a feature of Chinese history was 
often p o l i t i c a l i n motivation. With the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of nomadic and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l populations i n East Asia, a cycle of his t o r y began which was 
largely founded on these differences of range, and the fact that the former 
way of l i f e permitted extensive " l a t e r a l movement" whereby the nomads could i f 
they wished maintain m i l i t a r y pressure on China while eluding Chinese 
campaigns against them: 
"For about two thousand years the rule of hi s t o r y was to be that 
great Chinese dynasties were formed i n the heart of the country, 
moved up to the f r o n t i e r with a strong momentum, enrolled nomad and 
semi-nomad a u x i l i a r i e s , struck s w i f t l y and at long range into the 
steppe, and paralyzed the nomadic society with such sudden defeats 
that the r e s u l t i n g Pax Sinica lasted f or two generations or more; 
while the great nomad conquests were preceded by decades of gradual 
encroachment on the Chinese f r o n t i e r s , accompanied by minor warfare 
among the t r i b e s themselves and between r i v a l s f o r supreme 
leadership," (19) 
Lattimore f i n d s there to have been many parallels between the Roman and 
Chinese empires. Both aimed at r u l i n g an orbis terrarum or t'len hsla (.tian 
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x-ia) - terms "semantically equivalent" to a l l of the c i v i l i s e d world - though 
ultimately from w i t h i n boundaries fixed with the intention of defining a l i m i t 
of expansion, with the Roman limes f u l f i l l i n g the same functions as the Great 
Wall. And f o r the Romans the Mediterranean and Black Seas integrated t h e i r 
empire through water transport much as the Yangtze and Grand Canal did in 
imperial China, The a c t i v i t i e s of the various barbarians inhabiting the whole 
region between these empires exh i b i t many common characteristics. 
European discoveries i n navigation and armaments brought into being a 
new h i s t o r i c a l era with new types of f r o n t i e r s and of colonies. In the second 
of these a r t i c l e s Lattimore again discusses the three types of empire to be 
found i n Asia by the beginning of the present century.(20) The spread of 
maritime based imperialism to Asia produced rule at a distance by a small 
colonial e l i t e who remained deliberately apart from the local population. Where, 
as i n India, they became committed to economic development i t was engineered 
so as to be integrated with B r i t i s h economic requirements. 
Offering some prognosis on the future, given the r e l a t i v e decline of the 
maritime powers, Lattimore discerns both hopeful and worrying trends. There 
are now grounds f o r believing that some old antagonisms w i l l disappear. 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n has made feasible, f o r example, the economic integration of 
China and Mongolia, an i m p o s s i b i l i t y while each reli e d upon the practice of a 
d i s t i n c t i v e and exclusive v/ay of l i f e , On the other hand the strongest factor 
binding the Western nations together i s a shared c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y (the 
strength of c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u i t i e s being often underrated), and as a result of 
the Second World War and i t s aftermath these nations now confront the Soviet 
bloc i n a geographical sense as well as i n a competition f o r world hegemony. A 
t h i r d group or po t e n t i a l group of nations also exists i n prototype of which 
India i s the most prominent example. The f r o n t i e r s between the two power blocs 
are unlike those of imperial China since each seeks to remake the world i n i t s 
image. Here the countries of the t h i r d group may yet act as mediators; 
"The f r o n t i e r s between the American-Western and the Soviet-Chinese-
Eastern groups are not of a Great Wall type for one very s i g n i f i c a n t 
reason; each of these groups represents an i n s t i t u t i o n a l system of 
combined economic and soci a l organization that i s capable of taking 
over the en t i r e world and making i t an a l l inclusive orbis terrarum. 
The Indian type does not appear to have the capacity (or the desire) 
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to take over the orbis terrarum, but i t does appear t o have the 
capacity t o hold the other two groups apart, and i f i t should be 
able to do that long enough, perhaps an annealing process w i l l 
become possible, integrating a world of d i f f e r e n t but reciprocating 
components." (21) 
Once again, though f o r an additional reason, the countries of the t h i r d world 
w i l l have a v i t a l role t o play. 
World frontiers: a later exposition 
The constancy of Lattimore's i n t e l l e c t u a l preoccupations may be judged by 
the f a c t that many of these h i s t o r i c a l ideas are restated twenty years later 
i n a piece devoted to a discussion of the geography of the ancient empires. On 
several issues, however, Lattimore o f f e r s a more precise judgement. Within 
geographical parameters, we are t o l d , human beings may choose a wide range of 
economic a c t i v i t i e s . Once a pattern i s established "vested interests" are 
created with the re s u l t that those social classes who derive most benefit from 
t h i s pattern r e s i s t i t s change and create i n s t i t u t i o n s designed to perpetuate 
i t , Thus the "landlord class" of imperial China dominated the social and 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the state, and resisted Chinese expansion into a 
t e r r a i n unsuited t o intensive agriculture which would have led to "a st r a i n i n g 
of the pattern of power i n the hands of a small urban-landlord-bureaucratic 
e l i t e " , (22) Again the comparison with Rome i s pursued, though Lattimore points 
out that the greater d i v e r s i t y of the urban and r u r a l units of the empire led 
to a greater d i v e r s i t y of trade i n the Mediterranean and Black Sea arteries. 
The Roman empire d i d not possess a deep hinterland equivalent to the region 
south of the Yangtze and thus could not f a l l back when faced with barbarian 
onslaught, 
Concerning the decline of empires Lattimore now maintains that both the 
Chinese and Roman empires f e l l to barbarian invasions "because they could not 
establish mutually s a t i s f a c t o r y balances of trade" with the nomadic 
confederations beyond t h e i r f r o n t i e r s . Here Lattimore comes close to accepting 
the idea that the emergence amongst the nomads of state forms can be 
explained i n terms of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to t h e i r leaderships of plunder. 
Barbarian chiefs could accumulate a surplus of goods not readily exchanged 
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with t h e i r neighbours; they commanded followers v/hose everyday tools and 
s k i l l s could readily be turned to warlike purposes. In the case of China the 
exchange of " g i f t s " and " t r i b u t e " with the nomads disguised the fact that 
"barbarian- chiefs used m i l i t a r y pressure to obtain more trade than would have 
resulted from the ordinary operation of supply and demand". (23) 
China and the Chinese revolution 
In a number of w r i t i n g s of the early 1960s Lattimore set down his 
synaptic view of some of the major themes in Chinese history, For the most 
part t h i s view was i n accordance with his previous work (24), though on several 
s i g n i f i c a n t topics he introduces new arguments. In these w r i t i n g s he i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned to underscore the profound effects of imperialism on 
early modern China, On Lattimore's view imperialism biased development towards 
the coastal regions and foreign interests. In time, however, i t generated a 
national reaction s u f f i c i e n t l y strong so as to embrace s i g n i f i c a n t elements 
amongst the commercial classes; i t also prompted the emergence of a communist 
movement whose prolonged contest with the bureaucratic and mercantile 
in t e r e s t s of the coast forced i t t o accommodate a variety of a l l i e s united 
under a predominantly n a t i o n a l i s t platform. This unique Chinese path to 
communism explained the differences that had developed between the Chinese 
communists and t h e i r erstwhile bretheren i n Moscow. On the upheavals of the 
l a t e r Maoist period however, Lattimore - consistent with his views of the 
l a t e r 1940s - finds continued American h o s t i l i t y to be the chief cause. 
In his most considered piece on pre-revolutionary Chinese history 
Lattimore o f f e r s an account of the changes brought about by industrialism and 
the penetration of foreign c a p i t a l . (25) There had been no indigenous 
development of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n because of the part i c u l a r social and p o l i t i c a l 
structure of t r a d i t i o n a l China i n which the ethos and interests of "the 
landlord class" prevailed. The spread of imperialism into China in the 
nineteenth century had consequences v/hich obstructed modernisation and delayed 
the appearance of social and p o l i t i c a l forces with the i n c l i n a t i o n and power to 
harness modern industry to serve the cause of national independence. Foreign 
domination of Chinese railways t i e d development more to the needs of foreign 
trade than to domestic development. The Treaty Port system created a new 
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middle class f a m i l i a r w ith industry and trade but based f o r the most part i n 
foreign concessions where they could play no p o l i t i c a l role. The Treaty Ports 
also offered refuge and immunity from Chinese justice for defeated warlords, 
and a f t e r the formation of the Wanking government provided a home f o r the 
"bureaucratic monopolists" who were the chief beneficiaries of Kuomintang rule. 
When, a f t e r the Western hold on China had been weakened by the impact of the 
F i r s t World War, a "national bourgeoisie" emerged to challenge t h e i r 
"compradore" peers, the former had also to deal with the h o s t i l i t y of the 
foreign powers who policed the coastal enclaves; 
"Through the Treaty Ports, the i n d u s t r i a l impact was concentrated on 
a t i g h t geographical pattern of targets. Chinese who set out to 
master the i n d u s t r i a l system found that i n order t o do so they had 
also to capture the p o l i t i c a l l y f o r t i f i e d foreign positions of 
economic p r i v i l e g e i n the Treaty Ports; but i f , seeking a p o l i t i c a l 
support of t h e i r own, they appealed to Chinese nationalism, t h e i r 
demands were rejected by the foreigners as u n j u s t i f i a b l y 'anti-
foreign'. There followed a long chain of coalitions and s p l i t s . 
Businessmen and bankers of the new middle class and intellectuals 
of the new. Western-trained i n t e l l i g e n t s i a would s h i f t to the Left. 
Later some of them, carrying i n the Western press the label of 
'dangerous radicals' would s h i f t back to the Right - Chiang Kai-shek 
i s an example, but always there would be a r a l l y i n g of new 
'moderate' r e c r u i t s to the Left, as i n the National Salvation 
Movement of the 1930s." (26) 
In 1949 with the capture of the coastal c i t i e s by the communists a few 
c a p i t a l i s t s f l e d , but the great bulk of the new classes and s t r a t a fostered by 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n stayed on to assist, f o r reasons of " n a t i o n a l i s t i c pride", the 
new phase of modernisation t h a t had begun. 
In presenting t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the impact of foreign economic 
a c t i v i t y on the p o l i t i c a l and social f a b r i c of China Lattimore was putting 
forward an argument v/hich had long been popular with many Chinese 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s and which would soon be given greater currency i n the 1960s by 
r e v i s i o n i s t new l e f t i n t e r p r e t a t i ons of the American role i n world p o l i t i c s . 
Though such a broad hypothesis i s d i f f i c u l t to tes t , the trend of much recent 
scholarship i s t o conclude, however, that imperialism as a force i n Chinese 
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h i s t o r y was neither as pervasive nor as deleterious as was once supposed. 
Historians have presented a good deal of evidence f o r the resilience of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l economy, and f o r the a b i l i t y of the imperial government to ignore 
or obstruct foreign economic a c t i v i t y i n Chinese domains. Indeed, some have 
even argued that the net effect of contact with world commerce was to transfer 
to China both c a p i t a l and technology otherwise unobtainable, (27) Here i t may 
be supposed that Lattimore was generalising from his former f r o n t i e r 
experiences and his admitted d i s l i k e of the ethos of the Treaty Ports rather 
than submitting the evidence to any new scrutiny. 
Chinese Communism 
On the reasons f o r the communist v i c t o r y i n 1949 Lattimore argues i n 
1960 that the Chinese revolution was something of an exception to the pattern 
of revolutions i n Asia and elsewhere. Rather than being the result largely of 
the weaknesses of the previous system, the triumph of the Communist Party was 
the product of a long struggle against a variety of opponents during which the 
leadership had to experiment with new state forms and mobilise new a l l i e s 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y the peasantry), chara c t e r i s t i c s that set the Chinese revolution 
apart also from that i n Soviet Russia and which explain the present divergence 
of view between the two communist states.(28) So far, then, i t was Lattimore's 
view that the revolution i n China was as much national as social, though the 
ideology of the Communist Party f a c i l i t a t e d the recognition of peasant 
grievances thereby winning many of that class to the Party's programme. 
With the advent of the Cultural Revolution, Lattimore, l i k e many 
commentators on China sought, from the fragmentary evidences available, to 
o f f e r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these momentous events. I t i s not altogether 
su r p r i s i n g , given his personal experiences as much as his previous s t r i c t u r e s 
on the conduct of the United States i n Asia, that he should lay a good deal 
of the blame f o r t h i s upheaval on the American government. 
Lattimore stresses, i n a series of lectures given i n Sweden in 1968, the 
independent character of Chinese Marxism. The leaders of the revolution came 
to Marxism f o r t h e i r own reasons and not as surrogates of Moscow. They were 
therefore able t o evolve t h e i r own method, harnessing the "natural i n s t i n c t i v e 
nationalism of the peasants i n North China" i n the f i g h t with the Japanese. 
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Lattimore o f f e r s an account of t h i s method, Mao Tse-tung's "mass line", which 
stresses i t s allegedly pragmatic and populist features: 
"[Mao's] conclusion i s that i f the communists wanted to put 
themselves at the head of a revolutionary movement i n China, they 
must begin by following what the people wanted. Only after 
convincing the people that they v^ere going i n the direction that the 
people wanted could they put themselves at the head of the movement. 
This has remained ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of the revolutionary method of Mao 
Tse-tung. Throughout his career he seems to have had a conviction 
that the most downtrodden class i n China, the peasantry, had an 
i n s t i n c t i v e knov/ledge of what was in t h e i r own Interest, the general 
di r e c t i o n i n which they should move," (29) 
I t i s the job of professional revolutionaries also, according to Mao's view, to 
refine and sophisticate the methods adopted by the peasants to achieve t h e i r 
ends. At several points Lattimore emphasises Mao's pragmatism, reflected in his 
bel i e f t h a t " i f the theories and the facts do not agree then i t i s probably the 
theory that needs some adjustment". There i s , of course, some irony i n t h i s 
claim. Although the post-Mao leadership i n China now int e r p r e t t h e i r ideology 
i n t h i s s p i r i t , claiming j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n Mao's dictum "seek t r u t h from facts", 
Mao himself i s c r i t i c i s e d f o r the dogmatic influence he exerted i n the later 
years of his l i f e . (30) 
On the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n making sense of the Cultural Revolution, 
Lattimore o f f e r s some caustic remarks on the pervasive influence of "an 
American f i l t e r " on almost a l l expert and media opinion, He states the view 
that the Cultural Revolution i s not a chaotic aberration but i s b u i l t on the 
previous experience of the communist movement i n China and i s addressed 
towards dealing with i n t e r n a l and external threats to the revolution and i t s 
goals. Public c r i t i c i s m of the Party, a practice which distinguishes Chinese 
communism from the Soviet prototype, can be traced back t o the techniques of 
mobilisation used at Yenan. The appearance of the Red Guards and the turmoil 
of the succeeding years can be understood as a response to the likelihood 
that, f r u s t r a t e d by the indecisive nature of the c o n f l i c t i n Vietnam, the 
United States would attack China. Lattimore l i n k s the Sino-Soviet s p l i t to the 
d i f f e r e n t paths to v i c t o r y taken by the Chinese and Russian revolutionaries. 
Whereas the Bolsheviks were only the beneficiaries of an unpopular war, the 
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Chinese communists were p a t r i o t i c p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a long national struggle for 
s u r v i v a l . Echoes of t h i s difference of h i s t o r i c a l experience can be detected i n 
the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i (Liu Shaoqi) on 
the best means t o respond to an in e v i t a b l y aggressive imperialism. Whereas Liu 
favoured turning back to the Soviets for modern armaments (and accepting 
Soviet leadership as the p o l i t i c a l p r i c e ) , i t was the view of Mao Tse-tung and 
Lin Piao (Lin Biao) that an American attack would force the revolution back to 
the Yenan stage; the country should therefore make i t s e l f ready for a 
decentralised struggle waged by an armed and mobilised population. The need 
perceived by the Maoists to preserve the gains of the revolution and f i g h t the 
growth of bureaucracy was the background" to the complementary great debate 
that was being conducted i n education. The present preference given to 
students of worker and peasant o r i g i n was the result of the previous system of 
equal educational opportunities favouring the sons and daughters of "the old 
bourgeoisie". As Lattimore candidly observes i n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n at the same 
time, i n view of the grave external threat confronting them, the Chinese cannot 
a f f o r d t o place the children of the old r u l i n g classes i n positions of power 
les t they prove unreliable followers of the new order: 
" I f there are to be any defectors or faint-hearted resi s t e r s , i t i s 
feared they w i l l be of t h i s o r i g i n . This i s what l i e s behind the 
closing of schools and colleges f o r drastic reorganisation, which 
has accompanied the encouragement of revolutionary fervour, with i t s 
emphasis on youth, among the Red Guards."(31) 
Where others saw chaos and disorder, Lattimore stresses the p r a c t i c a l and 
indeed allegedly educational aspects of the Cultural Revolution; 
" I suggest that often, by dropping such labels as marxism, 
communism and so on one can analyze a s i t u a t i o n i n a very practical 
way and show that the communist leadership i n China, i n spite of 
the disturbances we see i n the Great Cultural Revolution, in the Red 
Guards, and i n the reported controversies among leaders, are dealing 
more with hard facts and tough problems than with cloudy 
ideological obsessions; and the people themselves, through t h e i r 
mass organisations, are getting a p o l i t i c a l education. This i s more 
than being indoctrinated by a privileged 61ite. I t i s , i n the newly 
fashionable phrase, 'participatory polities'."(32) 
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I t should be noted also that Lattimore's assessment of the grounds f o r 
what he took to be the widespread peasant support f o r the communist regime 
underwent a s i g n i f i c a n t change. Whereas i n 1948 he understood the demands of 
the Chinese peasantry to be "the private ownership of land and the r i g h t to be 
represented i n government" (33), now he did not a t t r i b u t e the deficiencies of 
the programme of mass land c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n i n the commune movement - i t " f e l l 
short" of Chinese hopes but "certainly was not a t o t a l collapse" - to the 
repression of those demands. Rather, the prestige of the communist cadres i n 
the r u r a l areas was apparently so high due t o t h e i r role i n the c i v i l war with 
the Kuomintang that t h e i r peasant followers launched the communal experiment 
of 1958 and 1959 with an excess of zeal. The problems that resulted were "not 
due to resistance but to over-enthusiasm". In the long run important lessons 
were learned, just as i n the contemporaneous Great Leap Forward concerning 
which movement Lattimore o f f e r s a s i m i l a r assessment. (34) These sentiments run 
p a r a l l e l , t o a s i g n i f i c a n t extent, with his view (to be considered in the next 
chapter) that the c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n programme mounted by the communists i n 
Mongolia i n the early 1930s f a i l e d due to a s i m i l a r excess of indigenous zeal. 
Although the historiography of the Cultural Revolution shows i n 
retrospect that many who were at least as well acquainted with the country as 
Lattimore affirmed s i m i l a r sentiments, his readiness to embrace what i s now 
known to have been an episode characterised by chaos and blood l e t t i n g i s a 
measure of his deep d i s i l l u s i o n v/ith what he regarded as the wrong turn made 
i n American Asian policy i n the 1950s. What i s most noteworthy i n Lattimore's 
argument, from the point of view of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l biography, i s the 
vehemence with which America i s blamed f o r p r e c i p i t a t i n g the present c r i s i s i n 
Asia. Whereas Soviet expansion i n the postwar era more or less matches "the 
maximum f r o n t i e r s of the old Ts a r i s t empire", and the People's Republic of 
China conforms (with the exception of Mongolia) to the boundaries of the 
Manchu empire, the United States has enlarged the sphere of i t s control to the 
Pacific l i t t o r a l of Asia, Showing i n Vietnam that they intend to maintain t h e i r 
c o n t r o l of t h i s sphere using war as a means i f necessary, i t i s not surprising 
t h a t China should conclude that a further "escalation" may bring United States 
forces to her t e r r i t o r y . In Asia i t i s America rather than the communist bloc 
who has taken the i n i t i a t i v e : 
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"Against [the] fact that both China and Russia represent on the 
whole the ... stable ... restoration of old f r o n t i e r s there i s the 
s t r i k i n g contrast that today, a f t e r Vorld War I I , the pov/er of the 
U.S.A. i s to be found i n areas enormously dis t a n t from America, 
where i t never existed before. We have US garrisons and US bases i n 
South Korea, while neither Russians nor Chinese have troops i n North 
Korea; US garrisons and bases i n Japan and Okinawa (which has been 
in part detached from Japanese sovereignty); i n the Philippines; i n 
Taiwan (where the Chinese are prevented from asserting t h e i r 
sovereignty, once promised to them by America); i n South Vietnam, 
where there i s a huge American army, while there are no Chinese 
troops i n North Vietnam; i n Thailand (actively used as a base f o r 
bombing Vietnam) - and so on. Where, then, i s the expansionism, 
where i s the 'domino effect'?" (35) 
Now, s e t t i n g aside the question of Soviet dominance i n Eastern Europe, 
t h i s i s a curious argument unless one accepts that the creation of the Tsarist 
empire was a largely benign exercise f o r the peoples of Asia thus encompassed 
and unless one maintains also that the American role i n Asia has been played 
out despite the wishes of a l l the Asian peoples and governments concerned and 
against t h e i r interests. In f a c t Lattimore had accepted both of these premises 
fo r twenty years, though he had never stated the implications of t h i s view in 
quite such f o r t h r i g h t terms before. He had also long been persuaded that the 
American view of China had always been founded upon misunderstandings. The 
Americans imagined that t h e i r refusal t o seek concessions on the China coast 
i n the nineteenth century had won f o r them a special affection with the 
Chinese, whereas the Chinese knev/ that America was just as much as the 
European powers a beneficiary of the Treaty Port system, a hypocrisy 
compounded by American trade i n stra t e g i c goods with Japan i n the 1930s. From 
"sentimentality" the American perception had veered to h o s t i l i t y when post-war 
hopes of China's role as the special f r i e n d of the United States i n Asia had 
been dashed. Events since that time had only confirmed that these 
misunderstandings remained. (36) 
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Contemporary Chinese and Asian frontiers 
The reappearance of f r o n t i e r disputes i n the lat e r years of the People's 
Republic provided the occasion f o r comment from Lattimore on t h e i r basis i n 
his t o r y . On the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 he finds that neither i n 
the treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 - "the only equal, or non-unequal treaty 
signed by China" - nor i n the lat e r Russian annexation of the maritime region 
beyond the Ussuri River d i d the Russians acquire " t e r r i t o r y inhabited by 
Chinese or e f f e c t i v e l y ruled from Peking". Rather, the present boundary between 
the two powers i s largely the result of the mutual expansion of the Tsarist 
and Manchu empires i n regions l i g h t l y populated by peoples of neither nation. 
On t h i s f r o n t i e r i t s e l f , therefore, "there i s no casus belli" and such incidents 
as there have been are more a r e f l e c t i o n of the h o s t i l i t y betv/een the tv/o 
regimes.<37) This argument i s ce r t a i n l y to give the Russians the benefit of the 
doubt f o r t h e i r acquisition i n 1858 of a l l the t e r r i t o r y north of the Amur R 
iver. As a re s u l t of the Taiping rebellion and the Arrow War the attention of 
the Chinese government was directed elsewhere, and there was l i t t l e evidence 
of e f f e c t i v e Chinese cont r o l of those regions any distance from the bank of 
the r i v e r i t s e l f . Nevertheless t h i s t e r r i t o r y had been recognised as Chinese i n 
1689, and even i n 1858 (as Lattimore points out) i t was s t i l l proposed that 
the region south of the r i v e r and east of the Ussuri was to be held j o i n t l y by 
both empires. The weakness of the Russian position at that time and in 1959 i s 
perhaps reflected i n the recent Soviet proposal to allow the Chinese undisputed 
sovereignty over the islands on t h e i r side of the main channel of the Amur and 
Ussuri Rivers. I t was a dispute over one of the largest of these islands -
Chenpao <Zhenbao, Damansky) - which had precipitated the worst of the clashes 
i n the l a t t e r year. (38) 
In 1972, as part of e f f o r t s by the Chinese government to build bridges to 
the United States by i n v i t i n g individuals thought to be "old friends of China" 
f o r tours of t h e i r country, Lattimore spent two f u l l months r e v i s i t i n g f r o n t i e r 
regions from Manchuria t o Sinkiang. For the most part his comments, i n a 
lecture delivered t o the Royal Geographical Society, on the economic and 
educational development of these areas are favourable, He also finds the 
national m i n o r i t i e s making s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n assuming positions of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the administration of t h e i r areas, and his mildly c r i t i c a l 
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comments on the dimemberment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region are 
balanced by the remark that the many changes experienced by the Mongols i n 
China "are d e f i n i t e l y f o r the better". But he does f i n d f a u l t with the o f f i c i a l 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s doctrine v/hich claims that China i s and has always been a mu l t i -
n a t i o n a l i t y state. This would lead to what Lattimore regards as the unlikely 
h i s t o r i c a l claim that the Mongol conquest of China was the result of a " c i v i l 
war"; i t would also j u s t i f y the charge that Russian and Soviet control of many 
North and East Asian peoples amounted to the i m p e r i a l i s t annexation of regions 
that should be part of China. Lattimore's companion on the t r i p Fujiko Isono 
suggested to t h e i r Chinese hosts that instead of these i n f l a t e d h i s t o r i c a l 
claims the present Chinese regime should begin with the conditions agreed 
under the "equal" t r e a t y of Nerchinsk, a suggestion approved at a dinner 
meeting, according to Latimore's account, by Premier Chou En-lai (Zhou 
Enlai).(39) 
Following the Chinese punitive invasion of Vietnam i n 1979 Lattimore 
of f e r s a more c r i t i c a l account of t h i s n a t i o n a l i t i e s doctrine. I t was a fact 
that many of the northern peoples saw the Ch'ing empire as a Manchu rather 
than a Chinese e n t i t y , and owed t h e i r l o y a l t y to i t s rulers rather than to a 
Chinese state. I t was also true that the Great Wall f r o n t i e r and the lack of 
Chinese c u l t u r a l influence beyond i t s i g n i f i e d the s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of Chinese 
contr o l of that portion of Inner Asia they held i n the nineteenth century. In 
1911, therefore, Tibetans and Mongols should have been permitted "to go t h e i r 
own way". This, of course, i s i n sharp contrast to the incorporative and non-
r a c i a l character of imperial Russian expansion which i s one of Lattimore's 
enduring themes. So to i s the permeable and i n d e f i n i t e nature of China's 
southern boundary which i s manifest in the strong c u l t u r a l influence exerted 
on the lands of Indochina. This l a t t e r point, according to Lattimore, l i e s 
behind the current Chinese attempts to chastise Vietnam, f o r t h i s region i s 
taken to be w i t h i n China's sphere: 
"Although the Chinese did not claim the di r e c t rule of Indochina, 
they were f u l l y aware of the range and force of t h e i r prestige. They 
took i t f o r granted that Indochina came wit h i n the sphere of t h e i r 
c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l hegemony, and e n t i t l e d them to ascendancy 
in judging questions of p o l i t i c a l philosophy."(40) 
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At least some of the old characteristics of the Chinese f r o n t i e r are thus to 
be seen i n events of the present. 
Lattiffiore's more recent h o s t i l i t y towards China, at least regarding the 
question of the national minorities, can only be followed with reference to his 
contemporaneous work on and experiences i n Mongolia (the subject of the 
following chapter). In the same a r t i c l e Lattimore has a few good words to say 
fo r those Cambodian communists who v/ish t o return to the h i s t o r i c a l "legacy" 
of Ho Chi Minh - the unity of the Indochinese peoples - and as might be 
expected a t t r i b u t e s most of the blame f o r the Cambodian tragedy to the 
strategy of Nixon and Kissinger. The Pol Pot era was not the outcome of a 
communist revolution but a "medieval Jacquerid'. And the savagery of a formerly 
gentle people was the product of "an American-made situation", (41) Such was 
the cost of American policy makers giving the highest p r i o r i t y to strategic 
and m i l i t a r y objectives i n Asia. Lattimore evidently f e l t that his v/arnings of 
t h i r t y years previously, though ignored had been well founded. 
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V : Mongol c±v±l±ssi-b±oxi, 
From the 1950s onwards Lattimore's chief preoccupation has been with the 
Mongols. Although he occupied a chair i n Chinese studies at Leeds University 
from 1963 to 1970 his inter e s t i n the Mongols i n no way diminished, indeed he 
was able to introduce a Mongolian studies programme in t o his new department, 
bringing to B r i t a i n one of his former collaborators at Johns Hopkins, Urgunge 
Onon, to as s i s t with teaching. Even during the most d i f f i c u l t days of the 
McCarthy inspired persecution Lattimore found time to work (with Onon) on a 
tr a n s l a t i o n of a Mongol biography of the f i r s t leader of s o c i a l i s t Mongolia, 
Sukebator (Siiukhbaatar), publishing i t with a lengthy introduction i n 1955.(1) 
With the dismissal of the perjury charges against him, and the resumption of 
his teaching duties at Johns Hopkins, Lattimore undertook a fresh study of 
Western h i s t o r i c a l materials and commentary on the nomads i n general and the 
Mongols i n p a r t i c u l a r the f r u i t s of which he published i n a series of a r t i c l e s 
over the next ten years. 
In 1961 Lattimore's relationship with the Mongols took a new turn as a 
resu l t of a v i s i t he was able to make with h i s wife to the Mongolian People's 
Republic. The Lattimores had attended, i n 1960, a gathering of the 
International Congress of O r i e n t a l i s t s i n Moscow. Amongst the Mongolian 
delegation was Natsagdorj (Nachukdorji), a member of the Mongolian Academy of 
Sciences and the author of the l i f e of Sukebator Lattimore had previously 
translated. During the meeting the Mongolian delegation extended an i n v i t a t i o n 
on behalf of the Academy of Sciences f o r Lattimore to v i s i t t h e i r country, an 
i n v i t a t i o n he was able to take up i n the following year. (2) From that v i s i t 
came a popular account of the h i s t o r y and present condition of the Mongols, 
Nomads and Commissars. This account evidently pleased his hosts for he was 
able to return on three fur t h e r occasions i n that decade, i n 1969 being 
granted the rare honour of induction as a f u l l member of the Academy of 
Sciences. (3) On the death of h is wife, as they were t r a v e l l i n g to the United 
States i n 1970 to l i v e i n retirement, the solicitude of the Mongols was such 
that he was offered permanent residence anywhere i n the country.(4) Though 
Lattimore d i d not accept t h i s o f f e r he returned to the Mongolian People's 
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Republic on nine occasions i n the 1970s, and was awarded the state decoration 
of the Order of the Golden Nail (the Polar Star) i n 1979, 
Though he laboured long and hard on the t r a n s l a t i o n and editing of the 
p o l i t i c a l memoirs and autobiography of h is s a i n t l y f r i e n d the Dilowa, a work 
eventually brought out with the assistance of Fujiko Isono i n 1982, i n t h i s 
f i n a l phase of his career Lattimore devoted most of his time to teaching and 
to generating a wider popular and scholarly interest i n Mongolia and Mongolian 
studies. He also devoted a good deal of time, through translations and 
commentary, t o introducing to an international audience the best of 
contemporary Mongol scholarship. In time his reputation i n America as a 
scholar outlasted and overcame his p o l i t i c a l denigration i n the McCarthy era, 
and his pioneering rol e i n his subject on both sides of the Atlantic was such 
that he eventually became Honorary President both of the Anglo-Mongolian 
Society and of the Mongolia Society of the United States. 
In h i s w r i t i n g s of t h i s time, though he repeats many of his ideas and 
arguments of farmer years, he does develop new understandings of h i s t o r i c a l 
and contemporary issues i n Mongolian studies. Under the stimulus of Soviet and 
Mongol Marxist analyses he tackles the problem of "feudalism" i n Mongolian 
hi s t o r y , and the related question of the role of r e l i g i o n i n late mediaeval 
times. He also devotes some atten t i o n to the course and character of the 
Mongolian revolution, and the relationship between the Mongols and Soviet 
Russia. In discussing these questions i n more recent times he makes a point of 
introducing material from Mongol scholarship which, he complains, i s too l i t t l e 
known even by some of those w r i t i n g on Mongolia, 
Feudalism in Mongol history 
Despite having been the recipient of c r i t i c i s m from Wittfogel f o r his use 
of the term "feudal" - according to Wittfogei t o describe Asiatic societies as 
feudal was to accept a key Marxist hypothesis against the evidence, and thus 
to signal t h e o r e t i c a l subservience to Moscow - Lattimore offered his 
speculations on the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the term to Inner Asian nomadic societies 
i n a lengthy piece published i n 1954. Here the influence of Russian and Soviet 
scholarship, p a r t i c u l a r l y the work of Vladimirtsov and Yushkov i s apparent. As 
has already been pointed out, Lattimore's reading of such sources had already 
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led him to a reassessment of the d i f f e r i n g characters of the nineteenth 
century empires i n Asia. Regarding the Russian contribution to the study of 
feudalism, Lattimore remarked years l a t e r that he was s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed 
by the attempt of Yushkov to develop a comparative study of feudal 
i n s t i t u t i o n s to translate h i s a r t i c l e of 1946 while at Johns Hopkins.(5) 
Lattimore postulates that f o r two thousand years steppe societies were 
subject t o two feudalising tendencies. Although these f o r a period produced 
" f r o n t i e r feudalism" i n those societies h i s t o r i c a l and geographical factors 
both prevented t h e i r t r a n s i t i o n t o f u l l y feudal social and economic formations 
and also ensured periodic p a r t i a l regressions back towards t r i b a l i s m . (6) The 
f i r s t tendency had i t s roots i n the organisation adopted f o r expeditions to 
plunder the a g r i c u l t u r a l population of the neighbouring a g r i c u l t u r a l regions of 
China. The proceeds of plunder, i n strengthening the nomads, made possible as 
well as a t t r a c t i v e the formation of leagues larger than the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l 
or clan organisations of these peoples. Devices of f i c t i v e kinship enlarged the 
o r i g i n a l clan, but the cr u c i a l device was the creation of the nukur (friend, or 
companion) rel a t i o n s h i p through which a man could attach himself to a chief 
not his kinsman. Lattimore points out the etymological i d e n t i t y of t h i s terra 
with others found l e g i t i m i s i n g s i m i l a r practices i n contemporaneous feudalisms, 
though he does not f i n d t h i s i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r the 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of these leagues as feudal. The s i t u a t i o n became transformed, he 
claims, upon the conquest of China (when i t occurred) by one of these leagues. 
Such a conquest led to the creation of t r u l y feudal i n s t i t u t i o n s . Some 
associates of the c h i e f t a i n garrisoned the a g r i c u l t u r a l regions of China, t h e i r 
rule r e s t i n g upon both t h e i r command of m i l i t a r y levies supported by the 
peasant population, and the cooperation of t r a d i t i o n administrators and e l i t e s . 
Others i n the border regions, entrusted with the command of nomadic m i l i t a r y 
reserves, began to create feudal domains f o r themselves i n the ag r i c u l t u r a l 
regions under t h e i r control. In the f a r steppe those of the o r i g i n a l league who 
remained imitated as f a r as possible the new s t y l e of l i f e of the conquering 
e l i t e , importing where they could farmers and artisans and developing a taste 
f o r the commodities of advanced c i v i l i s a t i o n . None of these i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
however, were stable. The o r i g i n a l unity of the league evaporated with the 
passing of generations. Detached from t h e i r m i l i t a r y levies on the borders the 
o r i g i n a l conquerors i n the metropolitan regions were unseated by rebellions or 
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became absorbed by the o r i g i n a l and far more numerous population. The border 
nobles took service under the new rulers, or abandoned t h e i r domains for the 
steppe. The more di s t a n t nomads reverted to the cycle of warfare and plunder 
which gave r i s e to the o r i g i n a l conquest, As Lattimore points out, i f t h i s 
analysis i s accepted then the chosen subject of Wittfogel's major contribution 
to Sinology - a discussion of the Liao, a dynasty of nomadic origins which 
ruled North China and adjacent parts of Inner Asia between 907 and 1125 - i s 
one i n which feudal relations should play a major part whereas for reasons of 
contemporary p o l i t i c s they are ignored. (7) 
Feudal i n s t i t u t i o n s were also created when a Chinese dynasty of 
s u f f i c i e n t vigour enrolled nomadic chieftains as feudatories i n bordering 
regions i n order to create a m i l i t a r y shield round the core of the empire, In 
the long run these i n s t i t u t i o n s were as unstable as those created by nomadic 
conquerors i n China proper. The l o y a l t y of the nomadic a u x i l i a r i e s could not be 
guaranteed, and i n periods of imperial turmoil they could turn against t h e i r 
overlord either on t h e i r own account or i n the company of more distant 
tribesmen. I f t h i s did not occur there was, nevertheless, a constant temptation 
f o r such border feudatories t o encourage agriculture and Chinese settlement i n 
t h e i r domains i n order to enjoy the greater revenues produced, thus destroying 
t h e i r m i l i t a r y function. 
From h i s w r i t i n g s of t h i s period i t i s evident that Lattimore found the 
term "feudalism" least applicable to the society of those nomads who had 
minimal contact with sedentary c i v i l i s a t i o n s . The society of the pastoral 
nomads was one which exhibited an extreme of mobility i n property and 
persons. In so f a r as feudalism implies a foundation i n landed property and 
the immobility of vassals enfeoffed with t h i s property on condition of loyal 
service, such mo b i l i t y would appear to preclude genuinely feudal relations. 
Lattimore therefore has l i t t l e sympathy with the mainstream Soviet approach to 
t h i s question; 
" I have never been able to accept the Soviet model of 'nomadic 
feudalism', even when i t i s modified as 'patriarchal feudalism', 
mainly because the Soviet scholars are so much obsessed with 
working out theories of what the control of land must have been, 
asserting a priori that land i s the determining kind of feudal 
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property, that they neglect the significance of mobile four-footed 
property," (8) 
In an important discussion published i n 1961 of approaches to nomadic 
his t o r y , Lattimore o f f e r s f u r t h e r comment on the Soviet view that nomadic 
societies could e x h i b i t feudal features.(9) Despite a renewed discussion i n 
h i s t o r i c a l c i r c l e s i n the 1950s he finds there to have been l i t t l e advance over 
the argument of Koz'min i n the 1930s that the nobles i n these societies 
controlled the t e r r i t o r y and thus the common nomad was merely a peasant. But 
he i s evidently i n sympathy with the minority view of S. E, Tolybekov that 
under nomadic conditions the su p e r f l u i t y of land negates i t s usual role as a 
part of the means of production, and that such feudal tendencies as may appear 
in nomadic societies may be expected to derive from t h e i r relations with 
sedentary states rather than from t h e i r own i n t e r n a l dynamics. As to his own 
views, Lattimore o f f e r s a characterisation of nomadic societies which includes 
a discussion of the extent to which feudal relations may be found therein. 
In t h i s discussion, Lattimore advances the view that nomadic societies 
are set apart i n h i s t o r y by the mobility of the population and the livestock 
upon which they p r i m a r i l y depend. T i t l e t o land may vary from common 
ownership and use through r i g h t only to passage of livestock to permanent 
d i v i s i o n and possession. As to whether ownership of land or livestock i s 
primary f o r the contr o l of the society, t h i s again (.contra "recent Marxist 
writers") i s a question of period and circumstances. A given body of people 
may have so l i t t l e connection with a piece of t e r r i t o r y that they may prefer 
migration or f l i g h t t o domination from outside. Relations with a sedentary 
empire whether through conquest or defeat may, conversely, lead to the 
according of exclusive r i g h t s of settlement to par t i c u l a r bodies of people 
under specified leaders on condition of loyal m i l i t a r y service. Under these 
l a t t e r conditions "we are c e r t a i n l y e n t i t l e d to t a l k of feudalism, or of the 
beginnings of feudalism". On relations between chiefs and subordinates, the 
factor of m o b i l i t y led to certain unique features i n nomadic societies. In 
periods of warfare the l o y a l t y of retainers could not be ensured i n the same 
way as i n sedentary societies, though attempts were made by holding whole 
groups responsible f o r the conduct of t h e i r individual members. Attachment to 
a major empire transformed these relations which became more s t r a t i f i e d . But 
such attachment was not l i k e l y to be an enduring phenomenon. Nomad his t o r y i n 
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sum i s a series of cycles, "alternating phases of centralization and 
decentralization", i n which the forces within nomadic society interact with 
those of t h e i r sedentary neighbours. 
In a work devoted to one of the "centralizing" phases of Mongol 
history,(10) Lattimore explains how Chinggis Khan "imposed a feudal unity on 
a l l the Mongol tribes". Chinggis undermined the old practice of anda, the 
swearing of "blood l o y a l t y " to one putatively ones kinsman by a remote 
ancestor, a device appropriate to an era of clan warfare but one which 
obfuscated the issue of leadership, by s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r i t that of nukUr, or 
allegiance to a superior not one's kinsman. He was able to use the long 
standing existence of t r i b e s subordinate to his own f o r his new purposes, but 
he was forced t o destroy the convention of the "double t r i b e " , a permanent 
alliance between d i f f e r e n t clans each with i t s own chiefs, which again was 
inconsistent with obedience to his leadership alone. From the beginning 
Chinggis was dedicated to the creation of "a structure of power that would be 
capable of extension i n both time and space", and with his growing success he 
brought i n t o being other i n s t i t u t i o n s which superseded the old t r i b a l 
structure, including the creation of an e l i t e imperial guard and the granting 
of "appanages" or t e r r i t o r i e s and populations to kinsmen on condition of loyal 
m i l i t a r y service. The conquest of extensive sedentary states brought into being 
feudal r e l a t i o n s both between conquerors and subjects and w i t h i n Mongol 
society. 
From his many comments on the Manchu period i n Mongol his t o r y i t i s 
evident t h a t here also Lattimore finds the term "feudal" appropriate. After the 
submission of the p r i n c i p a l Khalka (Khalkh, Outer Mongolian) leaders to the 
K'ang-hsi (Kang Xi) emperor at Dolonnor (Dolonnur) i n 1691 the Mongols of 
both Inner and Outer Mongolia were settle d i n p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r i e s or 
"banners" (.Khoshuu, meag) ruled by hereditary Mongol princes or nobles usually 
of Chinggisid ancestry. These a r i s t o c r a t s , given new t i t l e s by the Manchus, 
held t h e i r lands on condition that they provide m i l i t a r y levies i n time of war. 
Those lands not held by the secular n o b i l i t y were the property of the Buddhist 
church, also the object of Manchu patronage and control. The three classes of 
commoners iarat, arad) - ordinary bannermen, the personal retainers of 
p a r t i c u l a r nobles, and those s e t t l e d on lands owned by the church - a l l owed 
service and t r i b u t e goods to t h e i r superiors. (11) Lattimore refers to t h i s 
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system of rule by secular and ecclesiastical notables holding particular lands 
as a "dual feudalism". (12) 
Given the predominent Soviet view up to the 1960s, discussed earlier, 
t h a t ownership or cont r o l of land i s cruc i a l f o r the character of the mode of 
production, i t i s noteworthy that Lattimore was able to f i n d and make 
available through a t r a n s l a t i o n a further work of Natsagdorj which, though i t 
does not attempt to refute d i r e c t l y t h i s assertion, approaches the question i n 
a more empirical fashion.(13) Natsagdorj agrees that i n the Manchu period the 
nobles were "the owners, with f u l l r i g h t s , of the t e r r i t o r y " of t h e i r f i e f s , and 
thus could "appropriate any part" of i t "for t h e i r personal use". Moreover the 
nobles and the monasteries possessed the best livestock which grazed on the 
most luxuriant pasture. But he fi n d s also that commoners often did possess i n 
small numbers t h e i r own animals, and that enough remained of the t r a d i t i o n of 
common land ownership that they could graze these animals i n any l o c a l i t y on 
t h e i r banner. The f u l l measure of feudalism i n t h i s period could only be taken 
thus, according to Natsagdorj, by considering the control of both land and 
animals, and by taking i n t o account also the remnants which s t i l l existed of 
ea r l i e r practices. This leads Lattimore to remark, of another of Natsagdorj's 
w r i t i n g s , that there was evidence of a subtle but s i g n i f i c a n t departure i n his 
work from the h i t h e r t o rather narrow Marxist approach of Soviet 
scholarship.(14) 
Feudalism and the state in the Marxist view of the nomads 
Given Lattimore's int e r e s t i n Soviet and Mongol scholarship, and his 
c r i t i c i s m of some of the assumptions thereof, i t i s necessary to off e r a b r i e f 
account of the context of that scholarship. As has been shown Lattimore was 
long of the view that the Mongolian People's Republic was the f i r s t s a t e l l i t e 
state of the Soviet Union. In scholarship as much as i n p o l i t i c s Mongolia has 
behaved as the most loy a l and consistent of a l l the s a t e l l i t e s , and thus the 
Marxist premises (and t h e i r transmutations as a res u l t of p o l i t i c a l exigencies) 
that provide the foundation f o r scholarly enquiry i n the Soviet Union f u l f i l 
the same function i n Mongolia. 
The study of nomadism and of the p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s which have been 
created from time to time by nomadic c i v i l i s a t i o n s are, prima facie, d i f f i c u l t 
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to reconcile with two propositions long taken as crucial assumptions i n 
o f f i c i a l Marxist scholarship. The f i r s t , based on an interpretation of some 
remarks of Marx i n the "preface" t o A Contribution to the Critique of P o l i t i c a l 
Economy, assumes a more-or-less linear progression of human societies from 
p r i m i t i v e communalism based upon the clan, through the intermediate stages of 
slave and feudal societies (characterised by the growth of class 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and the d i v i s i o n of labour), to capitalism and thence 
socialism. (15) The dynamic f o r t h i s progress i s provided by the tensions that 
arise w i t h i n each of these societies. At the beginning the "production 
re l a t i o n s " (work and ownership relations) of a given society provide an 
appropriate means by which the "productive forces" (labour, and i t s subject and 
instruments) are exploited, thus providing for the material needs of the 
society and f o r i t s reproduction. With the passage of time discoveries and 
inventions make new means of e x p l o i t i n g these productive forces possible, but 
the e x i s t i n g production r e l a t i o n s obstruct and impede such advance. The 
tensions created fuel a social revolution which ultimately brings a new society 
into existence with production relations more appropriate f o r the 
accomplishment of these newly i d e n t i f i e d tasks. The second of these 
propositions advances the claim that the state i s an epiphenomenon. According 
to Marx the form and character of the "legal and p o l i t i c a l superstructure" i s 
determined by the nature of the production relations; s p e c i f i c a l l y , the class 
which controls property dominates the state, (16) Now i t i s true that both of 
these propositions i n so f a r as they applied to Asia were somewhat modified i n 
Marx's own view by the existence of a form of society ("the Asiatic mode of 
production") exemplified i n the great c i v i l i s a t i o n s of that continent. Though 
t h i s i n turn raises further questions regarding the coherence of Marx's social 
theory, the existence of such a uniquely Asian social formation was struck 
from the Marxist canon i n 1931 as the result of p o l i t i c a l debates i n the 
Soviet Union,(17) 
As Ernest Gellner has pointed out(18), pastoral nomadism, though a 
developed form of production with a long hi s t o r y , i s something of an 
evolutionary cul-de-sac which changes only through contact (whether by way of 
conquest, trade, or colonisation) with other forms of society. In pastoral 
nomadism the d i v i s i o n of labour i s l i t t l e developed, much property i n land and 
livestock would seem to be communally owned, and clan t i e s are of great 
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importance, a l l factors which would seem to be redolent of that p r i m i t i v e 
communal stage of social organisation allegedly found i n greatest antiquity. 
On the other hand, from time to time f o r two millenia the pastoral nomads have 
produced large state formations even though there seems to have been l i t t l e 
antecedent change i n t h e i r way of l i f e . The Mongol r u l i n g class i n particular, 
f a r from emerging to take charge of the state machine as a result of pri o r 
developments i n the class structure seem themselves to create that machine. 
Nomadism would appear, therefore, t o challenge both of these essential Marxist 
propositions. Nomadism does not f i t into the linear view of history, nor does 
i t possess the i n t e r n a l dynamics necessary f o r i t s own transformation. Neither 
do the various p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s created by the nomads appear to be rooted i n 
that which Marx takes to be fundamental and determinative of such innovations, 
that i s , changes i n the mode of exp l o i t a t i o n of the productive forces. 
In the period i n which a r e l a t i v e l y narrow S t a l i n i s t orthodoxy held sway, 
the Soviet and Mongol position was that the era from the appearance of "the 
f i r s t states of the Huns to the empire of Genghis Khan" was the "early period 
of feudalism". Here i t was claimed that class d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n had emerged i n 
Mongol society with the decay of p r i m i t i v e communalism, and that i n the 
process the slave owning stage of society was simply omitted. (19) The 
foundations f o r t h i s view i n so f a r as they were s c i e n t i f i c were provided by 
the eminent Russian scholar Vladimirtsov. In his posthumous work which 
appeared i n the Soviet Union i n 1934 Vladimirtsov claimed to have i d e n t i f i e d 
i n 13th and 14th century Mongol society such essentials of feudalism as the 
f i e f (granted as a result of an act of homage to the r u l e r ) , an aristocracy, a 
retinue of the ruler's m i l i t a r y followers, and a class of serfs.(20) Clearly, i f 
Mongol nomadism can be interpreted as feudal, Mongol c i v i l i s a t i o n can be 
appropriated i n t o the linear Marxist schema of types of society. With even 
greater convenience the occasional efflorescence i n nomadic societies of large 
state systems can as a consequence be grounded i n the growth and permutation 
of feudal s o c i a l relations. 
In a c r i t i q u e of approaches to the phenomenon of feudalism Lawrence 
Krader argues t h a t Vladimirtsov's analysis would appear to be invalidated by 
the presence of many features i n the states of Chinggis and his immediate 
successors inconsistent with feudalism. Kinship relations remained important 
i n the Chinggis era, with a l l Mongols claiming a common ancestry with the 
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r u l i n g c l a n and new a l l i e s enrolled often on the b a s i s of f i c t i v e kinship 
bonds. Moreover, the law of Chinggis Khan iyasa, jasag) was absolute and 
recognised no mutual obligations but demanded only obedience from v a s s a l s and 
commoners a l i k e . Here the r u l e r was recognised as master of a l l the t e r r i t o r y 
of the empire, with the concept of the ownership of property in land l i t t l e 
developed and many f i e f s held over people rather than land. Far from the 
holders of t e r r i t o r i a l f i e f s wielding any independent power over a d i s t i n c t 
and separate subject population as in European feudalism, there seemed 
therefore to be few r e a l obstacles to the absolute authority of the Mongol 
ruler. Indeed, Vladimirtsov himself concedes i n another of h i s works that "the 
power of a Mongol Khan, e s p e c i a l l y of such a one as Chingis, v/as i n the s t r i c t 
sense unlimited." (21) In so f a r as the Mongol s t a t e s were not based on and 
sustained by plunder, Krader concludes therefore that many of t h e i r features 
can best be interpreted as "pale r e f l e c t i o n s " of those of the i r sedentary 
neighbours. (22) 
Changes i n Marxist s c h o l a r s h i p i n the l a s t two decades have led to the 
reexamination of these arguments and the consequent appearance of a somewhat 
l e s s dogmatic approach to the phenomenon of nomadism. Thus G.E. Markov, though 
he i n s i s t s that c l a s s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n e x i s t s in nomadic s o c i e t i e s through the 
i n d i v i d u a l ownership of l i v e s t o c k a l s o maintains that private property in 
pasture land only comes into being with the decay and transformation of 
nomadism: 
"The s o c i a l s t r u cture of the nomads was determined by a lack of 
adequate development of productive forces and of d i v i s i o n of labour, 
private property i n c a t t l e and communal property on pastures, and 
considerable s o c i a l and proprietary s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . " ( 2 3 ) 
On t h i s view pastoral nomadism appears to be, despite i t s long history, a 
t r a n s i t i o n a l form of s o c i e t y in which kinship t i e s and communal practices, 
both remnants of a former era, c a r r y on an independent l i f e for an extended 
period. As to the appearance of the nomadic s t a t e s , Markov emphasises t h e i r 
t r a n s i e n t and temporary character which i s understood as a r e s u l t of t h e i r 
lack of a "economic and s o c i a l base i n the steppe". Neither of these 
concessions would appear to square with the Marxist assumptions outlined 
previously, though these, of course, remain at the core of o f f i c i a l Soviet 
Marxism. But they of f e r s u f f i c i e n t room for manouevre for Katsagdorj, as has 
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been shown, to emphasise the communal elements of Mongol society as they may 
be seen even i n the eighteenth century. 
Anatoli Khazanov, though not in any way t y p i c a l of recent Soviet 
scholarship, has i n s i s t e d that one of the most common features of pastoral 
nomadic s o c i e t i e s i s communal ownership of land, with only the appearance of a 
"tendency" towards other forms of ownership in p a r t i c u l a r examples,(24) So 
diverse are the pra c t i c e s , l e v e l of c i v i l i s a t i o n , and s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
organisation of nomadic s o c i e t i e s that comparative a n a l y s i s y i e l d s only the 
common feature of "economic a c t i v i t y " . Moreover changes in nomadic s o c i e t i e s 
appear to proceed, not from the i n t e r n a l dynamics thereof but as a consequence 
of contacts with other s o c i e t i e s and c i v i l i s a t i o n s . (25) Reviewing in pa r t i c u l a r 
the h i s t o r y of the p o l i t i c a l systems found from time to time in nomadic s t a t e s 
Khazanov concludes that there i s not one but three d i s t i n c t types a l l of which 
may, though need not, proceed from an act of conquest. <26) Although the 
nomadic s t a t e based upon the payment of tribute by v a s s a l s inhabiting a 
separate ecological zone was a common form, some nomadic s t a t e s have 
transformed themselves into sedentary a g r i c u l t u r a l and urban s o c i e t i e s , and yet 
others have e x i s t e d on the b a s i s of a d i v i s i o n of labour between steppe and 
sown. The empire of Chinggis was based upon the subjugation of sedentary 
populations who then paid tribute to t h e i r Mongol overlords. Khazanov evidently 
believes that to regard t h i s empire or i t s immediate successors as transient 
i s to understate t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l role, and to attribute the emergence of t h i s 
empire to the growth of allegedly feudal s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i s to confuse cause 
and effect: 
"Towards the beginning of the thirteenth century there emerged in 
Mongolia not nomadic feudalism which, according to the view of 
Vladimirtsov, d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from feudalism i n Western Europe, but a 
soc i e t y of another type. In t h i s s ociety the main differences 
between the d i f f e r e n t s t r a t a and c l a s s e s consisted not i n t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n to key resources, but in t h e i r r e l a t i o n to power and 
government. Those d i r e c t obligations which the r u l e r s imposed on the 
ruled were not the cause, but the consequence of the emergence of 
the rulers."<27) 
Here i t should be pointed out that, in h i s discussion of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
of the term "feudal" to nomadic st a t e s , Khazanov has perforce to take into 
Page 158 Owen Lattimore and Asia 
Mongol c i v i l i s a t i o n , past and present/7 
account the f a c t that i n Soviet (and Mongol) schol a r s h i p feudalism i s more 
than a s e t of i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t i s , rather, one of the fundamental forms of 
human soc i e t y given i t s i d e n t i t y by unique "production relations", s p e c i f i c a l l y 
the control of a g r i c u l t u r a l land, the chief "productive force" and source of 
surplus, by a c l a s s of nobles who extract by threat of force an a g r i c u l t u r a l 
surplus from the producing c l a s s of s e r f s . On t h i s view, feudal i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
a p o l i t i c a l character - homage, f i e f s , an a r i s t o c r a c y , and so on - w i l l only 
appear a f t e r the emergence of these "production relations". And these 
production r e l a t i o n s w i l l themselves develop only with advances in the mode of 
exploitation of the "productive forces". Khazanov's remarks are p r i n c i p a l l y 
directed, therefore, against a major supposition of Soviet Marxist scholarship, 
that i s the supposition that p o l i t i c s cannot be an independent variable. 
Lattimore, of course, i s under no c o n s t r a i n t s with regard to h i s 
treatment of p o l i t i c s . I t i s c l e a r i n h i s account of Chinggis, and in h i s more 
general work on the fe u d a l i s i n g tendencies present i n the border regions of 
Inner Asia, that Lattimore has derived much information from Soviet (and 
l a t t e r l y Mongol) s c h o l a r s and indeed may have come to understand these 
h i s t o r i c a l i s s u e s i n a new l i g h t a s a r e s u l t . He nevertheless inter p r e t s the 
construction of "feudal" i n s t i t u t i o n s during the r i s e of the Mongol world 
empire and l a t e r in the Mongol regions of the Manchu empire as a c t s of 
p o l i t i c a l w i l l . As we have seen, Lattimore believes that the creation i n 
Chinese h i s t o r y of t r i b a l " r e s e r v o i r s " and the rule by dynasties of nomadic 
or i g i n of s t a t e s of mixed ecological character was a response to m i l i t a r y and 
p o l i t i c a l imperatives. I t would seem that Lattimore's a n a l y s i s of the nature of 
the i n s t i t u t i o n s established by Chinggis to supplant those that had prevailed 
amongst the Mongols previously i s incorrect, though some scholars would s t i l l 
regard the Mongol p o l i t y i n t h i s period as an example of "nomadic quasi-
feudalism".(28) I f Lattimore i s i n error, however, t h i s follows from h i s neglect 
of the fundamentally a b s o l u t i s t features of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of Chinggis and 
not from any conceptual mistake. On the other hand h i s account of the Manchu 
period in which deliberately designed feudal p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s coexisted 
with various older communal p r a c t i c e s and conventions (notably the common 
ownership of pasture) would seem to be accurate. 
Looking at t h i s l a t e r work i n the l i g h t of h i s h i s t o r i c a l writings of the 
l a t e r 1930s i t i s c l e a r that Lattimore i s s t i l l developing ideas given t h e i r 
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f u l l e s t expression i n Inngr Asiah F r q n t i q r s of China. Although they spring 
from d i f f e r e n t geographical bases for the l a s t two mi l l e n i a the cycles of 
nomadic and sedentary human h i s t o r y i n Inner and East Asia have constantly 
intersected yet without adapting a s t a b l e relationship. Even the careful 
creation of feudal i n s t i t u t i o n s by an energetic dynasty can only bring a 
temporary s t a b i l i t y , though a d i f f e r e n t and possibly mutually beneficial 
r e l a t i o n s h i p may come with the i n d u s t r i a l age. 
Buddhism in Mongolia 
Lattimore i s a l s o concerned i n h i s l a t e r w ritings to comment on the 
introduction into Mongol society of other i n s t i t u t i o n s Interpreted by some to 
perform a feudal role, namely, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of Tibetan s t y l e lama Buddhism, 
Here too while he p r a i s e s the contribution of (Marxist) Mongolian scholars to 
an understanding of the complex of h i s t o r i c a l issues involved, Lattimore again 
develops an account i n which p o l i t i c a l motives are preeminent. 
The r i s e of the influence of lama Buddhism amongst the Mongols in the 
l a t e r sixteenth century, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the role of Altan Khan (1507-1582) as 
i t s p r i n c i p a l patron and promoter, should be understood according to Lattimore 
in r e l a t i o n to the decline of Chinese power beyond the Great Wall at that time. 
T h i s decline had opened the p o s s i b i l i t y for the emergence of a marginal s t a t e 
or s t a t e s of a mixed character c o - e x i s t i n g and trading with China or even 
capable, i n the long term, of conquests inside the Great Wall, Such a state 
would only develop and grow in power i f i t incorporated a g r i c u l t u r a l areas to 
provide "storable c e r e a l foods", urban centres to furnish a regular supply of 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms, and regular administrators to order these non-nomadic 
a c t i v i t i e s and populations. In the event the Manchu Nurhaci (1559-1626) was to 
found such a s t a t e at the eastern end of the Great Wall, but the ambitions and 
methods of the Mongol Altan were s i m i l a r , Altan had the additional objective of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a "moral su p e r i o r i t y " over those Mongols not d i r e c t l y subject to 
him, an objective forced on him by the endemic c o n f l i c t s amongst the various 
Chinggisid r u l e r s of a people who had become increasingly divided since the 
expulsion i n 1368 of the Yuan dynasty from China. 
In endeavouring to r e a l i s e h i s ambition Altan sought to avoid that 
ensnarement of h i s s t a t e which would follow h i s r e l i a n c e upon Chinese 
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administrators. For h i s l i t e r a t e administrators and c l e r k s he turned therefore 
to Tibet, seeking a l s o to use the Tibetan r e l i g i o n to l e g i t i m i s e h i s claim to 
be the preeminent Mongol ruler. As Lattimore puts i t , the "monastery-building, 
account-keeping, establishment-minded Tibetans were the answer to h i s 
problem". (29) And here Mongol and Tibetan i n t e r e s t s coincided since the 
followers of the reformer Tsong-kha-pa (Tsongkaba) required at that time a 
s e c u l a r patron i n order to a s s e r t t h e i r control over the Tibetan church 
hierarchy. Their leader, bSod-nams rgya-mtsho, met Altan in 1578, at which 
meeting Altan was recognised as a reincarnation of Khobilai Khan while the 
Tibetan pontiff received the t i t l e of Dalai Lama. I t was not piety, therefore, 
but s t a t e c r a f t which led to Altan's acceptance of the Buddhist f a i t h and the 
consequent conversion of many Mongols to Buddhism. S i m i l a r motives may be 
detected i n patronage of the church i n the following century by the Mongol 
Khans Ligdan and Abdai. Indeed, the greatgrandson of the l a t t e r became the 
f i r s t Jebtsundamba (Javzandamba), or p r i n c i p a l Mongol Buddhist reincarnation, 
i n 1639, being confirmed i n the t i t l e by the then Dalai Lama. 
By t h i s time, though, hopes of uniting the Mongols by p o l i t i c a l or 
r e l i g i o u s means were fading with the r i s e of the Manchus. The emerging 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Mongol church, now claiming the allegiance of the majority 
of the Mongols, were put to other uses by t h e i r new overlords. According to 
Lattimore Manchu patronage of the Buddhist f a i t h was used to prevent any 
resurgence of Mongol (and a l s o Tibetan) unity. By encouraging the growth of 
extensive monastic e s t a t e s with t h e i r control of considerable revenues, and by 
enhancing the prestige of the r e l i g i o u s leadership the Manchus ensured that 
the now enfeoffed Mongol nobles would have p r i e s t l y r i v a l s . The chances of any 
s i n g l e Mongol noble coming to control a dangerously large and potentially 
d i s l o y a l fiefdom were reduced i n a system of control which might be 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a "dual feudalism", (30) Constraints were placed on the contact 
between the s e c u l a r and r e l i g i o u s worlds by the Manchu i n s i s t e n c e after 1757 
that reincarnations of the Jebtsundamba could no longer be found amongst the 
Chinggisid f a m i l i e s of Mongolia, but only i n Tibet, And patronage of more than 
one reincarnation amongst both the Mongols and the Tibetans gave the Manchus 
the option of d i v i d i n g further the l o y a l t i e s of these subject peoples. As 
Lattimore points out, the Manchus were care f u l to balance the authority of the 
Jebtsundamba with an Inner Mongolian reincarnation, the ICan skya (Changchia): 
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"The Changcbia Reincarnation ... completed a t r i a n g l e within which 
Manchu pol i c y could manoeuvre: the Dalai and Panchan Lamas i n Tibet, 
the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu i n Outer Mongolia, and the Changchia 
Khutukhtu i n Peking and Inner Mongolia," (31) 
From t h i s account i t can be seen that Lattimore i s very much concerned 
to i n t e r p r e t the spread of lama Buddhism i n Mongolia as a p o l i t i c a l 
phenomenon. In h i s work on Mongol r e l i g i o n Walther Heissig s i m i l a r l y 
emphasises the importance of p o l i t i c a l factors, as does Larry Moses in h i s 
standard account of the s o c i a l role of the church, (32) Both authorities, 
however, understand the p o l i t i c a l dimension in terms of Altan's search for 
legitimation, rather than h i s conscious wish to design a border state free 
from the enervating e f f e c t s of Chinese culture, Moses a l s o makes the point 
that Buddhism only became the f a i t h of the Mongols a f t e r a long struggle with 
Shamanism during which i t absorbed c e r t a i n of the forms and features of the 
vanquished r e l i g i o n , 
Moses claims that there i s some evidence that Buddhism did not e n t i r e l y 
disappear i n Mongolia between the expulsion of the Yuan r u l e r s from China in 
1368 and the meeting of Altan and bSod-nams rgya-mtsho two centuries later. 
In t h i s period, moreover, there i s to be found a p r i o r example of an ambitious 
Mongol r u l e r seeking Buddhist legitimation for h i s ambitions. Esen, in 1446 
and again i n 1452 sought r e l i g i o u s a r t i c l e s and i n s t r u c t i o n from the Buddhist 
church, though he turned to China rather than Tibet (where the r e l i g i o n was 
then i n profound d i s o r d e r ) . To understand t h i s development i s must be pointed 
out that the Mongols by t h i s time were divided (as a consequence of Mongol 
inheritance r u l e s ) by the r i v a l r i e s of various Chinggisid families, despite the 
continued existence of a Yuan r u l e r i n the steppe. Esen's need was much the 
same as Altan's, except that he was not even a member of the Chinggisid clan 
(the B o r jigin) whereas Altan was a member thereof, though not of the 
preeminent lineage. Esen's attempt to overthrow the inheritance of Chinggis on 
the b a s i s of a new r e l i g i o u s legitimation came to nothing with h i s murder by 
one of h i s e r s t w h i l e followers. Altan's attempt to create a new Mongol empire 
was threatened, a f t e r h i s i n i t i a l m i l i t a r y successes and the granting of t i t l e s 
to him by the Ming r u l e r s of China, by the Yuan claimant and by d i s l o y a l t y 
amongst h i s own kinsmen. The conquests of Altan's nephew had put him in 
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contact with Tibet and had brought Tibetan Lamas to h i s court. I t was to t h i s 
quarter that Altan turned; 
"The l i n e of B o rjigin Chinggisids who could propose re-unification 
cloaked i n the mantle of the Great Conqueror never acquired the 
necessary m i l i t a r y power to force i t s acceptance by the c o l l a t e r a l 
t r i b e s . Here i s perhaps the s i n g l e most important reason for Altan's 
systematic overtures to the leader of the new Yellow sect [bSod-
nams rgya-mtsho] of Tibet, which was by 1570 A,D, a powerful force 
in Tibet and Northwest China," (33) 
Altan had sent to the Chinese a l s o for a Tibetan c l e r i c , and here i t i s 
c l e a r that the a t t r a c t i o n of Tibetan church figures was not that t h e i r culture 
was not Chinese, but that Tibetan support r e c a l l e d the role of the 'Phags-pa 
Lama, the Tibetan preceptor of Khobilai who had seen h i s overlord as a 
Chakravartin, or l o r d l y Buddhist ru l e r . Thus i t i s no accident that Altan at 
the meeting of 1578 was recognised as an incarnation of Khobilai at the same 
time as h i s Tibetan a d v i s e r i d e n t i f i e d himself as the 'Phags-pa Lama, (34) At a 
stroke t h i s stratagem r e c a l l e d the greatness of that era while setting aside 
the s t r i c t r u l e s of inheritance that were i t s legacy in Altan's time. I t i s a 
t r i b u t e to Altan's s t a t e c r a f t that i n the years immediately following other 
Mongol leaders sought to emulate him. From the account offered by Moses, then, 
i t may be concluded that i t was Altan's search for legitimation rather than 
for administrators which led him to turn to Tibet, although Moses agrees that 
the subsequent d i v i s i o n s imposed on the Mongols by the lama church prevented 
the reemergence of a unified Mongol nation. 
The Mongolian revolution and satellitism 
In a great v a r i e t y of w r i t i n g s Lattimore has repeatedly considered and 
reconsidered a further complex of themes - the nature of the Mongolian 
revolution and the Soviet role therein. Throughout he has been concerned to 
emphasise the r e l a t i v e autonomy of the Mongolian revolutionary movement and 
the benign character of Soviet a s s i s t a n c e . Here there may be detected echoes of 
that s t a r k choice Lattimore perceived i n 1935 i n the predicament of the 
Mongols of China: s o c i a l revolution or ethnic obliteration. For whatever could 
be s a i d of the s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l character of the Mongolian People's Republic 
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i t has permitted the continued existence of the Mongols as a people, a cause to 
which Lattimore has long been attached. I t w i l l be maintained here that t h i s 
perspective has often dominated Lattimore's view of recent Mongolian history. 
Writing i n 1949 Lattimore detects in Soviet i n i t i a t i v e s in Mongolia a 
continuation of the T s a r i s t policy of using the country as a buffer or screen, 
except that the Soviets have a l s o "encouraged the Mongols to become able to 
look a f t e r themselves",(35) The position of the Mongols has always rendered 
r e l a t i o n s with Russia a c r u c i a l issue of foreign policy. They have never been 
able, on Lattimore's view, to play off the neighbouring powers against each 
other s i n c e the s o r r y fate of t h e i r kinsmen i n Inner Mongolia demonstrated 
that close r e l a t i o n s with China would bring extinction. Here i t should be noted 
th a t Russian patronage a f t e r 1911 played a major part i n allowing the Mongols 
to maintain t h e i r detachment from the new Chinese Republic, In the period of 
autonomy (1911-1919) the fear of reabsorption into China and the consequent 
l o s s of national and ethnic i d e n t i t y was the major preoccupation of the 
government of the Jebtsundamba, who combined re l i g i o u s and secular authority 
i n these years. The r e a s s e r t i o n of Chinese control enforced by the army of Hsu 
Shu-cheng (Xu Shujeng) i n November 1919 stimulated the growth of n a t i o n a l i s t 
feeling, such figures as Sukebator turning inevitably to the Russians for 
support. 
Lattimore compares the r o l e of Sukebator i n the Mongolian revolution to 
that of Sun Yat-sen i n the Chinese. Referring to the biography by Natsagdorj 
which he was l a t e r to publish i n t r a n s l a t i o n , Lattimore describes Sukebator as 
the leader of a n a t i o n a l i s t group of diverse composition, some of whom sought 
merely the r e s t o r a t i o n of autonomy while others had more f a r reaching s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l objectives. They came into contact with a more r a d i c a l group led 
by Choibalsang (Choibalsan) who had already formed an association with 
Russian revolutionaries. With Russian encouragement the two factions merged in 
much the same way as the Kuomintang and the Communist Party i n China formed 
an a l l i a n c e i n 1923, and thereafter both leaders were to depend on a s s i s t a n c e 
from the Soviets. Unlike the protracted h i s t o r y of the Chinese revolution, the 
Mongolian revolutionaries were able to s e t up a government by 1921, and though 
they co-existed f o r a time with the remnants of the old regime of the 
Jebtsundamba, by 1925 they were able to declare t h e i r ultimate goal to be "the 
attainment of communism". 
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Although Lattimore believes that a policy of seeking Russian a s s i s t a n c e 
"would have been a ne c e s s i t y f o r any Mongol government" determined to achieve 
complete independence from China, he does not believe that t h i s by i t s e l f made 
the p a r t i c u l a r form of the close a s s o c i a t i o n that followed between the Russian 
and Mongolian regimes and p a r t i e s inevitable. Indeed, the subsequent p o l i t i c a l 
h i s t o r y of Mongolia may be interpreted, on Lattimore's view, as the re s u l t of a 
struggle between f a c t i o n s with d i f f e r e n t attitudes towards the link with the 
Soviets: 
"The record shows .,, that Mongol p o l i t i c s have largely taken the 
form of competition between men who placed unquestioning confidence 
in Russia and men who, while recognizing the necessity of 
as s o c i a t i o n with Russia, have attempted to avoid both complete 
integration with the p o l i c i e s of Russia and involvement with the 
p o l i c i e s of any country not f r i e n d l y to Russia, For t h i s second type 
of policy, which f a l l s between conventional c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and i s 
hard to define, there has u n t i l recently been no convenient term; but 
a term has recently come into use which describes i t well; i t i s 
Titoism." (36) 
Accordingly, Lattimore i n t e r p r e t s the h i s t o r y of inner party c o n f l i c t in 
Mongolia, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c r i s e s of 1924 and 1930-32, as a manifestation 
of t h i s competition, although competition seems a somewhat jejune term for a 
process which resu l t e d i n the p h y s i c a l extinction of the losers. Thus the 
l a t t e r , i n which a rapid and i l l - p l a n n e d attempt a t the c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n of the 
ch i e f economic resource of the population, t h e i r f l o c k s and herds, brought 
economic and p o l i t i c a l d i s a s t e r should not be seen a s a r e s u l t of misguided 
Soviet interference or the o v e r s p i l l of s i m i l a r attempts i n the Soviet Union, 
The lurch to the l e f t i n t h i s period was, rather, the outcome of an endeavour 
to demonstrate, by Mongolian T i t o i s t s , " l e f t i s t independence of Russia". 
Lattimore i s i n no doubt that the dominant trend i n Mongolian p o l i t i c s has 
been both n a t i o n a l i s t and Marxist, such differences as there have been r e l a t i n g 
to the degree of independent development Mongolia should exhibit. In the event 
the winning f a c t i o n was content with a great degree of reliance on Soviet 
guidance. T h i s r e l i a n c e has produced, i n so f a r as sound evidence i s available, 
a p o s i t i v e balance sheet, with the prosperity of t r a d i t i o n a l herding a c t i v i t i e s 
being maintained while financing a "gradual i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , accompanied step 
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by step by the technological t r a i n i n g of Mongols to man industry as i t 
expands". As to the degree of "independence" of Mongolia as a nation, t h i s i s a 
question which must be "judged on the t o t a l evidence", by which Lattimore 
means that i n view of the pervasiveness of power bloc p o l i t i c s and the 
dependence of smaller countries on the great powers the sovereignty of such 
nations i s a f i c t i o n . ( 3 7 ) A l l that can be s a i d i s that, r e l a t i v e to other small 
and under-developed countries, and to the position of the Mongols of Inner 
Mongolia, the l o y a l t y of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Soviet a l l i a n c e 
i s evidence of the p o s i t i v e nature of that a l l i a n c e . 
In h i s introduction to the t r a n s l a t i o n of the l i f e of Sukebator by 
Natsagdorj Lattimore enlarges upon t h i s view of the Mongolian revolution. As 
he had come to regard the Mongolian People's Republic as a s a t e l l i t e of Soviet 
Russia but believed that t h i s did not transform the Mongols into puppets he 
takes h i s a n a l y s i s further by offering a general account of the phenomenon of 
" s a t e l l i t i s m " ; he a l s o comments on those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Soviet policy that 
appeared to govern the Soviet approach towards countries in that t h i r d zone 
that Lattimore had long maintained would play an important role in world 
p o l i t i c s , 
Soviet conduct i n the Third World seemed to follow a role Lattimore 
proposes to term the "doctrine of the i r r e v e r s i b l e minimum". The Soviets were 
prepared to give some measure of support to the regime of a Third World 
country provided that regime had made e f f o r t s to free i t s nation permanently 
from c a p i t a l i s t domination. Thus the Soviets had a s s i s t e d the Ataturk regime 
in Turkey and the Nanking regime of Chiang Kai-shek i n China not because they 
expected to e n l i s t these nations as c l i e n t s t a t e s but because long term Soviet 
p o l i c y had been advanced with the rebuffs these nations had offered to Western 
trading and diplomatic p r i v i l e g e s . In Mongolia i n the early years of the 
revolution Soviet i n t e r e s t s had been s u f f i c i e n t l y served by the s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
of the S i b e r i a n f r o n t i e r and the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese i n t e r e s t s 
that had followed the 1921 revolution. Taking the longer view here also, the 
Soviets had r e f r a i n e d from annexation of Mongolia despite i t s occupation by 
the Red Army i n 1921; they were a l s o content in the years that followed "to go 
slowly i n pressing i n t e r n a l S o v i e t i z a t i o n of the country".(38) 
Going back to a d i s t i n c t i o n Lattimore f i r s t developed i n 1936, because 
the Soviets had abstained from annexation of Mongolia despite the presence 
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there of a regime well disposed towards them, Mongolia was not a puppet state 
(a term which was then applicable to Manchukuo) but a s a t e l l i t e , (39) Lattimore 
then o f f e r s a d e f i n i t i o n of the anatomy of s a t e l l i t i s m as d i s t i n c t from the 
"feudal" form of dependency, the c r u c i a l features of which are the character 
and aims of the s a t e l l i t e regime. Such a regime comes to power with the 
a s s i s t a n c e of the regime of the patron state, depends upon i t for i t s 
continuing existence, and seeks to emulate i t i n in t e r n a l policy. Within the 
s a t e l l i t e s t a t e there i s a h o s t i l e opposition or potential apposition which, 
should i t supplant the r u l i n g regime, would create the conditions for the 
gr a v i t a t i o n of the s t a t e "into the orbit of some country other than, and 
probably h o s t i l e to, the country protecting the actual regime". Given the 
closeness of patron and c l i e n t "any v a r i a t i o n s within the dominant state are 
promptly r e f l e c t e d within the s a t e l l i t e state". (40) 
By viewing Mongolia as an example of s a t e l l i t e dependency, Lattimore 
believes that many otherwise puzzling episodes in modern Mongolian hi s t o r y 
become explicable. These include the rapid development of the revolution in 
Mongolia, the "genuine warmth" of Mongolian references to Soviet example and 
a s s i s t a n c e - i n t h i s "Choibalsang was no sycophant" - and the alleged absence 
of " c o n f l i c t i n g nationalisms" i n the record of Soviet-Mongolian relations. On 
t h i s l a t t e r point Lattimore puts i n the mouth of a hypothetical Mongol 
commoner as eloquent a case as might be presented for in t e r n a l c l a s s warfare 
(though he believes t h i s a n a l y s i s " i s e n t i r e l y independent of Marxist terms"). 
Alleging that the educated c l a s s e s wished only to maintain the i r own 
pr i v i l e g e s , and were compromised by t h e i r manifest w i l l i n g n e s s to re l y upon 
Chinese and Japanese "protectors" no case could be made according to t h i s 
spokesman for an overriding national and c l a s s s o l i d a r i t y : 
"Our only defense against the kind of outside protectors ... [the 
"privileged c l a s s e s " ] w i l l t r y to c a l l i n i s to find outside 
protectors of our own. There i s only one answer: the revolutionary 
Russians. We must r e l y upon them while we gain time to t r a i n up a 
new generation of Mongols to run things in a new way. These new men 
we must, for our own safety, fin d to the maximum possible extent in 
fa m i l i e s that have no t i e s with the old privileged c l a s s e s , and that 
w i l l increase the antagonism between us and the right-wing 
n a t i o n a l i s t s . In order to get the Russian help - which i s the only 
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thing that w i l l p u l l us through - the Russians, too, must feel they 
are getting something out of i t . That i s going to mean ... they w i l l 
take the lead ... in international policy ,., [and in] economic 
development," (41) 
Cooperation with the Russians was therefore the only a l t e r n a t i v e for such 
people, which explains the reason why, even given the extent of Russian 
penetration of Mongolia, there was "never ,,. a r e a l l y dangerous revolt i n Outer 
Mongolia" i n the 1930s despite the close proximity of potential Japanese 
patrons of an a l t e r n a t i v e regime. 
In 1956, as a r e s u l t of the publication by Nicholas Poppe of a very 
d i f f e r e n t account of the Mongolian s a t e l l i t e regime as well as of some d i r e c t 
c r i t i c i s m of Lattimore's approach thereto, Lattimore of f e r s some s i g n i f i c a n t 
amendments to h i s view of s a t e l l i t i s m , He now wishes to emphasise the f a c t 
that, though the regime and i t s supporters i n a s a t e l l i t e s t a t e are a minority, 
they have a "disproportionate influence". This i s so, 
"because the moment of decision a r i s e s when other groups, which 
taken together are i n f a c t the majority, are more a f r a i d of some 
other country or countries than they are of the one into whose orbit 
the conscious minority wants to bring them as a s a t e l l i t e , " ( 4 2 ) 
In the case of Mongolia i t i s Lattimore's opinion that a s a t e l l i t e regime came 
into being p r i n c i p a l l y through the fear of the majority of the threat posed by 
China and Japan, The Mongolian revolution was thus an i l l u s t r a t i o n of a 
p r i n c i p l e Lattimore finds to be common in history, though l i t t l e noticed by 
h i s t o r i a n s , that of a people marching backward into a future they l i t t l e 
a nticipated or understood through d i s l i k e and fear of the known, Lattimore i s 
prepared to acknowledge that once t h i s regime was securely i n power "cruel 
things were done" i n order to prepare against the danger of Japanese attack 
and i n order to ensure continuing Russian support. But, repeating a point he 
had made on many occasions before, at that time "Mongolia had a v i t a l i n t e r e s t 
i n supporting the Soviet Union", as i s shown by the repulse by Soviet and 
Mongolian forces of a major Japanese invading force on the Mongolian border at 
Khalkhyn Gol (Chalchyn Gol) in May-June 1939,(43) 
In Nomads and Commissars, written following h i s 1961 v i s i t to Mongolia, 
Lattimore r e s t a t e s many of these judgements on the Mongolian revolution. He 
emphasises the independent but emulatory development of the p o l i t i c a l and 
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economic strategy of the revolutionary regime, arguing at one point that the 
very extremism of the forced c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n p o l i c i e s of 1929-31 i s evidence 
that neither Soviet nor Comintern advice was the cause, though the Soviets had 
the power to intervene i f they had so chosen. Because Mongol-Soviet r e l a t i o n s 
were so intimate "the Russians must have known a l l about the p o l i c i e s while 
they were being debated and passed, and could have caused them to be modified 
i f they had considered them wrong". (44) But as a r e s u l t of h i s experiences in 
1961 Lattimore i s now of the opinion that h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the term 
" s a t e l l i t e " would need to be "modified" to f i t the present r e a l i t y of the 
Mongolian People's Republic, The precise nature of the necessary modification 
i s not s p e c i f i e d , but Lattimore adverts to the unique circumstances of the 
country and the knowledge Mongols evidently have of the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of 
many Soviet p o l i c i e s as a solution to these problems, (45) 
So f a r Lattimore's treatment of the connection between the Mongolian 
revolution and the Soviet Union has followed that of Mongolian sources. In the 
year that Nomads and Commissars was published, the People's Revolutionary 
Party made public c r i t i c i s m of the personality c u l t that had developed around 
the Mongolian leader Choibalsang. There can be l i t t l e doubt that S t a l i n was the 
o r i g i n a l for the c u l t of h i s Mongolian contemporary, jus t as Krushchev's 
denunciation of S t a l i n began the reinterpretation, i n i t i a l l y within the Party, 
of Choibalsang's h i s t o r i c a l role. At f i r s t Choibalsang's c r i t i c s had in mind 
h i s purge (again i n emulation of S t a l i n ) of many senior p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
figures between 1937 and 1939,(46) but in time t h e i r actions opened the way 
for an o f f i c i a l reexamination of other i s s u e s in the h i s t o r y of the revolution. 
In h i s l a t e r work Lattimore amends h i s interpretation of some pa r t i c u l a r 
episodes accordingly, though he s t i c k s doggedly to most of h i s e a r l i e r 
a s s e r t i o n s including h i s view that the revolution of 1921 was not simply 
imposed by the Soviet Red Army, and that the c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n f i a s c o of 1929-
31 was the r e s u l t of misplaced Mongolian zealotry. (47) On the unrest generated 
by the l a t t e r movement, Lattimore now acknowledges that i t was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
widespread and serious that Soviet forces were c a l l e d i n to repress i t , though 
t h i s apparently at the request of the regime in Ulan Bator,(48) Concerning the 
changes i n the leadership of the regime i n 1928 which closed off any other 
a l t e r n a t i v e than the s t a t u s for Mongolia of a Soviet c l i e n t , Lattimore now 
follows the most recent h i s t o r i c a l account published i n Mongolia. This 
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acknowledges that when the " R i g h t i s t s " (including the Central Committee 
Chairman Dambadorji [Dambadorj]) refused at the Seventh Party Congress in 1928 
to modify t h e i r tolerance of private trading i n the economy in li n e with the 
changes then being made in the Soviet Union they were purged on the orders of 
a commission dispatched by the Comintern. (49) But even the abandonment in 
1932 of the extreme p o l i c i e s that had prevailed up u n t i l that time in favour 
of "the new turn" Lattimore s t i l l regards as being the r e s u l t of the Mongolian 
Party, a f t e r an extensive debate, taking good advice, rather than "the response 
of ' s a t e l l i t e s ' who meekly obey foreign orders",(50) 
The historiography of the Mongolian revolution 
I t i s evident that i n t h i s f i n a l stage of h i s career Lattimore had become 
quite deeply attached to a conception of the Mongolian revolution as an 
autonomous though e x t e r n a l l y i n s p i r e d movement which rescued a previously 
declining people from national and ethnic oblivion. The reasons for t h i s 
attachment w i l l be speculated upon i n the concluding section of t h i s work, but 
the importance of t h i s conception for Lattimore i s such that i t must be 
discussed i n the l i g h t of the h i s t o r i c a l record. 
Up u n t i l the 1950s the obscurity of Mongolia, i t s lack of any 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t i e s except with the Soviet Union, and the paucity of h i s t o r i c a l 
materials a v a i l a b l e from Ulan Bator, rendered serious work on the country very 
d i f f i c u l t , Lattimore had v i s i t e d the c a p i t a l with Vice-President Wallace in 
1944 for three days but such materials as he had been able to gather 
(including Natsagdorj's l i f e of Sukebator) reflected the personality c u l t and 
the S t a l i n i s t d i s t o r t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l record then as prevalent i n Mongolia 
as i n the Soviet Union. 
Many of the points made in Lattimore's writings of the 1950s accept the 
b a s i c account offered by the regime of i t s e l f at l e a s t regarding the personal 
r o l e of various members of the leadership and the nature and extent of Russian 
intervention and control i n Mongolia. At the same time a school of Western 
s c h o l a r s evidently w r i t i n g with the experience of post-war Eastern Europe in 
mind Interpreted the creation of a Soviet s a t e l l i t e i n Mongolia as following 
the same pattern as i n Europe, These s c h o l a r s emphasised the organisation of 
the Party on Soviet t e r r i t o r y i n 1921 a f t e r revolutionary Mongols had 
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t r a v e l l e d to the Soviet Union in the previous year to seek Russian aid against 
the Chinese occupiers of t h e i r country, and the subsequent i n s t a l l a t i o n of the 
regime as a consequence of Soviet m i l i t a r y occupation. The period since 1921, 
or 1924 when the l a s t Jebtsundamba died and the Party was reorganised (and 
s h o r t l y thereafterwards renamed the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) to 
accept a s p e c i f i c a l l y revolutionary programme on the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the l o c a l 
representatives of the Comintern, was seen as one in which the Soviet Union 
dominated p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s i n the Mongolian People's Republic. Thus from that 
time the hapless Mongols experienced a l l the v i c i s s i t u d e s of t h e i r Soviet 
bretheren, being encouraged to "enrich" themselves when the equivalent of the 
New Economic Policy prevailed i n Mongolia, then being thrown into a disastrous 
and bloody c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n campaign in 1929, and suffering purges of leading 
personnel a f t e r 1936.(51) 
There i s a good deal of evidence for many of the contentions made by 
members of t h i s school. Thus, to take some examples, at the t h i r d Party 
Congress which began i t s deliberations on 4 August 1924, the representative of 
the Comintern, the Buryat-Mongol from the Soviet Union Rinchino (Rinchin), 
d i s t r i b u t e d a pamphlet s e t t i n g out the case for Mongolia now choosing the 
s o c i a l i s t road under Soviet tutelage. When he was opposed i n t h i s by the l o c a l 
revolutionary Danzan as too advanced for the concrete conditions of Mongolia, 
Rinchino riposted with the charge that Danzan wished to deliver Mongolia to 
the Chinese. With the help of members of the League of Revolutionary Youth, the 
youth wing of the Party, Rinchino and h i s Mongol a l l i e s turned the Congress 
into an ad hoc court which declared Danzan and others gu i l t y of treason and 
had them summarily executed. The Soviet Minister to Mongolia, Vasiliev, then 
turned up to comfort the delegates with the observation that they had done the 
cor r e c t thing as t h i s was a l s o the prac t i c e in the Soviet Union, (52) In h i s 
account of a v i s i t to Ulan Bator i n early 1927 as a representative of the 
Kuomintang (then s t i l l in a l l i a n c e with the Communist party in China, and 
recognised as a " f r a t e r n a l party" by the Comintern) Ma Ho-t'ien (Ma Hetian) 
observed that the various organs of the government were dominated by Soviet 
advisers,(53) And, as has been shown, Lattimore himself now accepts that the 
purge at the seventh Party Congress i n 1928 of those "Rightists" (including 
Dambadorji) who had pursued an "anti-Party opportunist policy" was c a r r i e d out 
on the i n s t r u c t i o n s of a commission despatched to Ulan Bator by the Comintern, 
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This work being done, the Congress then "underlined the importance of 
strengthening the bonds between the MPRP and the Comintern, making the advice 
given by Comintern i n s t r u c t i o n s the guidlines for operations, s o l i d i f y i n g the 
fr i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s established between Mongolia and the Soviet Union, and 
remaining boundlessly l o y a l to them", (54) The introduction of the "New Turn" in 
1932 was a l s o a r e s u l t of d i r e c t Soviet intervention. In accordance with a 
Joint resolution of the Comintern Executive Committee and the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of 29 March 1932 the former policy of 
rapid c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n was abandoned at a meeting of the Central Committee of 
the Mongolian Party the following month, A number of prominent leaders were 
purged a t t h i s meeting, the Mongolian comrades taking note of the Soviet view 
of "the serious mistakes committed by the majority of the leaders of the MPRP" 
and the "concrete ways of cor r e c t i n g them", (55) 
But the authors of the school who see Mongolia as an early prototype of 
the form of regime l a t e r created i n Eastern Europe tend to telescope periods, 
and take i t as almost se l f - e v i d e n t that the Soviet Union i n 1921 was as much 
disposed to acquire new dependencies as was S t a l i n i n 1945, With the r e v i s i o n s 
that have occurred i n recent Mongolian and Soviet s c h o l a r s h i p on the evolution 
of the Mongolian revolution a d e f i n i t i v e account of the l a t e r 1920s and events 
thereafter remains to be written, though many old judgements have been 
overturned. Several authors, however, have offered new interpretations of the 
or i g i n s and turning points of the revolutionary regime, and i t s relationship 
with the Soviet Union, 
According to T.E. Ewing, there i s something to Lattimore's contention that 
there were important differences between the two groups who came together to 
form the nucleus of the Mongolian People's Party. The "Consular H i l l " group who 
included Choibalsang seems to have been more inclined to seek revolutionary 
solutions to the Mongol predicament and numbered among i t s members 
indi v i d u a l s who by the standards of the time and place might be termed r a d i c a l 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The "East Urga" group, of which Sukebator was a member, had the 
more limited aim of promoting Mongol independence, perhaps because i t included 
men who were or had been s t a t e and m i l i t a r y functionaries. But the leaders, 
respectively, of these groups were, contrary to l a t e r accounts, Bodoo and 
Danzan.(56) Bodoo went on to be the chairman of the revolutionary government 
while i t was s t i l l e s tablished on Soviet t e r r i t o r y in A p r i l 1921, though he was 
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purged i n an obscure episode i n 1922, Danzan suff e r i n g the same fate i n 1924. 
Sukebator's prominence at t h i s time derived (as b e f i t t e d a person of m i l i t a r y 
t r a i n i n g and experience) from h i s leadership i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s ; the lat e r 
c u l t of Sukebator evidently has more than a l i t t l e to do with the fact that as 
he died i n 1923 his reputation was not s u l l i e d i n the subsequent p o l i t i c a l 
struggles. S i m i l a r l y the dominant role accorded t o Choibalsang i n lat e r Mongol 
accounts of these years i s a r e f l e c t i o n of his predominance af t e r 1936. 
Encouraged by a v i s i t from I . A. Sorokovikov, who came to Mongolia i n 
March 1920 t o assess f o r the Comintern reports he had received of a 
revolutionary movement among the Mongols, and two further clandestine Soviet 
missions, Danzan and Choibalsang tr a v e l l e d to Verkhneudinsk (Ulan Ude) i n July 
i n the hope of securing Soviet help against the occupation of t h e i r country by 
the Chinese, The i n i t i a l response of the Soviets, however, was extremely 
cautious, no doubt because they were endeavouring to avoid further m i l i t a r y 
entanglements with the C i v i l War not yet won. The Japanese had only begun the 
withdrawal of t h e i r troops from the Russian Far East which had been 
reconstituted as the buffer Far Eastern Republic. The Soviets also had to deal 
with the a c t i v i t i e s of h o s t i l e White forces, p a r t i c u l a r l y those led by Semenov. 
I t should be noted that, i n view of t h e i r l a t e r role, i t was at the suggestion 
of the Mongols themselves at t h i s time that Buryats including Rinchino should 
be recruited t o a s s i s t i n t h e i r revolutionary plans. In the following month 
fu r t h e r members of the i n c i p i e n t revolutionary regime travelled from Urga to 
j o i n t h e i r colleagues Danzan and Choibalsang. This group has come to be known 
to h i s t o r i a n s c o l l e c t i v e l y as the Khalkha Seven, and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that a l l 
apart from Sukebator and Choibalsang died i n purges between 1922 and 1939. 
Although some members of the group had disdained contact with the 
Jebtsundamba i t was the Soviets who had insisted from the f i r s t that an 
appeal from the former head of state would help to legitimise a Soviet role i n 
Mongolian attempts t o expel the Chinese. (57) 
The Mongols t r a v e l l e d on to Soviet t e r r i t o r y i n Irkutsk i n August, a 
group led by Danzan f i n a l l y making i t s way to Moscow probably i n late 
September 1920. Here the Soviets f i n a l l y offered the Mongols some money and 
weapons, though i t i s apparent that they d i d so because Mongolia had i n the 
meantime been invaded by a White force led by Baron Ungern-Sternberg who 
intended to tu r n the country i n t o a base f o r the reconquest of Russia. Even at 
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t h i s point the Soviet commitment t o the revolutionary group remained limited. 
Two further developments, however, changed t h i s policy abruptly. Repeated 
overtures to China f a i l e d to secure the permission of the government i n Peking 
f o r the Soviets t o intervene i n Mongolia with the objective of expelling 
Ungern-Sternberg. When Urga f e l l t o his forces on 3 February 1921 the Chinese 
showed no i n c l i n a t i o n to do the job themselves, with or without Soviet 
cooperation. This tipped the balance, and the Soviets resolved to back whatever 
revolutionary force could be fostered among the Mongols. The f i r s t congress of 
the Mongolian People's Party was held accordingly on Soviet s o i l at Kyakhta 
between 1 and 3 March 1921, and on 13 March a provisional government was 
established there by the new Party. The way was thus opened f o r m i l i t a r y 
action by revolutionary partisans against the Chinese s t i l l i n occupation of 
parts of Mongolia and against Ungern-Sternberg, and f o r the intervention of 
the Soviet Red Army which entered Urga on 6 July. (58) The formation of the new 
revolutionary government though i t was brought into being by Soviet 
intervention may thus be interpreted as a result of the Soviet resolve to 
protect t h e i r Far Eastern borders rather than of an incipient Soviet 
imperialism. 
Thereafter, though there were a whole series of changes of ta c t i c s and 
personnel, the Soviets seem to have exercised a strong influence on Mongolian 
a f f a i r s , But Charles Bawden disputes the Soviet and Mongol claim that with the 
death of the Jebtsundamba i n 1924 a "general l i n e " was l a i d down that ensured 
that henceforth Mongolia would follow the s o c i a l i s t road, "bypassing 
capitalism" w ith the assistance of the Soviet Union. I t i s Bawden's contention, 
as against both Soviet scholars and those who would inte r p r e t Mongolian 
h i s t o r y as an early example of what b e f e l l the states of Eastern Europe a f t e r 
1945, t h a t the rea l turning point was 1928.(59) U n t i l that time though the 
power of the old n o b i l i t y had been undermined and a s t a r t had been made in 
the modernisation of education and other aspects of society, the policies 
followed i n Ulan Bator neither t i e d the country economically to the Soviet 
Union nor destroyed the r e l i g i o n which was the centrepiece of the old culture. 
But i n 1928 d i r e c t Soviet intervention eradicated a p o l i t i c a l leadership which 
was showing signs of independence, and launched Mongolia irrevocably upon a 
course of soci a l and economic transformation closely modelled af t e r that of 
the Soviet Union. Though Bawden's assertion that Mongolia might i n other 
Page 174 Qwen Lattimore and Asia 
MongQl c i v i l i s a t i o n , past and present/7 
circumstances have become a " l i b e r a l democracy" seems far-fetched, i t appears 
inc o n t r o v e r t i b l e t h a t from that time any other course of development f o r the 
country was closed o f f . This i s confirmed by the resolution of the 1928 Party 
congress: 
"Unless we implement such things as d i r e c t l y opposing the feudalists 
and lamas, and more especially the new r i c h - a newly emergent 
force which w i l l t i e up the revolution - develop and improve the 
liv e l i h o o d of the poor and middle ards [commoners] and 
cooperativize, there i s no way we can develop outside the c a p i t a l i s t 
road." (60) 
"Satellitism" and Lattlmore's assumptions 
Although the h i s t o r i c a l record would now appear to support the view that 
the formation of the o r i g i n a l revolutionary c i r c l e s i n Mongolia was an 
autonomous and local reaction to a national c r i s i s , and that Soviet m i l i t a r y 
intervention i n 1921 was a reluctant response to the threat posed by Ungern-
Sternberg rather than a ploy t o introduce a s o c i a l i s t regime i n Ulan Bator, 
what i s known about events thereafter provides l i t t l e foundation f o r 
Lattimore's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Mongolian revolution. Without Soviet support 
and armed intervention the o r i g i n a l revolutionary regime would never have been 
placed i n power. As early as 1924 Soviet intervention kept the revolutionaries 
on the path approved by Moscow, and the purge of the "Rightists" i n 1928 and 
the subsequent lurch to the l e f t ensured that from that time the revolution 
would proceed at the pace and i n the di r e c t i o n required by the Soviet elder 
brother. 
As the p r i n c i p a l American s p e c i a l i s t on modern Mongolia Lattimore ought 
to have been aware even i n the 1950s of some of the inadequacies of his view 
of the communist regime. While i t i s true that a f t e r 1950 many aspects of his 
scholarly routine (not to mention h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l assumptions) were disrupted 
by h i s p o l i t i c a l and legal ordeal, he had already defended t h i s interpretation 
f o r a decade. That he was not so aware, at least on the evidence of his 
published w r i t i n g s , may perhaps be understood by a reconsideration of the 
assumptions underlying his analysis of Mongolian " s a t e l l i t i s m " . While conceding 
that the very existence and programme of the s a t e l l i t e regime depends upon the 
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actions of the patron state, and describing the regime and i t s supporters as a 
minority, Lattimore then reduces "Mongol p o l i t i c s " to a struggle between 
factions both equally Marxist but divided on the amount of emphasis to be 
placed on the national aspects of the revolution. In the event the " T i t o i s t s " 
l o s t which would seem to indicate that what l i t t l e capacity the Mongols had 
f o r independent development was destroyed, but what Lattimore ignores i s the 
opinion of those groups he c o l l e c t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e s as the "majority" who 
apparently had no p a r t i c u l a r wish to l i v e under a Marxist government at a l l . 
I t i s no wonder that there was l i t t l e capacity f o r " c o n f l i c t i n g nationalisms" 
i n r e l a t i o n s between patron and c l i e n t i f one r e s t r i c t s one's analysis solely 
to the r u l i n g Marxist factions. Of course Marxist regimes, i n a t r a d i t i o n which 
has i t s o r i g i n s i n Marx's own rejection of the opinions of the European 
peasantry, have customarily accorded p o l i t i c a l status only to those groups 
thought favourable to the r u l e r s and t h e i r programme. For an external analyst 
to f a l l i n with t h i s practice while claiming o b j e c t i v i t y i s indicative of 
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
A further assumption of Lattimore's argument i s that any other course 
would res u l t i n the a l t e r n a t i v e national leadership s e l l i n g out to the Chinese, 
thereby presiding over the c o l l e c t i v e o b l i t e r a t i o n of the Mongols as a d i s t i n c t 
people. This, as Charles Bawden has pointed out, i s to underrate the potential 
shown i n those beginnings of contacts between Mongolia and Western Europe in 
the 1920s. These resulted i n the dispatch of students to France and to Germany 
and of a trade mission to and quasi-diplomatic relations with the l a t t e r 
country. A l l these contacts were evidently broken o f f at Soviet insistence in 
1929, though those trained personnel who returned to t h e i r country and 
survived the purges of the 1930s have made important s c i e n t i f i c and social 
contributions to national development. (61) 
This argument i s also t o impute a consistency of opinion to t h i s majority 
fo r which there i s l i t t l e evidence. In the Mongolia of the 1920s there were no 
doubt a t a v i s t i c lamas and lay nobles who could see no further than the 
rest o r a t i o n of the autonomous regime. But there were also those in the church 
who were strongly c r i t i c a l of i t s role, and there were yet others who looked 
to a the transformation of the old order short of ideological and p o l i t i c a l 
subservience to Moscow, Even the new s o c i a l i s t administration had sought to 
open contacts with the United States, and r i g h t through the 1920s despite 
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t h e i r intentions and the many advantages that they enjoyed the Soviets were 
unable to displace China as Mongolia's dominant trading partner u n t i l 1929 
when a vigorous anti-Chinese campaign e f f e c t i v e l y severed these trading l i n k s 
by p o l i t i c a l means,(62) I t i s as well to r e c a l l also that the sentiments of the 
n o n - p o l i t i c a l majority were undoubtedly influenced by the conduct of the 
Marxist regime. I f t h i s majority had come to take on a real i d e n t i t y by 1932 
(when the regime was threatened by major rebellions) then i t may be surmised 
t h i s was because they did not agree with the attacks on r e l i g i o n and personal 
property which were threatening the existence of both of these apparently 
cherished i n s t i t u t i o n s . (63) I f by then assistance was sought by members or 
groups w i t h i n t h i s majority from the Chinese and Japanese t h i s i s not to be 
thought s u r p r i s i n g since the regime i n Ulan Bator had made i t plain i t ruled 
by force and therefore nothing less than force would destroy i t . 
Whether, i n fa c t , anything short of Soviet s a t e l l i t e status would have 
delivered the country to either the Chinese or the Japanese i s a moot point. 
From the collapse of the Manchu empire to the communist vi c t o r y of 1949 
neither Tibet nor Sinkiang were ruled from Peking (or, la t e r , Nanking). In the 
l a t t e r region a considerable number of Chinese colonists sustained a Chinese-
administration with which the young Lattimore was impressed. Soviet trade 
penetrated the region, and Soviet m i l i t a r y assistance was crucial i n putting 
down a major i n t e r n a l rebellion, but Sinkiang became neither a Soviet s a t e l l i t e 
nor Soviet t e r r i t o r y . When the Chinese warlords had attempted to bring 
Mongolia under t h e i r control t h e i r e f f o r t s had ended i n ignominious f a i l u r e 
since t h e i r energies were p r i n c i p a l l y directed towards conquest of ethnic 
China and c o n t r o l of the c a p i t a l . An independent Mongolia might have f a l l e n to 
a resolute Chinese attack by a united government, but, af t e r 1916, i t i s not 
r e a l l y possible to t a l k at a l l of a single national government, though t h i s 
f i c t i o n was maintained f o r external purposes. Indeed, an independent Mongolia 
might have have provided j u s t the r i g h t stimulus for a more equitable policy 
on the part of the Chinese towards the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, thosis people 
whose p l i g h t had awakened Lattimore's interest and concern i n the f i r s t place. 
As i t was at the c r i t i c a l time energies w i t h i n the Mongolian People's Republic 
were absorbed i n an internecine inner c o n f l i c t , and t h i s and the dictates of 
Comintern and Soviet policy prevented Ulan Bator from playing an active or 
interested role. 
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I t remains to account f o r Lattimore's d i s i n t e r e s t i n the views and 
aspirations of the Mongolian majority, something of the explanation of which 
should now be v i s i b l e . The Dilowa who was evidently a shrewd judge of 
character once remarked th a t as Lattimore "had no vocation f o r r e l i g i o n " there 
was no point i n h i s t r y i n g to explain Buddhism to him.(64) Consider now 
Lattimore's treatment of Altan Khan's conversion to Buddhism. Lattimore 
regarded even Altan's quest f o r a l e g i t i m i s i n g theory f o r his imperial 
ambitions as too ethereal a purpose. Consequently he hypothesised a materialist 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the spread of the Tibetan r e l i g i o n among the Mongols. 
Consider also the nub of Lattimore's analysis of Buddhism i n the Manchu 
period. Whatever i t s beliefs and social practices i t was essentially a form of 
feudalism, and an obstacle as well to national unity. I t can be concluded that, 
having no patience with r e l i g i o n himself Lattimore had l i t t l e concern f o r the 
r e l i g i o n of others. The rel i g i o u s and other beliefs of the Mongols, i n so f a r 
as they d i d not advance the social revolution he had come by 1935 to regard 
as necessary f o r the s u r v i v a l of the Mongols as a people, were as of l i t t l e 
i n t e r e s t p o l i t i c a l l y as those of t h e i r ancestors were h i s t o r i c a l l y . I t i s but a 
short step t o denying t h e i r existence. 
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From t h i s account of the i n t e l l e c t u a l biography of Owen Lattimore i t can 
be seen that he has been concerned i n a long l i f e with many ideas and issues. 
From an int e r e s t i n the p o l i t i c a l geography of f r o n t i e r s , he developed a then 
novel approach to Chinese h i s t o r y which stressed the role of the f r o n t i e r i n 
the making of that h i s t o r y . From an interest i n the sit u a t i o n and p l i g h t of 
Chinese f r o n t i e r peoples, he came to champion the cause of the Mongols, f i r s t 
those w i t h i n the Chinese Republic and lat e r those i n independent Mongolia. An 
early observer of the emergence i n t o world p o l i t i c s of a t h i r d bloc or Third 
World of nations, he came t o advocate an American foreign policy which would 
recognise the aspirations of those nations f o r development and national 
sovereignty. 
Throughout his l i f e the greatest continuity that can be discerned i s his 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional commitment to the Mongols, the former to t h e i r 
h i s t o r i c a l role, the l a t t e r to t h e i r r i g h t to a separate national and cul t u r a l 
existence. In his lectures at Leeds Lattiraore once observed that i n the 1930s 
he had been "sentimentally [and] romantically aroused by the Inner Mongolian 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement". (1) I t would not be too extreme to claim that t h i s 
statement describes not a f l e e t i n g phase of his i n t e l l e c t u a l development but an 
enduring feature of his world view, I t has been the purpose of t h i s study to 
show how t h i s commitment come about, and how i t effected his approach to 
h i s t o r i c a l and contemporary issues. 
Lattimore's o r i g i n a l i n t e r e s t had been i n long distance trade and trade-
routes. This i n t e r e s t had provided the impetus f o r his f i r s t travels into the 
i n t e r i o r of China, tr a v e l s which stimulated an enduring c u r i o s i t y concerning 
f r o n t i e r regions and peoples. Up to t h i s point Lattimore had been most 
influenced by the extensive l i t e r a t u r e already available on exploring and 
t r a v e l i n the i n t e r i o r of Asia, a l i t e r a t u r e i n which remarks on topography 
and h i s t o r y are often juxtaposed with comments on folkways and the local 
manifestations of "The Great Game" of Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y . To an extent t h i s 
l i t e r a t u r e has always been for Lattimore a model, since he has been concerned 
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most often t o understand any given phenomenon i n i t s widest geographical and 
h i s t o r i c a l context even i f t h i s led to the broadest of speculations. Probably 
the most uniform feature of t h i s otherwise diverse l i t e r a t u r e i s i t s concern 
with the influence of geography and climate on these regions. The desiccation 
hypothesis of Huntington was then i n vogue as an explanation for the 
disappearance of formerly t h r i v i n g c i v i l i s a t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Taklamakan 
basin. In t h i s way Lattimore was introduced to the notion of geographical 
determinism, and t o the ideas of Huntington i n particular. 
In the Chinese f r o n t i e r regions Lattimore was confronted with a series of 
puzzles. Although modern means of transport were f a c i l i t a t i n g the expansion of 
Chinese c i v i l i s a t i o n , and drawing even the most remote areas into economic 
intercourse with the world market, the Chinese i n these regions were 
apparently reluctant to adopt ways of l i f e more suited to t h e i r new habitat. 
They were also contemptuous of those f r o n t i e r peoples unwilling to seek 
incorporation i n t o that c i v i l i s a t i o n . At t h i s point during his travels i n 
Manchuria i n 1930 conclusions formed from personal observation and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l discovery appeared f o r Lattimore to coincide. Although i n a 
f r o n t i e r region the Chinese i n Manchuria did not behave l i k e the pioneering 
f r o n t i e r populations of Western l i t e r a t u r e . At the same time they were 
determined t o reduce to subservience those of the indigenous inhabitants (the 
most numerous of whom were the Mongols) who showed any wish to remain i n 
these regions, an int e n t i o n often abetted by the conduct of the local 
t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e s . In short both Chinese and f r o n t i e r peoples seemed to evince 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ascribed by Spengler, the f i r s t volume of whose Decline of 
the West accompanied Lattimore on his travels, (2) to "late" or moribund 
c i v i l i s a t i o n s . 
By t h i s time Lattimore had resolved to make the Mongols an object of 
special study, Both Huntington and Spengler as well as his desire to 
understand the mainsprings of Mongol c i v i l i s a t i o n led him to Toynbee, 
Huntington because he i s the source of the desiccation hypothesis Toynbee 
applied i n order t o explain the occasional but spectacular contributions of the 
pastoral nomads to world h i s t o r y , Spengler because Toynbee seemed to be 
engaged i n a s i m i l a r project though from a more empirical standpoint. But 
greater f a m i l i a r i t y with the nomads led Lattimore to reject Toynbee's assertion 
t h a t t h e i r way of l i f e , and consequently t h e i r contribution to world history. 
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simply reflected the l i m i t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s of t h e i r habitat. Pastoral nomadism 
f o r Lattimore i s a stage of c i v i l i s a t i o n which i n part represents an 
h i s t o r i c a l l y late choice or range of choices f o r those practising i t . As for 
the contribution of the nomads to world history, further research led Lattimore 
t o the view that interactions between nomads and sedentary c i v i l i s a t i o n s were 
more continuous and complex than Toynbee had allowed. In the later 1930s 
Lattimore formulated h i s d e f i n i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of nomad-Chinese 
interactions. Rather than, with Toynbee, the nomads playing a limited and 
essentially a - h i s t o r i c a l role, being "pushed" by climatic fluctuations and 
"pulled" by the commodities of the sedentary c i v i l i s a t i o n s , i n the East Asian 
case i t i s the sedentary c i v i l i s a t i o n which i s i t s e l f locked in a cycle of 
production and reproduction of i t s fundamentals which remains unchanged 
despite p o l i t i c a l and dynastic fluctuations. Here the influence of Wittfogel's 
characterisation of the pattern of Chinese hi s t o r y was an undoubted influence, 
though there are also echoes of Spengler and Toynbee i n the apparent i n a b i l i t y 
of Chinese c i v i l i s a t i o n to d i v e r t i t s energies into d i f f e r e n t channels. 
Meanwhile, the contemporary predicament of the Mongols became for 
Lattimore a major preoccupation. For some time he held the hope that the Inner 
Mongolian n a t i o n a l i s t movement would force the Chinese authorities to 
recognise the j u s t claims and redress the grievances of t h e i r f r o n t i e r 
inhabitants. Here the ideology of Sun Yat-sen would seem to hold out such a 
p o s s i b i l i t y , though i n practice the Kuomintang regime i n Nanking (to the extent 
that i t took an inte r e s t i n the problems of the Mongols) proved incapable of 
c o n t r o l l i n g the regional warlords who e f f e c t i v e l y dominated Inner Mongolia. 
However the ultimate i n a b i l i t y of the old secular and ecclesiastical e l i t e s to 
protect the Mongols from national o b l i v i o n eventually brought Lattimore round 
to the view that only a social revolution would preserve them as a d i s t i n c t 
people. 
Having by t h i s time w r i t t e n up i n d e f i n i t i v e form his interpretation of 
the h i s t o r y of nomad-Chinese interactions, Lattimore's appointment in 
Chungking led him to ponder the prospects f o r China. Whereas i n e a r l i e r days 
Lattimore had been something of a c r i t i c of the Kuomintang, he now formed the 
view that i n c o a l i t i o n (since 1936) with the Communist Party Chiang Kai-shek's 
regime could successfully tackle the social and economic crises before which 
previous reformers had been impotent. There i s no doubt that though Spengler 
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and Toynbee were now dist a n t influences i n his thinking, Lattimore was as 
convinced of the need f o r a fundamental renovation i n Chinese society as he 
was regarding the society of the Mongols, In 1941, f o r example, he emphasised 
the domestic problems the remedying of which would be crucial i f the regime i n 
Chungking was t o continue to exist. Foreign assistance might help t h i s regime 
i n the f i g h t against the Japanese f o r a time, but ultimately " i t must get on 
with the revolution or i t w i l l f i n d that that the revolution can get on without 
i t " , (3) In his remarks on the communists i t appears that he viewed them as 
p r i n c i p a l l y n a t i o n a l i s t a r t i c u l a t o r s of peasant interests whose a c t i v i t i e s were 
largely independent of Soviet Russian direction. When, by 1947, he had lost his 
confidence i n Chiang's a b i l i t y to lead a reforming administration Lattimore 
came to regard the communists as most l i k e l y (given t h e i r experiences and 
programme) t o carry out the reforms China so urgently needed. His later 
w r i t i n g s on China suggest that he found t h i s expectation confirmed. 
Lattimore's growing stature as a public commentator and his sporadic 
contacts with government led him to of f e r a series of proposals regarding the 
best course f o r American policy i n the aftermath of the war. Although his 
experience and knowledge of Asia were largely confined t o China, Lattimore was 
confident that he detected across the whole continent the same forces at work: 
a desire f o r national sovereignty and material improvement coupled with a 
conviction that the old economic and p o l i t i c a l order was no longer acceptable. 
I f the United States chose t o ignore or repress those farces, as much present 
i n the communist movements of Asia as elsewhere, American prestige and 
influence would suffer and the appeals of the Soviet Union would be enhanced. 
Soviet-American r i v a l r y i n Asia was acute at the f r o n t i e r s of t h e i r respective 
zones, which f o r the US included South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, In Asia the 
Soviet Union, on Lattimore's view, exerted a powerful force of at t r a c t i o n , A 
successful United States policy i n Asia would need t o match that power of 
a t t r a c t i o n , economically by sharing the bounty of US resources and 
technological accomplishments, p o l i t i c a l l y by backing reforming national 
governments against either old or new reactionaries. In the event not only was 
Lattimore's advice not followed, but he and others were called to account f o r 
the consequences f o r American power i n Asia they had feared and predicted. 
In h i s work from the 1950s onwards two further themes have been 
prominent. In some respects his somewhat speculative w r i t i n g s on the world 
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h i s t o r y of f r o n t i e r s are a generalising of his previous insights. In an 
important sense Lattimore has judged Chinese and Russian, and later American 
society by t h e i r respective treatment of the peoples on t h e i r f r o n t i e r s or 
peripheries, t h i s being a further example of the per s i s t i n g influence of his 
early f r o n t i e r experiences. As he was t o observe i n his retrospective judgement 
i n 1962 of the central ' thesis of h is many w r i t i n g s up to that date, "every 
•society t r i e s to establish f r o n t i e r s that conform to i t s own 
characteristics". (4) The second theme, and the one which has dominated his 
l i f e , has been the h i s t o r y and contemporary c i v i l i s a t i o n of the Mongols, his 
preoccupation with which w i l l be considered i n connection with his views on 
the Soviet Union and world p o l i t i c s . 
In retrospect, the l a t t e r half of the twentieth century, though i t has 
seen a struggle between the two great power blocs i n Asia as elsewhere, has 
not been one i n which the countries of the Third World have played as much of 
a mediating rol e as Lattimore had anticipated. And the s o c i a l i s t regimes of 
Asia, though they have a l l been responsible f o r great i n t e r n a l upheavals i n 
t h e i r societies have not brought f o r t h that marked improvement i n material 
conditions t h a t Lattimore thought would be forthcoming from the new era i n 
that continent. Undoubtedly the greatest testimony t o the f a i l u r e of communist 
s t y l e modernization t o make a rea l difference to mass conditions of l i v i n g has 
been the major s h i f t i n development strategy i n China aft e r 1978. Lattimore 
was correct, however, i n predicting that communism i n Asia would manifest as 
time went on a strongly n a t i o n a l i s t character, The only and supremely i r o n i c a l 
exception has been the Mongolian People's Republic which has followed doggedly 
behind the Soviet elder brother through a l l the vicissitudes of the world 
communist movement. As Lattimore feared American intervention i n Asia has, i n 
some l o c a l i t i e s , helped keep i n power authoritarian regimes. But f a r from being 
the prisoners of old interests and classes these regimes have often carried 
through so c i a l transformations as extensive as those seen i n s o c i a l i s t 
p o l i t i c a l systems; i n the cases of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan they have 
brought about economic changes f o r which the present era w i l l be remembered. 
How are Lattimore's expectations of the s o c i a l i s t bloc t o be explained? 
The 1930s and 1940s of t h i s century are l i t t e r e d with the misplaced hopes of 
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Western i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the mission and promise of the Soviet Union. The most 
common or i g i n s of these hopes were either d i s i l l u s i o n with l i b e r a l and 
parliamentary systems i n t h e i r own countries, or an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the 
Soviet Union with the achievement of socialism as i t i s prescribed i n Marxian 
doctrine. Now i t i s clear that from about 19-36 Lattimore was wont to voice 
u n c r i t i c a l opinions on the Soviet Union. These were usually concerned with 
matters related to his special interests - with Soviet policy i n East Asia or 
the po s i t i o n of the peoples of the Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union -
but he nevertheless f e l t s u f f i c i e n t l y well informed to describe, i n a phrase 
often discussed before the US Senate Committees i n early 1950s, Stalin's show 
t r i a l s as "a triumph f o r democracy".(5) Indeed, Lattimore's interest i n the 
USSR was s u f f i c i e n t l y aroused by his t r i p through the country i n 1936 for him 
to take a short course i n the Russian language i n London i n the winter of that 
year. In 1940 Lattimore characterised Soviet policy i n Mongolia as "in the 
interests of the Mongol people as a whole",(6) and i n his work i n the 1950s on 
the o r i g i n a l pattern of colonisation i n the Russian Far East he went so fa r as 
to accept the then current Soviet position(7) that Tsarist expansion by (in 
his terms) progressive "incorporation" was altogether more benign to the 
peoples concerned despite i t s i m p e r i a l i s t impulse as compared with the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the other colonial powers, In the 1960s he had nothing but praise 
f o r Soviet conduct towards Mongolia, and f o r the in t e r n a l policy of the 
Mongolian People's Republic which was and i s closely modelled on Soviet 
precedents and guided by Soviet instructions. Lattimore's i n t e l l e c t u a l route to 
t h i s u n c r i t i c a l approach towards the Soviet Union was not, however, either of 
those commonly taken by Western i n t e l l e c t u a l s of that era, 
Spengler and Toynbee rather than Marx and Lenin seem to be the origins 
of Lattimore's be l i e f that the present century was one of c o n f l i c t between 
c i v i l i s a t i o n s i n which the peoples of Asia, i f they were not to be overwhelmed 
by external force, would need t o i n i t i a t e and undergo fundamental social 
renovation, Already i n his remarks of 1931 on the struggle of c i v i l i s a t i o n s i n 
Manchuria, Lattimore described Soviet Russia as a "young" culture, and to that 
extent a model f o r the regeneration of Asian peoples. Lattimore's further work 
on f r o n t i e r peoples, and i n p a r t i c u l a r his close personal involvement with the 
predicament of the Mongols reinforced these notions. I t i s evident, thus, that 
hi s subsequent favourable assessment of the Soviet Union derived i n part from 
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Soviet sponsorship of Mongolia which not only kept the Mongols alive as a 
separate people with t h e i r own national i d e n t i t y but apparently admitted them 
to a share of the resources created by Soviet i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . I t also 
derived i n part from the p o l i t i c a l and social progress of Soviet border areas 
which was a marked contrast, i n Lattimore's opinion, with the sorry tale of 
Chinese f r o n t i e r regions. There i s also a geo p o l i t i c a l current i n Lattimore's 
ideas which again goes back to his e a r l i e r i n t e l l e c t u a l preoccupations. I f Asia 
was to be a theatre of struggle between the two major powers, Soviet power 
would in e v i t a b l y be land based whereas American power would need to take on a 
maritime form. For some time Lattimore had believed that the era of maritime 
empire was at an end, He had also formed the opinion that the success of the 
Soviet Union i n Asia could be traced to i t s progressive treatment of i t s Asian 
population. This was to be contrasted with the logic of maritime empires which 
dictated c l i n g i n g onto beachheads and l a t t e r day Treaty Ports i n the interests 
of trade and p r o f i t . Therefore a d i r e c t contest i n Asia between the great 
powers could not be won by the United States. When these r e a l i t i e s were 
ignored by American policy makers Lattimore could regard the United States as 
pursuing an i m p e r i a l i s t strategy as against the progressive stance of the 
Soviet Union, a posi t i o n he openly affirmed by the late 1960s. 
I t may be surmised that Lattimore's renewed enthusiasm from 1960 onwards 
f o r the Mongolian People's Republic and a l l i t s works has at i t s root ( i n 
addition to the continuation of h is e a r l i e r interest) a further cause. Although 
the perjury charges against him were f i n a l l y dismissed i n 1955, Lattimore's 
career i n the United States was then e f f e c t i v e l y at an end. Formerly a man who 
had moved i n the highest academic and p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s , he now found himself 
an outcast, his i n s t i t u t e liquidated and many scholars f e a r f u l of contact with 
him l e s t they su f f e r a s i m i l a r fate. His ordeal had also exacted a considerable 
physical t o l l , as individuals who knew him i n those years w i l l t e s t i f y . When he 
was greeted w i t h such enthusiasm by the delegation of Mongol scholars i n 
Moscow i n 1960, and treated t o an extensive t r i p i n the Mongolian People's 
Republic (a country he had made so many e f f o r t s t o v i s i t i n the past) 
subsequently, his reception must have seemed to him a contrast i n every sense 
with the treatment he had received i n his native country. Once again, 
i n t e l l e c t u a l conviction and personal experience combined to have a powerful 
impact on h is world view. Long convinced that only a fundamental social 
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renovation would save the Mongols as a people, Lattimore was now being given 
the rare honour, bearing i n mind Mongolia's then remoteness and 
i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y , of being able to view at f i r s t hand that social renovation in 
action. From th a t time Lattimore's completely u n c r i t i c a l a t titude towards the 
Mongolian People's Republic (though not necessarily to Mongolian Marxist 
scholarship) flowed from these two i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional springs. Thus, 
despite having pioneered (with Mongolia in mind) the use of the term 
" s a t e l l i t e " t o r e f e r to a p o l i t i c a l and ideological dependant state, Lattimore 
abandoned i t i n 1962 as no longer appropriate to the Mongolian People's 
Republic, I t i s an i r o n i c a l comment on his l i f e ' s work that Lattimore w i l l be 
remembered much longer f o r t h i s contribution to the modern p o l i t i c a l 
vocabulary than f o r his contentions regarding the independent status of 
contemporary Mongolia, 
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